A Cold Start for Hot Wars- Indian Doctrine

The latent conºict between

nuclear-armed rivals India and Pakistan makes continued strategic stability

in South Asia uncertain. A breakdown of deterrence between the two

countries would have serious consequences, including the potential use of nuclear

weapons. Since 1999 there have been two military crises involving India

and Pakistan that escalated to the point where outside actors felt the need to

intervene to prevent the outbreak of war. A low-level, Pakistani-backed insurgency

in Indian-controlled Kashmir adds to the tense relations between the

two nations. Given the nuclear dimension involved, as well as India's increasingly

prominent role in world affairs and Pakistan's domestic instability, strategic

and military developments on the subcontinent are of great concern to

the broader international community.

In response to the perceived inability of the Indian military to react to the

December 2001 attack on the Parliament building in New Delhi by Pakistanibacked

Kashmiri militants and the subsequent military standoff with Pakistan,

known as Operation Parakram (Operation Victory), the Indian Army announced

a new limited war doctrine in April 2004 that would allow it to mobilize

quickly and undertake retaliatory attacks in response to speciªc challenges

posed by Pakistan's "proxy war" in Kashmir. This Cold Start doctrine marked

a break from the fundamentally defensive orientation that the Indian military

has employed since independence in 1947. Requiring combined arms operating

jointly with airpower from the Indian Air Force, Cold Start represents a

signiªcant undertaking for the Indian military. This study explores the Cold

Start concept, including its potential impact on strategic stability in South

Asia, and assesses the Indian military's progress toward implementing the

new doctrine since its unveiling.

Limited war on the subcontinent poses a serious risk of escalation based on

a number of factors that are not necessarily under the control of the policymakers

or military leaders who would initiate the conºict. A history of

misperception, poor intelligence, and India's awkward national security

International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Winter 2007/08), pp. 158–190

© 2008 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

158

A Cold Start for Hot Wars?

A Cold Start for

Hot Wars?

Walter C. Ladwig III

The Indian Army's New Limited

War Doctrine

Walter C. Ladwig III is a doctoral candidate in international relations at Merton College at the University of

Oxford.

The author would like to thank Cara Abercrombie, Stephen Cohen, Andrew Erickson, Šumit

Ganguly, Matthew Jenkinson, Ronald Kinser, Anit Mukherjee, Michael Sulmeyer, and Daniel

Twining for their helpful comments and advice, as well as the organizers of the Summer Workshop

on the Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy.

decisionmaking system suggests that Cold Start could be a risky undertaking

that may increase instability in South Asia. An assessment of recent war games

as well as organizational developments within India's military suggests that,

at present, Cold Start is still in the experimental phase—with signiªcant organizational

and resource barriers to its full implementation. Nevertheless,

India's progress toward developing an operational Cold Start capability

should be monitored. As the Indian Army enhances its ability to achieve a

quick decision against Pakistan, political leaders in New Delhi may be more

inclined to employ force in a future conºict—with potentially catastrophic

results.

This article has four parts. The ªrst section provides an overview of the

Sundarji doctrine of massive conventional retaliation to Pakistani aggression,

which India began to employ in the early 1980s, and explains the pressures for

doctrinal change that emerged as a result of Operation Parakram. The second

section outlines the signiªcant features of the Cold Start doctrine. Section three

discusses the implications of a Cold Start–style limited war doctrine for strategic

stability in South Asia. Section four assesses India's progress toward implementing

Cold Start by focusing on three areas: infrastructure development,

organizational changes within the military, and operational capability as demonstrated

through recent war games. In addition, it offers several conclusions

about the state of India's progress toward operationalizing Cold Start.

The Sundarji Doctrine and Operation Parakram

Since independence, India's military posture had been fundamentally defensive.

1 Former Defense Minister George Fernandes described it as "a nonaggressive,

non-provocative defense policy based on the philosophy of

defensive defense."2 Under the so-called Sundarji doctrine, pursued by India

between 1981 and 2004, seven defensive "holding corps" of the Indian Army

were deployed near the border region with Pakistan.3 The units consisted of

A Cold Start for Hot Wars? 159

1. This is not to imply that the Indian military has been employed only defensively, but rather that

its training and organizational outlook has traditionally favored defensive operations.

