Abbottabad Letters of Osama Bin Laden
Osama Bin Laden's Abbottabad Letter: Bin Ladin's documents do not explicitly point to any institutional Pakistani support for Bin Ladin. Bin Ladin's second main concern was to find alternative places outside Afghanistan and Pakistan to mount "external operations."
In contrast to Bin Ladin's public statements that focused on the injustice of those he believed to be the "enemies" (a`da') of Muslims, namely corrupt "apostate" Muslim rulers and their Western "overseers," the focus of his private letters is Muslims' suffering at the hands of his jihadi "brothers" (ikhwa). He was at pains advising them to abort domestic attacks that cause Muslim civilian casualties and instead focus on the United States, "our desired goal." Bin Ladin's frustration with regional jihadi groups and his seeming inability to exercise control over their actions and public statements is the most compelling story to be told on the basis of the 17 declassified documents. The main points from each of the report's four sections are briefly summarized below.
Documents Found from Osama's Abbottabad Home (Thought to be his speech etc.)
Pakistan
Unlike the explicit and relatively substantive references to the Iranian regime, the documents do not have such references about Pakistan. Although there are notes about "trusted Pakistani brothers," there are no explicit references to any institutional Pakistani support. The one instance Pakistani intelligence is mentioned is not in a supporting role: in the course of giving detailed instructions about the passage his released family from Iran should take, Bin Ladin cautioned `Atiyya to be most careful about their movements lest they be followed. More precisely, he remarked that "if the [Pakistani] intelligence commander in the region is very alert, he would assume that they are heading to my location and he would monitor them until they reach their destination."203 This reference does not suggest that Bin Ladin was on good terms with the Pakistani intelligence community. Another reference worth highlighting in this regard, is that Bin Ladin did not appear to enjoy freedom of movement with his family. In his long list of security measures to be followed by the "brothers" to evade the eyes of the authorities, he wrote to `Atiyya that it is most important not to allow children to leave the house except in emergency situations. For nine years prior to his death, Usama bin Ladin proudly told `Atiyya that he and his family adhered to such strict measures, precluding his children from playing outdoors without the supervision of an adult who could keep their voices down.204 Bin Ladin, it was said, could run but he could not hide. He seems to have done very little running and quite a lot of hiding. Rather than outright protection or assistance from states such as Iran or Pakistan, Bin Ladin's guidance suggests that the group's leaders survived for as long as they did due to their own caution and operational security protocols.205 While the release of new documents may necessitate a reevaluation of al-Qa`ida's relations to Iran and Pakistan, the documents for now make it clear that al-Qa`ida's ties to Iran were the unpleasant byproduct of necessity, fueled by mutual distrust and antagonism. The limited discussion of the Pakistani military does not lend itself to any final determination on ties between bin laden and Pakistani state or actors within it, but bin laden's emphasis on security precautions suggests that fear and suspicion dominated his calculations.
Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden had a contentious and troubled relationship with al Qaeda's affiliates around the world,according to a new study of documents seized during the raid on his compound one year ago. Documents from the bin Laden compound reveal the al Qaeda leader's frustration with what he saw to be the incompetence of the affiliates, according to the report by the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.
Here are some excerpts from the report. The full report is posted here, and here are the actual (translated) letters.
The Scope of the Report
It was reported that "thousands of items" were captured from Usama bin Ladin's compound during the Abbottabad raid. To date, however, only 17 documents have been declassified and provided to the CTC, all of which are hereby released with the publication of this report. They consist of electronic letters or draft letters, totaling 175 pages in the original Arabic and 197 pages in the English translation. They were written over several years. The earliest is dated September 2006 and the latest April 2011, a week before Bin Ladin's death.
Management Trouble
Rather than a source of strength, Bin Ladin was burdened by what he viewed as the incompetence of the "affiliates," including their lack of political acumen to win public support, their media campaigns and their poorly planned operations which resulted in the unnecessary deaths of thousands of Muslims.
The documents show that some of the affiliates sought Bin Ladin's blessing on symbolic matters, such as declaring an Islamic state, and wanted a formal union to acquire the al- Qa`ida brand. On the operational front, however, the affiliates either did not consult with Bin Ladin or were not prepared to follow his directives. Therefore, the framing of an "AQC" [Al Qaeda Central] as an organization in control of regional "affiliates" reflects a conceptual construction by outsiders rather than the messy reality of insiders.
