Wednesday, May 25, 2011

Intense US Monitoring of Pakistan’s Nuclear and Missile Programmes

Intense US Monitoring of Pakistan's Nuclear and Missile Programmes


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abdul qadeer khan

In an April 2008 secret cable, then US Ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson stressed to the Strategic Plans Division chief Khalid Kidwai that talk of the "possible release of AQ Khan has caused alarm and concern" among US officials. The ambassador further emphasised the "USG was firmly opposed to lifting the current restrictions on Khan's activities".



KARACHI: Despite Pakistan's repeated assurances that its history as a nuclear scofflaw was firmly behind it, the US has continued to intensely monitor Pakistan's nuclear and missile programmes, a survey of US diplomatic cables obtained by Dawn indicates.
Dozens of cables — some confidential, others secret — from US embassies around the world are seen inquiring into purchases by Pakistan's nuclear and missile complexes on the international market.
For example, at the start of 2008, the US Deputy Chief of Mission Nancy McEldowney at the US embassy in Ankara details her discussions with Turkish authorities about the US desire to see action taken against a suspicious shipment to Pakistan.
US officials, according to the cable, "urged the GOT (Government of Turkey) to contact the governments of Japan and Panama to request the shipment be diverted to another port and returned to the shipper".
While Turkish authorities "stressed that more lead time was necessary to allow the GOT to take action in such cases", Ms McEldowney "underscored that, given the proliferation concerns related to this shipment and the fact that Pakistan's nuclear program is not under full-scope IAEA safeguards, the GOT should take all necessary action to prevent the shipment from arriving in Pakistan".
The intricate pursuit of suspect Pakistani shipments often involved discussions with Chinese authorities. For example, a secret cable from December 2009 notes that when local authorities were notified of "Beijing-based Nav Technology's efforts to supply controlled gyroscopes to a firm in Pakistan", US officials received a satisfactory response "that as with all proliferation cases China would 'actively cooperate' on this case".
In Taiwan, too, Pakistan's missile programme and related international trade came in for intense American scrutiny. In a secret cable sent out from Taipei in the autumn of 2005, the then director of the American Institute of Taiwan, Douglas H Paal, sent a detailed reported on Pakistan's trade with a local manufacturer, Xtra Industrial Corporation.
Mr Paal writes about how "Pakistani manufacturer 'Mechanical Engineering Workshop (MEW)' possibly purchased 14 sets of 'hydraulic cylinders' from Xtra Industrial Corporation in March 2005, from Taiwan-based Design Engineering Centre (DEC) transferred to Pakistan's National Development Complex (NDC) for research and development of short-mid range missiles." As with other cases Taiwanese authorities were recommended that they place Xtra under an inspection target list even though the manufacturer did not violate Taiwan's strategic high tech commodity export control regulations.
On one occasion, French authorities rebuffed US requests to intercept a "shipment of telemetry equipment from the French firm In' Trad to Pakistan, with the possible end-user being New Technologies Islamabad, which is associated with Pakistan's ballistic missile programme".
In a secret cable from January 2005, a French non-proliferation official, David Bertolotti, is quoted as providing US officials with "comprehensive comments on the shipment and the reasons behind the Government of France's decision not to examine its contents and to allow it to continue onto Pakistan".
While the French officials emphasised that the "GOF wanted to be more helpful regarding the suspect corporation between In'Trad and Pakistani missile entities" they also pointed out that they needed "more precise information regarding the type of equipment being exported as well as clearer indications that the end users were associated with Pakistan's ballistic missile programme".
The fate of Abdul Qadeer Khan is also seen to be exercising the minds of American officials determined to ensure Mr Khan remains in detention.
In an April 2008 secret cable, then US Ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson stressed to the Strategic Plans Division chief Khalid Kidwai that talk of the "possible release of AQ Khan has caused alarm and concern" among US officials. The ambassador further emphasised the "USG was firmly opposed to lifting the current restrictions on Khan's activities".
In a separate meeting with Asif Zardari, then co-chairman of the PPP, Ambassador Patterson reminded him of Pakistan's financial dependence on the United States and therefore the need to pay heed to matters of concern to the US government. "Not coincidentally, Ambassador raised the issue during a briefing on the extensive nature of US aid to Pakistan."