2. George Fernandes, "The Dynamics of Limited War," Strategic Affairs, Vol. 7 (October 16, 2000),

http://www.stratmag.com/issueOct-15/page07.htm.

3. Pakistani Air Comdr. Tariq M. Ashraf terms the conventional military strategy pursued by

India between 1981 and 2004 the Sundarji doctrine (after Gen. Krishnaswamy Sundarrajan) in

Ashraf, "Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces," Military Review, Vol. 84, No. 6

(November–December 2004), p. 54. General Sundarrajan's overhaul of the Indian Army's conventional

doctrine in the 1980s is mentioned in Amit Gupta, "Determining India's Force Structure and

Military Doctrine: I Want My MiG," Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 5 (May 1995), pp. 449–450.

infantry divisions for static defense, mobile mechanized divisions that could

respond to enemy penetrations, and a small number of armored units.4 Although

possessing limited offensive power, as their name implies, the holding

corps' primary role during a war was to check an enemy advance.

India's offensive power consisted of three "strike corps," each of which was

built around an armored division with mechanized infantry and extensive artillery

support.5 Unlike the holding corps that were deployed close to the border,

the strike corps were based in central India (I Corps in Mathura, II Corps

in Ambala, and XXI Corps in Bhopal), a signiªcant distance from the international

border. In a war, after the holding corps had halted a Pakistani attack,

the strike corps would counterattack in the Rajasthan sector and penetrate

deep into Pakistani territory to destroy the Pakistan Army's own two strike

corps (known as Army Reserve North and Army Reserve South) through

"deep sledgehammer blows" in a high-intensity battle of attrition.6 The strike

corps would operate under the protection of the Indian Air Force, which

would be expected to ªrst gain air superiority over Pakistan and then provide

close air support to ground operations.

The limitations of this war-ªghting doctrine were exposed in Operation

Parakram.7 On December 13, 2001, ªve gunmen wearing military fatigues attacked

the Indian Parliament building in New Delhi. In the ensuing hourlong

gun battle, twelve people were killed, including all ªve of the gunmen, and

twenty-two were injured.8 Although no group immediately took responsibility

for the attack, suspicion quickly turned to Kashmiri militants because two

months earlier a similar assault had been carried out by the Jaish-e-

Mohammad (Army of Mohammad) on the Kashmir state assembly building in

which thirty-eight people were killed.9 After the Kashmir attack, the Indian

government warned the United States that if it did not use its inºuence with

Islamabad to convince Pervez Musharraf's government to rein in Pakistan's

support for militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiyyaba and Jaish-e-

International Security 32:3 160

4. V.R. Raghavan, "Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia," Nonproliferation Review,

Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall/Winter 2001), p. 8.

5. Ibid.

6. Pravin Sawhney and V.K. Sood, Operation Parakram: TheWar Unªnished (New Delhi: Sage, 2003),

p. 81.

7. For a detailed account of Operation Parakram, see ibid., from which much of this section is

drawn.

8. "Indian Parliament Attack Kills 12," BBC News, December 13, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/

hi/south_asia/1707865.stm.

9. "Militants Attack Kashmir Assembly," BBC News, October, 1, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/

hi/world/south_asia/1574225.stm.

Mohammad, India might be compelled to take action to force Pakistan to stop

allowing militants to cross the Line of Control into Kashmir.10

As credible reports began to link the gunmen who attacked the Parliament

to Pakistani-backed militant groups, India itself attempted to compel Pakistan

to ban the Lashkar-e-Taiyyaba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, extradite twenty

named individuals accused of terrorism in India, and prevent militants from

crossing the Line of Control.11 On December 18, the government mobilized for

war by launching Operation Parakram, the largest activation of Indian forces

since the 1971 Bangladesh war. Although uncertainty still surrounds the actual

objectives of Operation Parakram, at a minimum, India clearly intended to signal

to Pakistan that, nuclear weapons or not, it was willing to go to war to end

Pakistani support for militants in Kashmir.12 Unfortunately for India's efforts,

the decisiveness of its message was undercut by the inability of the Indian

Army to present a timely threat to Pakistan.

From the time the mobilization order was given, the armored columns of the

strike corps took nearly three weeks to make their way to the international

border area. In this intervening period, the Pakistan Army was able to

countermobilize on the border, and more important, Western powers became

increasingly concerned by the extent of India's military mobilization. Although

initially sympathetic to India in the wake of the December 13 attack,

the United States, which was conducting military operations in Afghanistan

from support bases in Pakistan, was troubled by New Delhi's increasing forcefulness.

