Enough Evidence Validating The Memo?
BRIEFING FOR ADM. MIKE MULLEN, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF During the past 72 hours since a meeting was held between the president, the prime minister and the chief of army staff, there has seen a significant deterioration in Pakistan's political atmosphere. Increasingly desperate efforts by the various agencies and factions within the government to find a home - ISI and/or Army, or the civilian government - for assigning blame over the UBL raid now dominate the tug of war between military and civilian sectors. Subsequent tit-fortat reactions, including outing of the CIA station chief's name in Islamabad by ISI officials, demonstrates a dangerous devolution of the ground situation in Islamabad where no central control appears to be in place. Civilians cannot withstand much more of the hard pressure being delivered from the Army to succumb to wholesale changes. If civilians are forced from power, Pakistan becomes a sanctuary for UBL's legacy and potentially the platform for far more rapid spread of al Qaeda's brand of fanaticism and terror. A unique window of opportunity exists for the civilians to gain the upper hand over army and intelligence directorates due to their complicity in the UBL matter. Request your direct intervention in conveying a strong, urgent and direct message to Gen Kayani that delivers Washington's demand for him and Gen Pasha to end their brinkmanship aimed at bringing down the civilian apparatus - that this is a 1971 moment in Pakistan's history. Should you be willing to do so, Washington's political/military backing would result in a revamp of the civilian government that, while weak at the top echelon in terms of strategic direction and implementation (even though mandated by domestic political forces), in a wholesale manner replaces the national security adviser and other national security officials with trusted advisers that include ex-military and civilian leaders favorably viewed by Washington, each of whom have long and historical ties to the US military, political and intelligence communities. Names will be provided to you in a face-to-face meeting with the person delivering this message. In the event Washington's direct intervention behind the scenes can be secured through your personal communication with Kayani (he will likely listen only to you at this moment) to stand down the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment, the new national security team is prepared, with full backing of the civilian apparatus, to do the following:
President of Pakistan will order an independent inquiry into the allegations that Pakistan harbored and offered assistance to UBL and other senior Qaeda operatives. The White House can suggest names of independent investigators to populate the panel, along the lines of the bipartisan 9-11 Commission, for example. The inquiry will be accountable and independent, and result in findings of tangible value to the US government and the American people that identify with exacting detail those elements responsible for harboring and aiding UBL inside and close to the inner ring of influence in Pakistan's Government (civilian, intelligence directorates and military).
Army Chief General Ashfaque Pavaiz Kayani, DG ISI Gen Ahmed Shuja Pasha & Mansoor Ijaz Respond
CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM
CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM
Chief of Army Staff (COAS) in his reply to the Supreme Court stated that the memo was a reality and a conspiracy was being hatched against the army and national security.
In the reply General Kayani writes that the Financial Times published Mansoor Ijaz's story about the memo on October 10. COAS Kayani was informed about DG ISI General Pasha's meeting with Mansoor Ijaz on October 24 and Pasha was of the opinion that there was enough evidence to validate the authenticity of the memo.The DG ISI said there was evidence which illustrated that Ijaz was in touch with Hussain Haqqani between May 9-11 and that they exchanged text messages and phone calls. Kayani says on October 28 the spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry and Presidency denied the memo in separate statements. Admiral Mike Mullen through his spokesperson first denied receiving the memo on November 8 but a few days later confirmed its receipt.
The reply goes on to state that on November 13, during a meeting with Prime Minister Gilani, I (Kayani) advised that those points of the memo which were leaked were very sensitive and that a decision had to be made on its being real or not. According to the reply Kayani strongly insisted that the Prime Minister summon Haqqani so he can brief the country's leadership about this matter.
Kayani told the prime minister that time was limited and the sooner we found out the facts the better it would be.
On November 15, Kayani said he was called by the President for a meeting and met him at two in the afternoon.
According to Kayani the prime minister had already informed the president about his recommendations. President Zardari informed Kayani that the decision to summon Haqqani had already been made.
On November 21, US General James Jones confirmed that he had taken the memo to Mullen.