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2009: China informed of Chinese firm's actions to provide Gyroscopes to Pakistan




238584 12/8/2009 7:33 09BEIJING3269 Embassy Beijing SECRET 09STATE124509 "VZCZCXRO0150
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #3269 3420733
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 080733Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7103
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 7016
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC" "S E C R E T BEIJING 003269

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/CM AND ISN/MTR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2034
TAGS: PARM, MTCR, PREL, ETTC, KSCA, CH, PK
SUBJECT: CHINA INFORMED OF CHINESE FIRM'S ACTIONS TO
PROVIDE GYROSCOPES TO PAKISTAN

REF: STATE 124509

Classified By: Political Section Regional Unit Chief Mark Lambert.
Reasons 1.4 (b),(c) and (d).

1. (S) PolOff delivered reftel demarche and nonpaper
notifying China of Beijing-based Nav Technology's efforts to
supply controlled gyroscopes to a firm in Pakistan to MFA
Arms Control and Disarmament Department Chemical and
Biological Division Attache Zhao Kun on December 8. Zhao
responded that, ""as with all proliferation cases"" China would
""actively cooperate"" on this case, ""particularly due to the
momentum built up in the relationship after President Obama's
visit."" Zhao said he would forward the information provided
to the ""relevant ministries"" for investigation and would
share any results ""in the proper time."" As PolOff departed,
Zhao noted ""unofficially"" that the lack of sanctions language
in the nonpaper ""made it easier to investigate this and
similar cases.""
HUNTSMAN


http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/25/2009-china-informed-of-chinese-firm%E2%80%99s-actions-to-provide-gyroscopes-to-pakistan.html



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2008: Turkey: Considering action on Pakistan shipment, concerned about short lead time


137269 1/14/2008 16:13 08ANKARA74 Embassy Ankara SECRET 08STATE3747 "VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAK #0074 0141613
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 141613Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4925
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 4271
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 1011
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 0127
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 0049
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE 0081
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0979
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
" "S E C R E T ANKARA 000074

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

ISN/CPI FOR ZARTMAN; ISN/CPI FOR RUSSELL; EUR/PRA FOR
FRIEDT; EUR/SE FOR MALIK; NSC FOR HAYWARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2033
TAGS: PARM, PREL, EWWT, SN, GM, TU, PK
SUBJECT: TURKEY: CONSIDERING ACTION ON PAKISTAN SHIPMENT,
CONCERNED ABOUT SHORT LEAD TIME

REF: A. STATE 3747

B. STATE 772
C. ANKRA 0016

Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney, Reasons 1.4 B and D

1. (S) We delivered ref a demarche to MFA Deputy Director
General for Nonproliferation and Arms Control Ahmet Gun on
January 14. Drawing on ref a points, we urged the GOT to
contact the governments of Japan and Panama to request the
shipment be diverted to another port and returned to the
shipper. Reiterating points raised in response to ref b
demarche (reported in ref c), Gun said he did not believe the
GOT had sufficient authority to take the requested action,
but said he will report the request to MFA Undersecretary
Apakan. Highlighting his concern that both ref a and b
requests provided very little time for the GOT to undertake
the necessary interagency coordination, Gun stressed that
more lead time was necessary to allow the GOT to take action
in such cases. Gun noted that the investigations related to
the shipment's export license is still ongoing, and the GOT
will take appropriate action against the company responsible
for the shipment if it is determined that the license was not
obtained through legitimate means. We underscored that,
given the proliferation concerns related to this shipment and
the fact that Pakistan's nuclear program is not under
full-scope IAEA safeguards, the GOT should take all necessary
action to prevent the shipment from arriving Pakistan.