This concern translated into U.S. involvement in the escalating conºict

as an intermediary, counseling restraint on both sides of the border. The U.S.

ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, urged the Indian government to refrain

from military action until President Musharraf delivered his "about turn"

speech on January 12, 2002, where in a nationwide address he denounced terrorism

in the name of Kashmir and pledged a renewed crackdown on militant

A Cold Start for Hot Wars? 161

10. There is a strong belief among Indian strategists that Pakistan has the ability to control the militant

groups in Kashmir. For supporting evidence, see C. Christine Fair, "Militant Recruitment in

Pakistan: Implications for Al Qaeda and Other Organizations," Studies in Conºict and Terrorism,

Vol. 27, No. 6 (November 2004), pp. 489–504.

11. India also suspended transportation links to Pakistan, reduced the size of its diplomatic mission,

and threatened to abrogate the 1960 Indus River treaty. Gaurav Kampani, "Placing the Indo-

Pakistani Standoff in Perspective," CNS Web Report (Monterey, Calif.: Monterey Institute of International

Studies, April 8, 2002), p. 10, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/pdfs/indopak.pdf.

12. As Pravin Sawhney and V.K. Sood note, "Operation Parakram was ordered without giving

any political direction to the armed forces about the target to be achieved." How the mobilized

army was to achieve India's demands was similarly unspeciªed. Sawhney and Sood, Operation

Parakram, p. 73.

groups in Pakistan.13 As a result of Musharraf's declaration, by the time the

strike corps reached the border region, India's political justiªcation for military

action had been signiªcantly reduced. Although tensions remained high over

the coming months, and war still appeared likely in the early summer of 2002,

Operation Parakram quickly lost momentum. The result was a ten-month

standoff that ended with India's quiet withdrawal rather than a military clash.

Musharraf's public statements aside, India had failed to achieve an end to

Pakistani support for terrorism within India. This failure was made clear in the

years following Operation Parakram as the death toll from terrorist attacks in

Kashmir continued to rise.14

The Indian Army's postmortem analyses of Operation Parakram sought to

understand why India had been unable to achieve signiªcant political aims

through its military deployment.15 Part of the blame fell to the Indian political

leadership, which failed to deªne any strategic objectives for the mobilization,

making it impossible to deªne victory or defeat for the operation.16 Defense

analysts, however, pointed to the long delay between the mobilization order

and the actual deployment of the strike corps as a key window that allowed

Pakistan to appeal to its allies, particularly the United States, to intervene before

India could bring military force to bear. It has also been argued that the

delay created enough of a gap between mobilization and commencement of

military operations for India's political leadership to lose its nerve. Such weakened

resolve could have subsequently been responsible for India's decision to

back down in the face of international pressure.17

Regardless of the cause of Operation Parakram's failure, strategic thinkers

within India's defense establishment came to acknowledge serious ºaws with

the Sundarji doctrine. A war-ªghting strategy that called for massive armored

thrusts to dismember Pakistan, they argued, was too crude and inºexible a

tool to respond to terrorist attacks and other indirect challenges.18 Further-

International Security 32:3 162

13. "Musharraf Speech Highlights," BBC News, January 12, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/

south_asia/1757251.stm.

14. Šumit Ganguly and Michael R. Kraig, "The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the

Limits of Coercive Diplomacy," Security Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2 (April–June 2005), p. 307. For an external

assessment that suggests India gained its political objectives in Operation Parakram, see

Alexander Evans, "India Flexes Its Muscles," Foreign Policy, No. 130 (May–June 2002), pp. 94–96.

15. India's political leaders generally believed that Operation Parakram achieved some positive

results by pressuring Washington and Islamabad to take action against Islamic militant groups

based in Pakistan; this view is not necessarily held by the Indian Army's leadership, however.

16. Sawhney and Sood, Operation Parakram, p. 73.

17. Subhash Kapila, "Indian Army's New 'Cold Start' War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed,"

No. 991 (Noida, India: South Asia Analysis Group, May 4, 2004), http://www.saag.org/papers10/

paper991.html.