If the criticisms of AQI [Al Qaeda in Iraq] in the documents are not particularly surprising, the concerns Bin Ladin expressed about AQAP [Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula] will no doubt be revealing to many. It is widely believed that AQAP is a success story from al-Qa`ida's perspective, especially since it is regularly described by senior U.S. government officials as the "most dangerous" of al- Qa`ida's affiliates. Yet the documents show that at least in 2010 Bin Ladin was far from being impressed with the brothers in Yemen." He comes across as critical of both their words and deeds, in particular the group's attacks in Yemen, its lack of acumen to win the Yemeni people's support, and the ill-advised public statements of its leaders. In fact, with the possible exception of AQI, none of the other "affiliates" appear to be more of a source of concern for Bin Ladin than AQAP.
Not Friendly With Iran
Relations between al-Qa`ida and Iran appear to have been highly antagonistic, and the documents provide evidence for the first time of al-Qa`ida's covert campaign against Iran. This battle appears to have been an attempt to influence the indirect and unpleasant negotiations over the release of jihadis and their families, including members of Bin Ladin's family, detained by Iran.
Pakistan
Unlike the explicit and relatively substantive references to the Iranian regime, the documents do not have such references about Pakistan. Although there are notes about "trusted Pakistani brothers," there are no explicit references to any institutional Pakistani support. The one instance Pakistani intelligence is mentioned is not in a supporting role: in the course of giving detailed instructions about the passage his released family from Iran should take, Bin Ladin cautioned `Atiyya to be most careful about their movements lest they be followed. More precisely, he remarked that "if the [Pakistani] intelligence commander in the region is very alert, he would assume that they are heading to my location and he would monitor them until they reach their destination." This reference does not suggest that Bin Ladin was on good terms with the Pakistani intelligence community.
On Their Own
Rather than outright protection or assistance from states such as Iran or Pakistan, Bin Ladin's guidance suggests that the group's leaders survived for as long as they did due to their own caution and operational security protocols. While the release of new documents may necessitate a reevaluation of al-Qa`ida's relations to Iran and Pakistan, the documents for now make it clear that al-Qa`ida's ties to Iran were the unpleasant byproduct of necessity, fueled by mutual distrust and antagonism.
Arab Spring and the Final Letter
Bin Ladin's last private letter is dated 25 April 2011. By then, events in the world, as he was observing them on his television screen, were unfolding at a pace that caused him to reassess his worldview. He saw the revolutions sweeping the Arab world to represent a "formidable event" (hadath ha'il), a turning point in the modern history of the umma. At the time he was writing, the presidents of Tunisia and Egypt, Zein al-`Abidin bin `Ali and Husni Mubarak, had fallen. Bin Ladin was convinced that their fall was bound to trigger a domino effect, and "the fall of the remaining tyrants in the region was inevitable." Thus, "if we double our efforts towards guiding, educating and warning Muslim people from those [who might tempt them to settle for] half solutions, by carefully presenting [our] advice, then the next phase will [witness a victory] for Islam, if God so pleases."
Conclusion: No Puppet Master
On the basis of the 17 declassified documents, Bin Ladin was not, as many thought, the puppet master pulling the strings that set in motion jihadi groups around the world. Far from being pleased with the actions of regional jihadi groups claiming affiliation with or acting in the name of al-Qa`ida, Bin Ladin was burdened by what he saw as their incompetence. Their lack of political acumen to win public support along with their indiscriminate attacks resulting in the deaths of many Muslims is a subject that dominates Bin Ladin's private letters composed in recent years.Bin Ladin was not even inspired by Inspire, AQAP's English-language magazine designed to appeal to Muslim Americans to launch random attacks in the United States. He warned of its "dangerous consequences," presumably due to its tasteless content and no doubt to the poor planning of the operations it promotes.In comparison to regional jihadi groups, Bin Ladin comes across as an outmoded jihadi. In contrast to their indiscriminate jihad, he was more interested in carefully planned operations.