2. (S) We further explained that once the 123 Agreement went
to Congress, Turkey's nonproliferation record would come
under additional scrutiny on the Hill. It would be
beneficial for us to be able to show that Turkey had taken
vigorous action in this case, and for this reason we would be
interested in the outcome of Turkey's investigation into the
shipment's export license. Gun acknowledged this and assured
us that Turkey takes its committments to international
nonproliferation agreements seriously.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey

WILSON


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2005: Investigation on shipment to Pakistan
41910 10/4/2005 8:27 05TAIPEI4068 American Institute Taiwan, Taipei SECRET 05AITTAIPEI1780|05STATE113697 "This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

" "S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 004068

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/TC, NP/CBM AND NP/ECC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2015
TAGS: ETTC, PARM, PINR, PREL, PTER, TW, SY, PK
SUBJECT: MTAG: TAIWAN INVESTIGATION RESULTS ON XTRA AND SHE
HONG

REF: A. TAIPEI 1780
B. STATE 113697

Classified By: AIT Director Douglas H. Paal, Reason 1.4 b/d

1. (S) On June 21, 2005, AIT ECONOFF Steve Lang
visited the Board of Foreign Trade (BOFT) seeking
assistance in investigations on two domestic
manufacturers Xtra Industrial Corporation and She
Hong Industrial Co., Ltd. On September 27, 2005,
AIT received response with detailed result of the
following.

2. (S) Begin Letter Text.

From: BOFT
To: AIT Economic Section
Letter date: September 23, 2005
Letter number: Mao Yang Fu Tzi 09401513000

Subject: Report on BOFT's investigations of Xtra
Industrial Corporation and She Hong Industrial Co.
Ltd. who might export machine tools to Syria and
Pakistan respectively.

Explanations:
–1. According to information provided by AIT's
Economic Officer Steve Lang on June 21, 2005.

(1) Pakistani manufacturer ""Mechanical Engineering
Workshop (MEW)"" possibly purchased 14 sets of
""hydraulic cylinders"" from Xtra Industrial Corporation
in March 2005, from Taiwan-based Design Engineering
Center (DEC) transferred to Pakistan's National
Development Complex (NDC) for research and development
of short-mid range missiles.

(2) Syrian manufacturer ""TDC Kaddour and Madani Co.""
purchased four-axis vertical machine tools which were
probably exported in November 2004. Reports indicated
that TDC again purchased 2 machine tools in early 2005 and
these two machines were likely exported in May 2005.

–2. BOFT's investigation results:

(1) Xtra Industrial Corporation exported 14 sets of ""Oil
Seal Kit for Hydraulic Cylinder"" to Pakistani MEW on May
23, 2005. These commodities were not in the Strategic
High-Tech Commodity (SHTC) list, and Pakistan is not in our
export controlled areas. Plus, the subject company MEW
is not on the U.S. Denied Persons List, Unverified List,
Entity List, nor on Japan's End User List. Therefore,
the subject export case did not violate Taiwan's SHTC
export control regulations.

(2) Regarding the possibility that She Hong exported four-
axis machine tools to Syrian company TDC Kaddour and Madani
Co. in November 2004 and May 2005, BOFT's investigation
indicated that although there were eleven records of
machine-tool exports in 2004 from She Hong to Syria, none
of the Syrian importers of these machine tools were TDC.
In addition, these subject machine tools were not SHTC
commodities, and these importers were not on any of the
U.S. and Japan's black list of manufacturers. The
exporting documents and references were forwarded to the
U.S. via AIT Economic Section in April 2005 to verify
suspicious importers (reported ref A). The investigation
also showed that She Hong did not export machine tools to
Syrian TDC Kaddour and Madani Co. in May 2005.

–3. To prevent these subject manufacturers from engagement
in weapons proliferation, BOFT has taken the following
measures:

(1) Officially requested that the Directorate General of
Customs (DGC), Ministry of Finance, prevent Xtra and She
Hong from illegally exporting SHTC by including Xtra and
She Hong in the Customs' high-risk management list, and
strengthen inspections of their exporting commodities and
trading partners.

(2) Informed Xtra and She Hong in writing that in the
future Xtra needs to apply for SHTC export permits prior
to exporting commodities to Pakistani MEW, DEC and NDC; and
She Hong needs to apply for SHTC export permits before
exporting goods to Syrian TDC Kaddour and Madani Co. BOFT
also requested that all related permit issuing agencies
comply with these control measures.