18. Y.I. Patel, "Dig Vijay to Divya Astra: A Paradigm Shift in the Indian Army's Doctrine," Bharat

more, mobilizing the entire military was not an appropriate policy to pursue

limited aims. A new approach was needed to meet contemporary security

challenges, including the capability to respond promptly to contingencies requiring

military force.

Three failings were identiªed with the performance of the Sundarji doctrine

in Operation Parakram. First, the enormous size of the strike corps made them

difªcult to deploy and maneuver. By the time the strike corps had reached

their forward concentration areas, President Musharraf had given his "about

turn" speech, and the United States was putting signiªcant pressure on India

to restrain its response. In the eyes of many senior Indian ofªcers, Pakistan had

outplayed them. It had managed to inºict a high-proªle attack on the Indian

capital via its proxies and then exploited the Indian Army's long deployment

time to internationalize the crisis in a manner that allowed Pakistan to escape

retribution.19 Even those in the Indian government who claim that Operation

Parakram was never intended to be anything more than an exercise in coercive

diplomacy had to be disappointed in the long delay between policy decisions

and military action.

A second perceived ºaw with the performance of the strike corps was their

lack of strategic surprise. Pakistan had its intelligence agencies focused on the

three strike corps, so that any action on their part would be quickly noticed—

particularly given their large, lumbering composition. Furthermore, once the

strike corps mobilized, their progress and destination could be easily deduced

by Pakistani forces, which could move to counter any intended attack.

Finally, the holding corps' lack of offensive power was a cause for concern.

These units were forward deployed in the border regions, yet could carry out

only limited offensive tasks. In the eyes of Indian Army strategists, the total

dependence on the strike corps for offensive power hindered India's rapid response

to the December 13 attacks.

Cold Start

To correct the perceived deªciencies in India's conventional war-ªghting doctrine,

the chief of army staff unveiled the new Cold Start concept in April 2004.

A Cold Start for Hot Wars? 163

Rakshak Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 6 (May–July 2004), http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/

ISSUE6-6/patel.html.

19. Pakistan's perceived conventional inferiority has led it to adopt strategies that would encourage

foreign intervention in future conºicts on the subcontinent and would allow it to avoid military

defeat at the hands of India. Islamabad appears to believe that objectives it is unable to gain

on the battleªeld can be achieved in postconºict negotiations with New Delhi.

The goal of this limited war doctrine is to establish the capacity to launch a retaliatory

conventional strike against Pakistan that would inºict signiªcant

harm on the Pakistan Army before the international community could intercede,

and at the same time, pursue narrow enough aims to deny Islamabad a

justiªcation to escalate the clash to the nuclear level.20

Cold Start seeks to leverage India's modest superiority in conventional

forces to respond to Pakistan's continued provocation.21 This doctrine requires

reorganizing the Indian Army's offensive power away from the three large

strike corps into eight smaller division-sized "integrated battle groups" (IBGs)

that combine mechanized infantry, artillery, and armor in a manner reminiscent

of the Soviet Union's operational maneuver groups.22 The eight battle

groups would be prepared to launch multiple strikes into Pakistan along different

axes of advance. It is envisioned that the operations of the IBGs would

be integrated with close air support from the Indian Air Force and naval avia-

International Security 32:3 164

20. For a representative view, see the comments made by a senior Indian ofªcer ahead of the

April–May 2007 Ashwamedh war game, "Army's Wargames to Test Reºexes against Nuke, Bio

Attacks," Times of India, April 6, 2007. This is not to deny that interservice politics played a role in

the advancement of the Cold Start concept. The army is seeking to refocus attention on what it

considers to be real war ªghting as it increasingly ªnds itself drawn into internal security missions

in Kashmir, Assam, and Punjab. It also is attempting to justify an increased share of the defense

budget for its own modernization programs vis-à-vis the navy and air force. The author thanks

Ronald Kinser for raising this point.

21. Christopher Langton, ed., The Military Balance, 2006 (London: Routledge, for the International

Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006), pp. 230–240. There is signiªcant disagreement as to whether

India possesses sufªcient conventional superiority over Pakistan to warrant discussion of a limited

war strategy. See, for example, Khurshid Khan, "Limited War under the Nuclear Umbrella

and Its Implications for South Asia" (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, May 2005), p. 21.