Kayani said that he was part of a meeting which also included the prime minister, president and DG ISI on November 22.
It was during this meeting that Haqqani briefed all of them and Prime Minister Gilani asked for Haqqani's resignation and ordered an investigation.
Towards the end Kayani writes that there was enough evidence validating the memo and there should be full review to evaluate the circumstance and facts behind it.
General Kayani said that the memo tried to decrease the morale of the Pakistan Army but was unsuccessful in doing so.
In the reply General Kayani writes that the Financial Times published Mansoor Ijaz's story about the memo on October 10. COAS Kayani was informed about DG ISI General Pasha's meeting with Mansoor Ijaz on October 24 and Pasha was of the opinion that there was enough evidence to validate the authenticity of the memo.The DG ISI said there was evidence which illustrated that Ijaz was in touch with Hussain Haqqani between May 9-11 and that they exchanged text messages and phone calls. Kayani says on October 28 the spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry and Presidency denied the memo in separate statements. Admiral Mike Mullen through his spokesperson first denied receiving the memo on November 8 but a few days later confirmed its receipt.
The reply goes on to state that on November 13, during a meeting with Prime Minister Gilani, I (Kayani) advised that those points of the memo which were leaked were very sensitive and that a decision had to be made on its being real or not. According to the reply Kayani strongly insisted that the Prime Minister summon Haqqani so he can brief the country's leadership about this matter.
Kayani told the prime minister that time was limited and the sooner we found out the facts the better it would be.
On November 15, Kayani said he was called by the President for a meeting and met him at two in the afternoon.
According to Kayani the prime minister had already informed the president about his recommendations. President Zardari informed Kayani that the decision to summon Haqqani had already been made.
On November 21, US General James Jones confirmed that he had taken the memo to Mullen.
Kayani said that he was part of a meeting which also included the prime minister, president and DG ISI on November 22.
It was during this meeting that Haqqani briefed all of them and Prime Minister Gilani asked for Haqqani's resignation and ordered an investigation.
Towards the end Kayani writes that there was enough evidence validating the memo and there should be full review to evaluate the circumstance and facts behind it.
General Kayani said that the memo tried to decrease the morale of the Pakistan Army but was unsuccessful in doing so.
DG ISI Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha submitted to the Supreme Court:
Respectfully submitted;
1. Respondent No 7 has not received any petition till now. However, in compliance with the orders of the Honourable Court dated 1.12.2011 reply is submitted herein:
2. Media Wing of ISI brought to my notice the piece published in the Financial Times on the 10th of October. It was written by one Mr Mansoor Ejaz. The writer had, in this article, criticised the ISI's role and suggested some actions against the Organization. This was usual anti ISI rhetoric.
3. But I did find the opening paragraph of this piece quite unusual and damaging. It mentioned that a senior Pakistani official had been attempting to pass on a message to senior US leaders indicating imminence of a military takeover in Pakistan. The whole thing looked intriguing. I concluded that one could write such a piece so blatantly unless he had some evidence to support his assertions. I, therefore, tasked my sources to know about Mr Mansoor Ijaz and find out if he would agree to share the information about the purported Memorandum.
4. It was confirmed to me by my sources that Mr Mansoor ijaz was ready to share the information but only with the Director General and also not in Pakistan. He insisted that the meeting shall be without any aides on both sides. Accordingly, a meeting was thus planned and took place in London on 22nd of October 2011.
5. Mr Mansoor Ijaz briefed me that our Ambassador in Washington had gotten in touch with him and remained in communication about the contents and delivery of the Memo to the relevant US authorities. He also showed me the proof of a large number of messages sent through BlackBerry which had been exchanged between our Ambassador in Washington and him regarding the document, which later came to be known as the Memorandum. He explained to me in fair amount of details about the circumstances leading to the drafting of Memo and why it was delivered through him. I told him, that I could not believe him unless I saw his BlackBerry and Computer myself to form an opinion that the messages were really exchanged between the two individuals. Having seen these means of communication used, I was satisfied that he had enough corroborative material to prove his version of the incident. He insisted that he will present the details of the evidence himself before a commission or court of law, if asked to do so.