(3) To include Xtra and She Hong in the 2005 SHTC regular
inspection target list, so as to prevent these two
manufacturers from evading the SHTC export control.

End Letter Text.

PAAL
PAAL
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2005: Demarche on French firm's assistance to Pakistan's missile program(s)
25185 1/10/2005 17:42 05PARIS174 Embassy Paris SECRET//NOFORN 05SECSTATE270425 "This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

" "S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000174

SIPDIS

NOFORN

FOR NP/CBM, EUR/PRA, EUR/WE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2025
TAGS: PARM, PREL, ETTC, HK, PK, CM, GM, FR, MTCRE
SUBJECT: MTAG 04 – 04: DEMARCHE ON FRENCH FIRM'S
ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN'S MISSILE PROGRAM (S)

REF: SECSTATE 270425

Classified By: EST Counselor Robert W. Dry for Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

1. (S) On 30 December 2004, EST officer delivered a
demarche to French Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
Point of Contact (POC) David Bertolotti, MFA Deputy Director
of Disarmament and Nuclear Non-proliferation, concerning the
10 December shipment of telemetry equipment from the French
firm In'Trad to Pakistan, with the possible end-user being
New Technologies Islamabad, which is associated with
Pakistan's ballistic missile program. Prior to the EST
officer presenting the demarche, Bertolotti asked if the
issue pertained to a shipment to Pakistan, to which EST
officer replied in the affirmative. Bertolotti then noted
that the issue had been raised in Washington, and that
British government officials had been actively engaging the
French. Following these comments, EST officer then presented
the demarche.

2. (S) In response to the demarche, Bertolotti provided
EST officer with comprehensive comments on the shipment and
the reasons behind the Government of France's (GOF) decision
not to examine its contents and to allow it to continue on to
Pakistan. The reasons provided included logistical
considerations, timing issues, legal concerns, and
insufficiently precise information. Bertolotti said that
while the GOF was fully engaged and concerned about this
transaction, it was operating within the constraints imposed
by French law, and that the onus of responsibility rested on
the British and United States governments to provide more
specific, actionable information regarding the purportedly
illegal cooperation between In'Trad and Pakistan's ballistic
missile program.

3. (S/NF) Bertolotti said that a British Embassy officer
had brought this same matter to his attention on 10 December,
only hours before the shipment was set to depart Charles de
Gaulle/Roissy airport for Pakistan. He added, however, that
British security representatives in Paris had met with French
security counterparts earlier in the day and had requested
French intervention to investigate, and, if appropriate, to
stop the shipment from departing France. French POC told EST
officer that his assumption was that the U.S. Government
(USG) was acting on the basis of information provided by the
British government, and was double-tracking the British
efforts. Bertolotti claimed that the eleventh-hour
notification and the non-specific nature of the information
provided by the British had left the GOF in an untenable
position. He then briefed EST officer on the legal and
logistical hurdles the GOF had to contend with regarding the
shipment, as well as the broader considerations that went
into the French decision to allow the shipment to reach
Pakistan.

4. (S) Bertolotti noted that not all telemetry equipment
was subject to dual-use licensing in France, and that the
equipment may have, in fact, been legal for export. He added
that the 10 December shipment had already cleared customs,
and that, short of a direct threat to the safety of the
flight, GOF customs officials had no legal authority to seize
and then search the shipment. Bertolotti added that the
imprecise nature of the information provided by British
government officials supporting their concerns had made it
all the more difficult for the French to take direct action.
Bertolotti further remarked that, from a logistical
standpoint, the request for seizure of the shipment had
presented obstacles. Primary among these was the fact that
the physical location of the shipment was unknown, and that
it could have been stored in one of twenty customs storage
facilities at the airport. Bertolotti also noted that a
similar shipment of telemetry equipment from In'Trad to the
Pakistani National Development Complex (NDC) had been
investigated and then cleared for delivery to Pakistan by
British Customs officials at a London area airport on 04
April.