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2012/05/03/excerpts-the-bin-laden-letters-from-abbottabadreport/
The correspondence includes letters by then-second-in-command Abu Yahya al-Libi, taking Pakistani offshoot Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan to task over its indiscriminate attacks on Muslims. The Al-Qaeda leadership "threatened to take public measures unless we see from you serious and immediate practical and clear steps towards reforming (your ways) and dissociating yourself from these vile mistakes that violate Islamic Law," al-Libi wrote. And bin Laden warned the leader of Yemeni AQAP, Nasir al-Wuhayshi, against attempting a takeover of Yemen to establish an Islamic state, instead saying he should "refocus his efforts on attacking the United States." Bin Laden also seemed uninterested in recognising Somali-based al-Shabab when the group pledged loyalty to him because he thought its leaders were poor governors of the areas they controlled and were too strict with their administration of Islamic penalties, like cutting off the hands of thieves. The US said the letters reflect al-Qaeda's relationship with Iran – a point of deep interest to the US government – as "not one of alliance, but of indirect and unpleasant negotiations" over some al-Qaeda terrorists and their families who were imprisoned in Iran. Nothing in the papers that were released points directly to alleged al-Qaeda sympathisers in Pakistan's government, although presumably such references would have remained classified. Bin Laden described "trusted Pakistani brothers" but didn't identify any Pakistani government or military officials who might have been aware or complicit in his hiding in Abbottabad. It wasn't immediately clear how many of bin Laden's documents the US was still keeping secret. In a note published with the 175 pages in Arabic that were released Thursday, along with English translations, retired General John Abizaid said they probably represent only a small fraction of materials taken from the compound in the US raid that tracked down and killed bin Laden in May 2011. The US said the documents span September 2006 to April 2011. Bin Laden was proud of the security measures that kept his family safe for many years, the report said. It said bin Laden boasted that his family "adhered to such strict measures, precluding his children from playing outdoors without the supervision of an adult who could keep their voices down." The report said the Special Forces troops in the bin Laden raid were trained to search the home afterward for thumb drives, printed documents and what it described as "pocket litter" that might produce leads to other terrorists. "The end of the raid in Abbottabad was the beginning of a massive analytical effort," it said. It said the personal files showed that, during one of the most significant manhunts in history, bin Laden was out of touch with the day-to-day operations of various terrorist groups inspired by Al-Qaeda. He was "not in sync on the operational level with its so-called affiliates," researchers wrote. "Bin Laden enjoyed little control over either groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda in name or so-called fellow travellers."