Some analysts point to the conventional wisdom of a 3:1 superiority in offensive strength at the

tactical level as a requirement for successful breakthrough operations and note that India's deployed

forces in the West achieve only parity with their Pakistani counterparts. Arzan Tarapore,

"Holocaust or Hollow Victory: Limited War in Nuclear South Asia," IPCS Research Papers, No. 6

(New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conºict Studies, February 2005), p. 16. Others suggest that a

1.5:1 superiority in forces at the theatre level, which India possesses, would "guarantee" an advantage

in combat power ranging from 5:1 to 6:1 "on 3 or 4 decisive strike axes." Kim R. Holmes,

"Measuring the Conventional Balance in Europe," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring

1988), p. 166. As Stephen Biddle has noted, however, "Even outnumbered invaders can create a

large local advantage on a chosen frontage" by differentially concentrating forces against a small

section of the battle line and deploying fewer troops elsewhere. Biddle, Military Power: Explaining

Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 40. Some

experts have argued that Pakistani forces are qualitatively superior to the Indians, which could

make up for their numerical inferiority. "Pakistan Has Quality Army, India Has Quantity, Say Experts,"

Agence France-Presse, May 22, 2002. Yet other observers believe that when quality and sophistication

of weapons systems are taken into account, India's relative superiority in military

forces is increased. John E. Peters, James Dickens, Derek Eaton, C. Christine Fair, Nina Hachigan,

Theodore W. Karasik, Rollie Lal, Rachel M. Swanger, Gregory F. Treverton, and Charles Wolf Jr.,

War and Escalation in South Asia (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2006), pp. 36–37.

22. Patel, "Dig Vijay to Divya Astra."

tion assets to provide highly mobile ªre support. As one retired Indian general

described, India is seeking to "mass ªrepower rather than forces."23 At the

same time, the holding corps (redesignated "pivot corps"), which would

be bolstered by additional armor and artillery, would concurrently man defensive

positions and undertake limited offensive operations as necessary. All elements

would engage in continuous operations, day and night, until their

military objectives were achieved.24

Rather than seek to deliver a catastrophic blow to Pakistan (i.e., cutting the

country in two), the goal of Indian military operations would be to make shallow

territorial gains, 50–80 kilometers deep, that could be used in postconºict

negotiations to extract concessions from Islamabad. Some commentators have

emphasized the ability to quickly mass ground and air ªrepower to deliver a

punishing blow to the Pakistan Army, perceived to be the source of much of

Pakistan's aggressive foreign policy, while not harming civilian centers.25

Although the operational details of Cold Start remain classiªed, it appears

that the goal would be to have three to ªve IBGs entering Pakistani territory

within seventy-two to ninety-six hours from the time the order to mobilize is

issued.26 As one Indian analyst argues, "[The IBGs] should be launching their

break-in operations and crossing the 'start line' even as the holding (defensive)

divisions are completing their deployment on the forward obstacles. Only

such simultaneity of operations will unhinge the enemy, break his cohesion,

and paralyze him into making mistakes from which he will not be able to

recover."27

A major emphasis of Cold Start is on the speed of both deployment and operations.

By moving forces into unpredicted locations at high speeds and mak-

A Cold Start for Hot Wars? 165

23. Gurmeet Kanwal, "Strike Fast and Hard: Army Doctrine Undergoes Change in the Nuclear

Era," Tribune (Chandigarh), June 23, 2006.

24. Although there are some apparent similarities between the limited incursions envisioned under

Cold Start and the Egyptian strategy in the Yom KippurWar, the approaches are actually quite

different. The Egyptians sought to seize territory quickly and then move to a defensive posture to

force the Israelis to assault ªxed defensive positions. In contrast, Cold Start seeks to employ both

ªrepower and maneuver to disrupt and defeat opposing forces in the ªeld through offensive operations.

Contrast the discussion of Cold Start in this article with Nadav Safran, "Trial by Ordeal:

The Yom KippurWar, October 1973," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Fall 1977), pp. 133–170.

25. Firdaus Ahmed, "The Calculus of 'Cold Start,'" India Together, May 2004, http://www

.indiatogether.org/2004/may/fah-coldstart.htm.

26. The majority of the Pakistan Army is based near the international border region and can mobilize

to its wartime positions within seventy-two hours. S. Paul Kapur, "India and Pakistan's Unstable

Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not Like Cold War Europe," International Security, Vol. 30,

No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 138–139.