5. (S) Regarding plans for future French action and
monitoring of In'Trad, Bertolotti informed EST officer that
French authorities had contacted the director of the
four-employee In'Trad firm, and that he had adamantly denied
that the telemetry equipment shipped had been prohibited for
export, and insisted that the firm was involved only in
completely legitimate transactions. These denials
notwithstanding, the GOF had, as of 11 December, begun to
monitor the activities of this company more closely and was
prepared to check all future exports from it. Bertolotti
added that, starting sometime in early 2005, the GOF was
planning to begin an official, interagency investigation into
the company, but added that this was a formal process and
often took months to complete.
6. (S/NF) Finally, Bertolotti noted that the GOF wanted to
be more helpful regarding the suspect cooperation between
In'Trad and Pakistani missile entities, and to implement the
necessary action against In'Trad if the firm was, in fact,
complicit in shipping prohibited equipment for use in
Pakistan's ballistic missile program. He added, however,
that in order to take focused, legal action against In'Trad,
the GOF needed more precise information regarding the type of
equipment being exported, as well as clearer indications that
the end-users were associated with Pakistan's ballistic
missile program. He then informed EST officer that French
security services had already requested more specific
information from their British security counterparts linking
In'Trad to the NDC, but had not yet received any such
information. Bertolotti then queried EST officer if he knew
whether the USG was basing its suspicions of In'Trad solely
on information provided to it by the British government, or
if it was acting in part on corroborating information
obtained independently of the British. EST officer replied
he was not privy to the sourcing of the information regarding
In'Trad, but would raise the issue with Washington.
Bertolotti then requested that the EST officer pass on the
GOF request for the USG to provide additional, more precise
information that would aid the GOF in its investigation of
In'Trad. EST officer replied that he would raise this
request with Washington. EST officer said that the USG in
any event would appreciate French government investigation
and enhanced watchfulness of In'Trad
Leach
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2008: Zardari says would have given IAEA access to A Q Khan if he could
150415 4/18/2008 14:06 08ISLAMABAD1613 Embassy Islamabad SECRET 08STATE37957 "VZCZCXRO2055
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #1613/01 1091406
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 181406Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6577
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 8476
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 7738
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 3139
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 9583
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 5334
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 4067
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY" "S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 001613

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2018
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, KNNP, PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTANI LEADERS DENY INTENT TO RELEASE A.Q. KHAN

REF: STATE 37957

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)

1. (C) Summary. In separate meetings with Strategic Plans
Division (SPD) Chief Kidwai,Pakistan People's Party Co-Chair
Zardari, and President Musharraf, DCM and Ambassador
expressed our deep concern over GOP statements and press
reports indicating that the restrictions on A.Q. Khan were
about to be lifted. Kidwai said he fully understood
international concerns but noted that, legally, Khan has been
pardoned and is voluntarily complying with house arrest.
Kidwai suggested we discuss the issue with leaders of the new
civilian government. Zardari said flatly that the reports
about GOP interest in releasing Khan were untrue; he had
ordered the Foreign Minister to stop making statements about
Khan. ""If I had my way,"" said Zardari, ""I would give the
IAEA access to Khan.""

2. (C) Kidwai is due next week to brief the National Command
Authority, including the new Prime Minister, on nuclear
issues. This will include SPD's previous tasking to create
another 9,000 megawatts of electricity through civilian
nuclear power. Given Pakistan's growing energy shortages, we
would not be surprised if the new government requests USG
assistance (similar to the proposed agreement with India) in
nuclear energy development. End Summary.

3. (C) DCM and Polcouns met April 15 with Strategic Plans
Division (SPD) Chief LtGen (ret) Kidwai to deliver reftel
points. Kidwai was accompanied by MG Bilal. In a separate
meetings April 16 and 17, Ambassador raised the issue with
Pakistan People's Party (PPP) Co-Chair Asif Zardari and
President Musharraf.

Kidwai: Ask the New Government


4. (C) DCM noted that recent press articles and statements
by some GOP officials about the possible release of A.Q. Khan
has caused alarm and concern. The USG was firmly opposed to
lifting the current restrictions on Khan's activities.
Kidwai's first response was to recommend we discuss the issue
with the new civilian government. For its part, he insisted
that SPD had not made any statements about Khan and had been
concerned to read the recent press comments.