I want to remind them of the importance of the people's first impression of who is addressing them, especially when he bears great responsibility. Since we carry the responsibility of a call that we want to deliver to the people, this takes care to find out what suits the people and the path from which you can reach them, deliver the faith to them, and convince them with it. Page 35 Part of this is to eliminate any strange appearance that will make them wonder and to adopt what they are used to, such as appearing in the media in true name, even if just a first name, and also appearing in Arab dress, as it is closer to the people than the dress of the people in these areas. (I also want to remind you that) people like short audio and video speeches and to disseminate what you can on the Internet. These are just opinions and I am open to your opinion. 15- You should send (a message) to the brothers in all the regions saying that a minimum of two brothers should be sent for suicide operations; they should not send a single suicide brother. We have experienced this in many operations where the percentage of success was very low, due to the psychological effects that overcome the brother in such cases. The most recent of which was the operation in which our brothers targeted the British Ambassador in Yemen, and one of our brothers, Allah have mercy on his soul, conducted it. Regardless of the heroism of the brother and his steadfastness, the psychological factors that affect the person in such cases necessitate the presence of a companion that will support and bolster him. Some people will say that some of the Prophet's companions conducted operations alone. This is a very different example: They were not suicide operations, and that is where the big difference lies. 16- I asked Shaykh Sa'id, Allah have mercy on his soul, to task brother Ilyas to prepare two groups – one in Pakistan and the other in the Bagram area of Afghanistan – with the mission of Page 36 anticipating and spotting the visits of Obama or Petraeus to Afghanistan or Pakistan to target the aircraft of either one of them. They are not to target visits by US Vice President Biden,
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Abbottabad Letter of Osama Bin Laden.pdf
اوسامہ بن لادن بچوں اور جھگڑا کرنے والی بیویوں میں گھرے رہتے تھے۔ ان کے بچوں کو کبھی کھبی کمپاؤنڈ میں کرکٹ کھیلنے کی اجازت تھی۔
ان کی سب سے چھوٹی بیوی کا تعلق یمن سے تھا۔ امل الصداح نے بن لادن کی زندگی کے بارے میں پاکستانی تفتیش کاروں کو کافی معلومات دی تھیں۔
امل نے جو معلومات فراہم کی تھیں وہ حال ہی میں میڈیا میں سامنے آئی ہیں۔
انہوں نے پاکستانی تفتیش کاروں کو بتایا کہ ان کی شادی سال دو ہزار میں افغان صوبہ قندھار میں ہوئی تھی۔ امریکہ پر نو گیارہ کے حملوں تک وہ بن لادن کی دیگر بیویوں کے ساتھ وہیں رہیں۔
بن لادن کی موت کی تفتیش کرنے والے سابق فوجی اہلکار بریگیڈئیر ریٹائرڈ شوکت قادر لکھتے ہیں کہ سال دو ہزار دو میں بن لادن اور امل الصداح نے پشاور کے جنوب میں واقع ایک گاؤں میں کچھ وقت گزارا تھا۔
امل نے تفتیش کاروں کو بتایا تھا کہ بن لادن وہاں علاج کے لیے گئے تھے۔ وہاں بن لادن سے ملاقات کرنے خالد شیخ محمد بھی آئے تھے۔
خالد شیخ پر نائن الیون حملے کے ماسٹر مائنڈ ہونے کے الزام میں مقدمہ چلایا جا رہا ہے۔
سال دو ہزار تین اور چار کی شروعات میں بن لادن، امل اور ان کے بچے سوات کے قریبی شہر شانگلا چلے گئے تھے۔
اس کے بعد سنہ 2004 کی گرمیوں میں یہ ہری پور میں رہے اور آخر میں 2005 کے آخر یا 2006 کی شروعات میں ایبٹ آباد آ گئے۔
امل نے تفتیش کاروں کو بتایا کہ سال 2003 اور سال 2008 کے درمیان انہوں نے چار بچوں کو جنم دیا اور سبھی بچے سرکاری ہسپتالوں میں پیدا ہوئے۔
بن لادن کی باقی دو بیویوں کے بارے میں سال 2001 کے بعد زیادہ معلومات نہیں ہے۔ سال 2001 میں یہ لوگ الگ ہوگئے تھے۔
بریگیڈیئر ریٹائرڈ قادر کے مطابق سعودی شہری سھام اور ان کے تین بچے سنہ 2003 میں بن لادن اور امل کے ساتھ ہری پور میں رہنے لگے اور وہ بن لادن کی موت تک ساتھ رہے۔
سھام چوبیس سالہ خالد کی ماں تھیں اور خالد گزشتہ برس امریکی کارروائی میں بن لادن کے ساتھ ہلاک ہوگئے تھے۔
بریگیڈئیر ریٹائرڈ قادر کے مطابق سھام ایک ٹیچر تھیں اور وہ لادن کے بچوں کو تعلیم دینے کی وجہ سے ان کے ساتھ رہیں کیونکہ انہیں معلوم تھا کہ یہ بچے کسی سکول سے تو تعلیم حاصل نہیں کر سکیں گے۔
بن لادن کی سب سے بڑی بیوی خیریہ نائن الیون کے حملوں کے بعد شاید ایران چلی گئی تھیں اور وہاں انہیں سال دو ہزار تین یا سال دو ہزار چار میں حراست میں لے لیا گیا تھا۔