6. I left London the next evening and reported my findings verbally to the Chief of Army Staff on 24th October 2011.
7. I met the Honourable President of Pakistan on 18th of November 2011 when this matter also came under discussion and I briefed him on what, according to my assessment, the facts were. I also suggested to him the issue pertained to National Security and should not be taken lightly. I suggested to the President that it will be in the fitness of things to ask our Ambassador in Washington to verify or contradict the matter.
8. The Respondent has the honour to lead ISI, an organization that stands in forefront, particularly during the peace time, to safeguard the security of the Country as well as the honour and respect of its people. Men and women under command of the Respondent continue to risk their lives and those of their children to positively contribute to the overall security calculus of the Country. All our efforts are geared towards that end.
9. The Respondent, in his humble personal capacity, maintains that access to unadulterated truth and justice is a right of the people of Pakistan, the real sovereign masters of this Country. To this end, Honourable Court may, if deemed appropriate, graciously consider the following:-
a. May kindly summon Mr Mansoor Ijaz to appear before the Honourable Court as he alone holds the real evidence, as claimed by him. He has already, at a number of occasions, indicated his willingness to do so, through the print and electronic media.
b. May kindly demand forensic examination of the computers and all the cell phones and Black Berry Telephones used since May 2011 till date by the both, Mr Mansoor Ijaz and our Ex Ambassador to the US.
c. May kindly consider retrieval of the Call Record Data related to this incident from the Black Berry as well as other service providers, if any.
10. Under the circumstances, the answering Respondent shall comply with all the directions given by this Honourable Court in the matter and render necessary assistance to its appointed commission whenever so required.
Respectfully submitted;
1. Respondent No 7 has not received any petition till now. However, in compliance with the orders of the Honourable Court dated 1.12.2011 reply is submitted herein:
2. Media Wing of ISI brought to my notice the piece published in the Financial Times on the 10th of October. It was written by one Mr Mansoor Ejaz. The writer had, in this article, criticised the ISI's role and suggested some actions against the Organization. This was usual anti ISI rhetoric.
3. But I did find the opening paragraph of this piece quite unusual and damaging. It mentioned that a senior Pakistani official had been attempting to pass on a message to senior US leaders indicating imminence of a military takeover in Pakistan. The whole thing looked intriguing. I concluded that one could write such a piece so blatantly unless he had some evidence to support his assertions. I, therefore, tasked my sources to know about Mr Mansoor Ijaz and find out if he would agree to share the information about the purported Memorandum.
4. It was confirmed to me by my sources that Mr Mansoor ijaz was ready to share the information but only with the Director General and also not in Pakistan. He insisted that the meeting shall be without any aides on both sides. Accordingly, a meeting was thus planned and took place in London on 22nd of October 2011.
5. Mr Mansoor Ijaz briefed me that our Ambassador in Washington had gotten in touch with him and remained in communication about the contents and delivery of the Memo to the relevant US authorities. He also showed me the proof of a large number of messages sent through BlackBerry which had been exchanged between our Ambassador in Washington and him regarding the document, which later came to be known as the Memorandum. He explained to me in fair amount of details about the circumstances leading to the drafting of Memo and why it was delivered through him. I told him, that I could not believe him unless I saw his BlackBerry and Computer myself to form an opinion that the messages were really exchanged between the two individuals. Having seen these means of communication used, I was satisfied that he had enough corroborative material to prove his version of the incident. He insisted that he will present the details of the evidence himself before a commission or court of law, if asked to do so.
6. I left London the next evening and reported my findings verbally to the Chief of Army Staff on 24th October 2011.
7. I met the Honourable President of Pakistan on 18th of November 2011 when this matter also came under discussion and I briefed him on what, according to my assessment, the facts were. I also suggested to him the issue pertained to National Security and should not be taken lightly. I suggested to the President that it will be in the fitness of things to ask our Ambassador in Washington to verify or contradict the matter.