5. (C) Kidwai said he was scheduled in the coming week to
brief Prime Minister Gillani and the other National Command
Authority members (FM Qureshi, Defense Minister Mukhtar, CJCS
Majid, Interior Minister Malik, and President Musharraf) on
nuclear issues. He did not yet know the new government's
thinking on Khan but said he suspected that FM Qureshi's
comments that Khan should be released had been made
off-the-cuff without due consideration. The facts, said
Kidwai, were clear — Khan had admitted his guilt and
received a presidential pardon. Therefore, his legal status
was that he was a free man. The GOP had been providing
security for ""personal and national security"" reasons, but
Khan had accepted this agreement voluntarily and had not
challenged his restrictions to date. If he tried to walk out
today, however, the GOP had no legal grounds to stop him.
That said, Kidwai stressed the government continued to have
concerns about Khan's safety; it would be the GOP's
responsibility if some ""loon"" attacked him.

6. (C) Kidwai said he fully understood international
concerns if Khan were released. But Khan remains a national
hero, noted Kidwai, and there were domestic political
pressures stemming from statements made by the political
parties during the campaign. Khan may now be ""in a mood to
get more human privileges.""

Gas Leak at Khushab: ""Minor""


7. (C) Asked by the DCM about the April 8 gas leak at the
Khushab heavy water plant which killed two workers, Kidwai
said the leak had been ""very, very minor."" The plant had
been shut down for maintenance when a welder created a leak
through which H2S toxic gas escaped. Two workers died, SPD
immediately sealed off and evacuated the area, and notified
the media; after a few hours, it was clear there had been no

ISLAMABAD 00001613 002 OF 002


radiation leak.

8. (C) When the DCM asked if Kidwai expected the
cash-strapped government to cut back on military or nuclear
programs, Kidwai defended his program as ""modest"" given a
comparison with other nuclear programs in the world. Kidwai
commented on Pakistan's growing energy crisis as well. He
noted that he would be briefing the Prime Minister on a
pending tasking for SPD to produce 9,000 megawatts of nuclear
energy in the coming years; he noted that it would take five
to six years to bring a new plant on line.

Zardari: No Release

9. (C) Ambassador followed up on the A.Q. Khan issue April
16 with Pakistan People's Party Co-Chair Asif Zardari.
Zardari said categorically that the reports were untrue and
the GOP had no/no plans to release Khan. ""I told Foreign
Minster Qureshi, who has no decision-making role on this
issue, to stop talking about Khan,"" stated Zardari. Zardari
alleged that false information was being leaked to embarrass
the PPP. ""If I had my way, I would give the IAEA access to
Khan,"" said Zardari. Not coincidentally, Ambassador raised
the issue during a briefing on the extensive nature of U.S.
aid to Pakistan.

10. (C) Comment: Benazir Bhutto's public comments (made in
the U.S. before she returned to Pakistan) that she would
grant the IAEA access to Khan were highly controversial in
Pakistan. Both Musharraf's party and Nawaz Sharif criticized
her extensively during the campaign on this point. Now that
Nawaz is part of the coalition government, Zardari's options
for delivering on Benazir's promise are more limited. The
good news is, however, that Zardari understands the negative
reaction lifting restrictions would have in Washington.

11. (C) Comment continued: Pakistan is facing a severe
cash-crunch, fed largely by rising fuel prices, and extensive
rolling power blackouts around the country. While we are
exploring ways to offer some USG technical energy assistance,
we would not be surprised if the new government requested USG
help (similar to the proposed agreement with India) in
developing civilian nuclear capacity.

Musharraf: No Release

12. (C) Separately, on April 17, President Musharraf
assured Ambassador that there were no plans to release Khan.
""He knows what he did and accepted the consequences,"" said
Musharraf. Musharraf noted that he had taken the opportunity
of briefing Foreign Minister Qureshi during their recent trip
to China on the A.Q. Khan issue. At most, said Musharraf,
Khan may for humanitarian purposes be allowed additional
family visitations. But he will not be released.


PATTERSON


 
 
 
 
 
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