اسامہ کے خاندان کو گزشتہ دنوں سعودی عرب ملک بدر کر دیا گیا ہے
ان کے بیٹے تو نامعلوم مقامات پر چلے گئے لیکن خیریہ وزیرستان میں بن لادن کے معاون عطیہ عبدالرحمن نے پاس چلی گئی۔
اس کے بعد وہ سال 2011 کی شروعات میں بن لادن کے ایبٹ آباد میں واقع مکان میں پہنچی۔
بریگیڈئیر قادر کے مطابق خیریہ، بن لادن کی سب سے چھوٹی بیوی سے بے حد حسد کرتی تھیں۔
وہ لکھتے ہیں' اوسامہ بن لادن اس وقت صرف امل کے ساتھ ہی سوتے تھے۔'
لیکن اس صورت میں وہ اپنی جان مشکل میں ڈال کر واپس بن لادن کے پاس کیوں آئیں؟
بریگیڈئیر ریٹائرڈ قادر کو شک ہے کہ خیریہ امریکیوں کو بن لادن کے ٹھکانے تک لائیں۔
ایسا معلوم ہوتا ہے کہ امریکی تفتیش کار ان سے کوئی بھی اہم معلومات حاصل کرنے میں کامیاب نہیں ہوئے۔
ایبٹ آباد میں اسامہ بن دلان کی رہائش گاہ کو منہدم کر دیا گیا ہے
مئی دو ہزار دس میں بی بی سی کو معلوم ہوا تھا کہ بن لادن وزیرستان گئے تھے۔ یہ وہی وقت تھا جب وزیرستان پر امریکی ڈرون حملے ہو رہے تھے اور پاکستان شدت پسندوں کے خلاف کئی آپریشن سرانجام دے رہا تھا۔
بن لادن وزیرستان میں اپنے کمانڈروں سے ملنے گئے تھے تاکہ وہ حالات کا خود جائزہ لے سکیں۔ اس کے بعد انہوں نے اپنے دورے کے بارے میں عطیہ عبدالرحمن کو طویل خط لکھا تھا۔
اکتوبر سال دو ہزار دس میں لکھا گیا کہ یہ خط امریکہ کی جانب سے جاری کیے گئے دستاویزات کا حصہ ہے۔
Tehrek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
القاعدہ کے بانی رہنماء اسامہ بن لادن نے اپنے آخری ایام میں ایک خط تحریر کیا تھا جس میں انھوں نے تحریک طالبان پاکستان کی حکمت عملی اور طریقہ کار کو تنقید کا نشانہ بنایا تھا۔
امریکی حکومت نے ایبٹ آباد میں اسامہ بن لادن کی رہائش گاہ سے قبضے میں لیے گئے کمپوٹر مواد کی بنیاد پر مرتب کی گئی دستاویزات کو جاری کر دیا ہے جس سے مختلف مسائل اور اسامہ کی سوچ کا علم ہوتا ہے۔
یہ دستاویزات امریکی فوجی اکیڈمی کے تحقیقی ادارے ' کامبیٹنگ ٹیرر ازم سینٹر' کی ویب سائٹ پر جاری کی گئی ہیں اور ان میں سب سے پرانی دستاویز دو ہزار چھ کی ہے۔
ان سے ظاہر ہوتا ہے کہ اسامہ بن لادن کو القاعدہ کے بہت سینئر کارکنوں کی ہلاکت کی وجہ سے یہ خطرہ تھا کہ تنظیم کا وجود ہی ختم ہوسکتا ہے۔ انہیں اس بات کی بھی فکر تھی کہ جہاد کی وجہ سے مسلمان ان کی تحریک سے بد زن ہو رہے ہیں اور انہوں نے یہ مشورہ دیا تھا کہ اسلامی دنیا میں حملے کرنے کے بجائے امریکہ پر توجہ مرکوز کی جائے۔
دستاویزات سے یہ بھی معلوم ہوتا ہے کہ القاعدہ کی اعلٰی قیادت میں اس بات پر بھی اختلافات تھے کہ ان تنظیموں کے بارے میں کیا حکمت عملی اختیار کی جائے جن پر القاعدہ کا براہ راست کنٹرول نہیں تھا کیونکہ ان تنظیموں میں 'ڈسپلن' کی کمی تھی اور وہ براہ راست ہدایات لینے کے لیے تیار نہیں تھیں۔ اسی سلسلےمیں ایک خط میں اسامہ بن لادن نے عراق اور یمن جیسے ممالک میں اپنے ساتھیوں کی بڑھتی ہوئی غلطیوں پر تشویش ظاہر کی تھی۔
اخبار واشنگٹن پوسٹ کا کہنا ہے کہ دستاویزات میں القاعدہ اور اس کے کارکنوں کے لیے کسی پاکستانی ادارے کی جانب سے حمایت کا کوئی واضح ذکر نہیں ہے۔ بعض دستاویزات سے یہ اشارہ بھی ملتا ہے کہ القاعدہ کے ایران اور پاکستان سے روابط تلخی کا شکار تھے۔
ایک دستاویز میں القاعدہ کا نام بدلنے کی تجویز ہے جبکہ ایک خط میں پاکستان تحریک طالبان کی حکمت عملی پر تنقید کی گئی ہے
اکتوبر دو ہزار دس کے ایک خط میں اسامہ بن لادن نے وزیرستان سے القاعدہ کے کارکنوں کو ہٹانے کی ضرورت کا ذکر کیا ہے۔
امریکی انٹیلی جنس اور انسداد دہشت گردی کے ماہرین نے اعلی قیادت کی سطح پر القاعدہ کے کام کرنے کے طریقہ کار اور حملوں کے لیے ممکنہ اہداف کی تفصیل معلوم کرنے کے لیے مہینوں تک باریکی سے ان دستاویزات کا مطالعہ کیا ہے۔
چند روز قبل برطانوی اخبار گارڈین نے باخبر ذرائع کے حوالے سے اپنی ایک رپورٹ میں یہ دعوٰی کیا تھا کہ دستاویزات میں القاعدہ کی اعلٰی قیادت اور ملا محمد عمر کے درمیان خط و کتابت بھی شامل ہے جس سے ظاہر ہوتا ہے کہ اسامہ بن لادن، ایمن الزواہری اور ملا عمر کے درمیان قریبی رابطہ تھا اور وہ افغانستان میں نیٹو افواج، افغان حکومت اور پاکستان میں ممکنہ اہداف پر مشترکہ حملوں کے بارے میں اکثر صلاح مشورہ کرتے تھے۔