8. The Respondent has the honour to lead ISI, an organization that stands in forefront, particularly during the peace time, to safeguard the security of the Country as well as the honour and respect of its people. Men and women under command of the Respondent continue to risk their lives and those of their children to positively contribute to the overall security calculus of the Country. All our efforts are geared towards that end.
9. The Respondent, in his humble personal capacity, maintains that access to unadulterated truth and justice is a right of the people of Pakistan, the real sovereign masters of this Country. To this end, Honourable Court may, if deemed appropriate, graciously consider the following:-
a. May kindly summon Mr Mansoor Ijaz to appear before the Honourable Court as he alone holds the real evidence, as claimed by him. He has already, at a number of occasions, indicated his willingness to do so, through the print and electronic media.
b. May kindly demand forensic examination of the computers and all the cell phones and Black Berry Telephones used since May 2011 till date by the both, Mr Mansoor Ijaz and our Ex Ambassador to the US.
c. May kindly consider retrieval of the Call Record Data related to this incident from the Black Berry as well as other service providers, if any.
10. Under the circumstances, the answering Respondent shall comply with all the directions given by this Honourable Court in the matter and render necessary assistance to its appointed commission whenever so required.
BRIEFING FOR ADM. MIKE MULLEN, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF During the past 72 hours since a meeting was held between the president, the prime minister and the chief of army staff, there has seen a significant deterioration in Pakistan's political atmosphere. Increasingly desperate efforts by the various agencies and factions within the government to find a home - ISI and/or Army, or the civilian government - for assigning blame over the UBL raid now dominate the tug of war between military and civilian sectors. Subsequent tit-fortat reactions, including outing of the CIA station chief's name in Islamabad by ISI officials, demonstrates a dangerous devolution of the ground situation in Islamabad where no central control appears to be in place. Civilians cannot withstand much more of the hard pressure being delivered from the Army to succumb to wholesale changes. If civilians are forced from power, Pakistan becomes a sanctuary for UBL's legacy and potentially the platform for far more rapid spread of al Qaeda's brand of fanaticism and terror. A unique window of opportunity exists for the civilians to gain the upper hand over army and intelligence directorates due to their complicity in the UBL matter. Request your direct intervention in conveying a strong, urgent and direct message to Gen Kayani that delivers Washington's demand for him and Gen Pasha to end their brinkmanship aimed at bringing down the civilian apparatus - that this is a 1971 moment in Pakistan's history. Should you be willing to do so, Washington's political/military backing would result in a revamp of the civilian government that, while weak at the top echelon in terms of strategic direction and implementation (even though mandated by domestic political forces), in a wholesale manner replaces the national security adviser and other national security officials with trusted advisers that include ex-military and civilian leaders favorably viewed by Washington, each of whom have long and historical ties to the US military, political and intelligence communities. Names will be provided to you in a face-to-face meeting with the person delivering this message. In the event Washington's direct intervention behind the scenes can be secured through your personal communication with Kayani (he will likely listen only to you at this moment) to stand down the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment, the new national security team is prepared, with full backing of the civilian apparatus, to do the following:
President of Pakistan will order an independent inquiry into the allegations that Pakistan harbored and offered assistance to UBL and other senior Qaeda operatives. The White House can suggest names of independent investigators to populate the panel, along the lines of the bipartisan 9-11 Commission, for example. The inquiry will be accountable and independent, and result in findings of tangible value to the US government and the American people that identify with exacting detail those elements responsible for harboring and aiding UBL inside and close to the inner ring of influence in Pakistan's Government (civilian, intelligence directorates and military).
It is certain that the UBL Commission will result in immediate termination of active service officers in the appropriate government offices and agencies found responsible for complicity in assisting UBL. The new national security team will implement a policy of either handing over those left in the leadership of Al Qaeda or other affiliated terrorist groups who are still on Pakistani soil, including Ayman Al Zawahiri, Mullah Omar and Sirajuddin Haqqani, or giving US military forces a "green light" to conduct the necessary operations to capture or kill them on Pakistani soil. This "carte blanche" guarantee is not without political risks, but should demonstrate the new group's commitment to rooting out bad elements on our soil. This commitment has the backing of the top echelon on the civilian side of our house, and we will insure necessary collateral support. One of the great fears of the military-intelligence establishment is that with your stealth capabilities to enter and exit Pakistani airspace at will, Pakistan's nuclear assets are now legitimate targets. The new national security team is prepared, with full backing of the Pakistani government - initially civilian but eventually all three power centers - to develop an acceptable framework of discipline for the nuclear program. This effort was begun under the previous military regime, with acceptable results. We are prepared to reactivate those ideas and build on them in a way that brings Pakistan's nuclear assets under a more verifiable, transparent regime.
The new national security team will eliminate Section S of the ISI charged with maintaining relations to the Taliban, Haqqani network, etc. This will dramatically improve relations with Afghanistan.
We are prepared to cooperate fully under the new national security team's guidance with the Indian government on bringing all perpetrators of Pakistani origin to account for the 2008 Mumbai attacks, whether outside government or inside any part of the government, including its intelligence agencies. This includes handing over those against whom sufficient evidence exists of guilt to the Indian security services.
Pakistan faces a decision point of unprecedented importance. We, who believe in democratic governance and building a much better structural relationship in the region with India AND Afghanistan, seek US assistance to help us pigeonhole the forces lined up against your interests and ours, including containment of certain elements inside our country that require appropriate re-sets and re-tasking in terms of direction and extent of responsibility after the UBL affair. We submit this memorandum for your consideration collectively as the members of the new national security team who will be inducted by the President of Pakistan with your support in this undertaking.
The new national security team will eliminate Section S of the ISI charged with maintaining relations to the Taliban, Haqqani network, etc. This will dramatically improve relations with Afghanistan.
We are prepared to cooperate fully under the new national security team's guidance with the Indian government on bringing all perpetrators of Pakistani origin to account for the 2008 Mumbai attacks, whether outside government or inside any part of the government, including its intelligence agencies. This includes handing over those against whom sufficient evidence exists of guilt to the Indian security services.
Pakistan faces a decision point of unprecedented importance. We, who believe in democratic governance and building a much better structural relationship in the region with India AND Afghanistan, seek US assistance to help us pigeonhole the forces lined up against your interests and ours, including containment of certain elements inside our country that require appropriate re-sets and re-tasking in terms of direction and extent of responsibility after the UBL affair. We submit this memorandum for your consideration collectively as the members of the new national security team who will be inducted by the President of Pakistan with your support in this undertaking.
NADEEM MALIK
Mansoor Ijaz Submits Response to Supreme Court
سپریم کورٹ میں میمو گیٹ اسکینڈل کے مرکزی کردار منصور اعجاز نے سپریم کورٹ آف پاکستان کو اکیاسی صفحات پر مشتمل تحریری جواب ، مبینہ اہم شواہد کے ساتھ پیش کردیا ہے، اس میں آئی ایس آئی کے سربراہ لیفٹنٹ جنرل احمد شجاع پاشا سے ملاقات کا تفصیلی احوال بھی شامل ہے- منصور اعجاز کے 81 صفحات پر مشتمل تحریری جواب کے مطابق منصور اعجاز کی جنرل پاشاسے22 اکتوبرکولندن کے پارک لین ہوٹل میں ملاقات ہوئی
Memo.pdf
Mansoor Ijaz Submits Response to Supreme Court
سپریم کورٹ میں میمو گیٹ اسکینڈل کے مرکزی کردار منصور اعجاز نے سپریم کورٹ آف پاکستان کو اکیاسی صفحات پر مشتمل تحریری جواب ، مبینہ اہم شواہد کے ساتھ پیش کردیا ہے، اس میں آئی ایس آئی کے سربراہ لیفٹنٹ جنرل احمد شجاع پاشا سے ملاقات کا تفصیلی احوال بھی شامل ہے- منصور اعجاز کے 81 صفحات پر مشتمل تحریری جواب کے مطابق منصور اعجاز کی جنرل پاشاسے22 اکتوبرکولندن کے پارک لین ہوٹل میں ملاقات ہوئی
Memo.pdf