اخبار کےمطابق اسامہ بن لادن القاعدہ کی ساکھ کو پہنچنے والے نقصان سے بھی کافی پریشان تھے اور انہوں نے صومالیہ میں الشہاب گروپ کے سربراہ مختار ابو الزبیر کو یہ پیغام بھی بھیجا تھا کہ وہ کھلے عام القاعدہ سے وابستگی کا اعلان نہ کریں کیونکہ اس سے فائدے کے بجائے الٹا نقصان پہنچ سکتا ہے۔ لیکن آج جاری ہونے والی دستاویزات سے معلوم ہوتا ہے کہ اسامہ بن لادن نے الشہاب کے القاعدہ سے باقاعدہ الحاق سے انکار کردیا تھا۔
اخبار کا دعوی تھا کہ پاکستانی طالبان کو بھی اس بارے میں ہدایات جاری کی گئی تھیں کہ اغوا کے واقعات میں وہ کن باتوں کا خیال رکھیں۔
Revealing insight into the Osama home when he was killed
By Umer Cheema
Sunday, May 06, 2012
Extensive background discussions by The News with officials who directly interrogated or granted access to the investigation of Osama's wives provide a rare insight into the whole saga. It has been found that Khairee, a PhD (although she mentioned different subjects as her specialisation during more than one interrogation) could be the prime custodian of the still guarded secrets of the events culminating in the raid.
Osama's third wife, Shareeja was also a PhD and was responsible for teaching all the children who lived in the compound using reading material electronically, downloaded on a PC3 computer.
Notwithstanding suspicion the rest of the family harboured about her and even Osama's Pakistani facilitators who opposed Khairee's reunion after eight years, she made a comeback with the approval of her husband, the only person who voted for her return.
And when Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti (real name Ibrahim), the famous courier of Osama living with him, went to receive her and escort her to the Abbotabad hideout housing the world's most wanted man, she was strip-searched, and all her belongings checked to ensure she did not have any chip installed for tracking her movements. As she rejoined the family, none of Khairee's five children accompanied her.
Upon arrival there, she was greeted with scepticism by Osama's 24-year son, Khalid who is from his third wife Shareeja Seeham, who would frequently ask her questions regarding the purpose of her arrival.
She ultimately delivered an intriguing answer: "I have one final duty to perform for my husband."
Her arrival coincided with the start of the blood-testing operation by Dr. Shakeel Afridi, launched by the CIA. Even the oft-quoted phone SIM that presumably led to the raid on the house, was also used by her for speaking to the female assistant of Shakeel, though it was in the use of al-Kuwaiti's younger brother. He was known there as Taiq (real name Abrar), according to the research of Brig. (Retd) Shaukat Qadir, given partial access to the ISI interrogation record.
Other than access to the ISI record, Shaukat also travelled extensively connecting dots finally putting them together in the shape of a book electronically published just a couple of days ago: "Operation Geronimo: the betrayal and execution of Osama bin Laden and its aftermath."
Other than Qadir, The News also obtained a document detailing Khairee's interrogation and spoke to the officials privy to her investigation by the Abbottabad Commission and the one conducted by the Joint Investigation Team (JIT).
Khairee who was asked to return to Saudi Arabia after 9/11 was caught by the Iranian authorities along with five children. Osama then decided to keep his two wives with him: Shareeja (from Saudi Arabia) and Amal, the youngest wife (from Yemen). His Syrian wife has not been in touch with him for a long time from whom Osama had 11 children.
How Khairee travelled to meet her husband was met with dodgy answers to the interrogators. In her first investigation, as reported by Shaukat Qadir, she claimed to have crossed back into Afghanistan and landed in the custody of Attiya, al-Qaeda's chief in Afghanistan who strip-searched her and sent her after receiving a go-ahead from Osama to send to Abbottabad.
When examined by the Abbottabad Commission, Khairee claimed crossing the Pak-Iran border, then heading to the Waziristan area from where she was collected by al-Kuwaiti who, rather than Attiya, strip-searched her in Afghanistan. She said her son Saad and his wife are somewhere in Waziristan.
As she was interrogated by Joint Investigation Team (JIT) for carrying out the deportation process, Khairee said she crossed the Pak-Iran border, then was brought to Islamabad with the help of some Pushtuns. She changed her statement yet another time to the same interrogators, saying she went to Waziristan first, then was taken to Lahore and from there to Abbottabad. On the question of children, she told the JIT her son Saad and wife stayed in Iran.
To the first interrogation team, she spoke in fluent English and to the second and third team of investigators, a translator was hired from Islamic International University's Arabic Department head, Dr. Zaitoon Begum, for this purpose. She told the first team her education was a PhD in Child Psychology and to the remaining two teams she claimed the doctorate was in Islamic Education. In terms of years, she would use the Islamic calendar. For example, she was married to Osama in Jamadi-ul-Awal 1405 Hijri and traveled to Pakistan from Iran in 1433 Hijri.
In the first interrogation, it was concluded that she arrived in Abbottabad in February-March 2011. The Abbottabad Commission understood through her examination that she had arrived in January 2011. She is from Saudi Arabia, according to the first two interrogations. To the third team, Khairee said she belonged to Sudan and acquired a PhD in Islamic Education from Khartoum University.
Shaukat Qadir, on the basis of a transcript of the ISI interrogation shared with him, says there was a dispute going on among the wives as Amal, the youngest wife told interrogators that all those living in the compound were perturbed at her arrival and the suspicion grew further when Khairee told Khalid that she had arrived for "one final duty to perform for my husband."
As Khalid shared this line with Osama, according to Shaukat Qadir, he said resigning to fate: "so be it. It would be a favour, wouldn't it; putting me out of my misery? And that is a wife's duty." Osama then also advised his two other wives and children to leave the compound sensing danger but they refused.
However before the Commission, Amal, the Yemeni wife, did not mention Khairee's exchanges with Khalid about the "last duty to be performed" unlike what she had earlier disclosed during investigation by the ISI.
Contrary to this statement of Amal to the ISI, she was not dismissive of whatever Khairee stated before the Abbottabad Commission. Khairee told the Commission that Amal was still not aware about Osama's killing therefore it should not be revealed to her as doing so would hurt her to an irreparable degree. Keeping this in mind, when the Commission asked Amal what she thought about Osama's fate, she said: "I think he is dead," and didn't fully confirm it endorsing what Khairee an already reported. According to the officials' privy to the Commission's examination of the wives, Khairee seemed to have tremendous influence over her fellow wives.
Amal further told the Commission that nobody from the family was allowed to use cell phones as long as they did not arrive in Abbottabad. When they were in Haripur, for instance, al-Kuwaiti or his brother would travel to Risalpur or Peshawar to make calls, instead of doing so from somewhere in Haripur. In Haripur, the Kuwaiti brothers would be known as Javed and Salim contrary to Abbottabad where they identified themselves as Arshad and Tariq.
Upon arrival in Abbottabad, a dish antenna was installed and only al-Jazeera channel was being watched, Amal told the Commission. None from Osama's family would use the phone, however, and it was being done by the courier brothers and their wives who had seven children, she further said.
Intriguingly, Khairee neither went upstairs to the second floor at the time of the raid where Osama was living in Amal's room, nor cared to see his dead body, she said during interrogation. Sumayya and Mariam, daughters of Shareeja, went upstairs and saw their father shot in the forehead. Khalid, their brother, was asked by the father to go downstairs to take care of al-Kuwaiti's families and was shot dead while going down.
In order to reassure that the dead man was Osama, the raiding US soldiers asked Summayya first in Arabic, she refused divulging his identity, merely saying he was a "man of God." When she didn't cooperate upon being asked thrice, the soldier slapped her, moving to Mariam with the same question who confirmed it. Later they rushed downstairs where Khairee and Shareeja huddled in a corner with the children and reconfirmed that the man killed upstairs was Osama.
According to Mariam's statement, the raiding soldiers were speaking fluent Arabic, Pushto and Urdu
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