27. Gurmeet Kanwal, "Cold Start and Battle Groups for Offensive Operations," ORF Strategic

Trends, Vol. 4, No. 18 (June 2006), http://www.observerindia.com/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/

strategictrend/StrategicTrendDetail.html?cmaid?1504&mmacmaid?1505.

ing decisions faster than their opponents can, the IBGs would seek to defeat

Pakistani forces in the ªeld by disrupting their cohesion. The Indian Army

would also seek to take advantage of surprise at both the strategic and the operational

levels to achieve a decision before outside powers such as the United

States and China could intervene on Pakistan's behalf. Analysts in both India

and Pakistan presume that the international community would intervene

and force an end to hostilities within two to three weeks of a war between the

two countries—although in reality, neither side has the logistical capability to

sustain a longer conºict.28 There also appears to be an unspoken assumption

that rapid operations would prevent India's civilian leadership from halting

military operations in progress, lest it has second thoughts or possesses

insufªcient resolve.29

The perceived advantages of the Cold Start doctrine over its predecessor are

ªvefold. First, forward-deployed division-sized units can be alerted faster and

mobilized more quickly than larger formations.30 If the battle groups and the

pivot corps start closer to the international border, their logistics requirements

are signiªcantly reduced, enhancing their maneuverability and their ability to

surprise. Second, even though division-sized formations can "bite and hold"

territory, they lack the power to deliver a knockout blow. In the minds of Indian

military planners, this denies Pakistan the "regime survival" justiªcation

for employing nuclear weapons in response to India's conventional attack.

Furthermore, under Cold Start, the Indian Army can undertake a range of responses

to a given provocation rather than the all-or-nothing approach of the

Sundarji doctrine. Third, multiple divisions, operating independently, have the

potential to disrupt or incapacitate the Pakistani leadership's decisionmaking

cycle, as happened to the French high command in the face of the German

blitzkrieg of 1940.31 Indian planners believe that when faced with offensive

thrusts in as many as eight different sectors, the Pakistani military would be

International Security 32:3 166

28. This is also in line with historical experience. The 1965 war lasted sixteen days, whereas the

1971 war was thirteen days long. Ashley J. Tellis, Stability in South Asia (Santa Monica, Calif.:

RAND, 1997), p. 13.

29. Subhash Kapila, "Indian Army's New 'Cold Start' War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed—Part

II (Additional Imperatives)," No. 1013 (Noida, India: South Asia Analysis Group, June 1, 2004),

http://www.saag.org/papers11/paper1013.html.

30. In a short-duration conºict, India would be hard-pressed to leverage the numerical superiority

of its conventional forces to achieve a decisive outcome. As a result, increased emphasis is put on

rapid mobilization of forces in an effort to quickly achieve victory.

31. Highly mobile panzer units drove deep into French territory along multiple lines of advance,

bypassing defenses and strong points. The presence of German troops behind French lines disrupted

the French command and control systems. Although the French still possessed numerous

troops in the ªeld, the French high command was paralyzed and unable to respond to the quickly

changing events on the ground—the result of which was France's catastrophic defeat and occupahard-

pressed to determine where to concentrate its forces and which lines of

advance to oppose. Fourth, having eight (rather than three) units capable of offensive

action signiªcantly increases the challenge for Pakistani intelligence's

limited reconnaissance assets to monitor the status of all the IBGs, improving

the chance of achieving surprise. In a limited war, India's overall goals would

be less predictable than in a total war, where the intent would almost certainly

be to destroy Pakistan as a state. As a result, Pakistan's defense against Indian

attacks would be more difªcult because the military objectives would be less

obvious. Finally, if Pakistan were to use nuclear weapons against Indian forces,

divisions would present a signiªcantly smaller target than would corps.32

As the Indian military enhances its ability to implement Cold Start, it is simultaneously

degrading the chance that diplomacy could diffuse a crisis on

the subcontinent. During Operation Parakram, the three-week delay for strike

corps mobilization provided enough time for the United States and other international

actors to mediate the conºict. This is, of course, what Cold Start

is intended to avoid. In a future emergency, the international community

may ªnd integrated battle groups on the road to Lahore before anyone in

Washington, Brussels, or Beijing has the chance to act.33 The next section explores

some of the additional implications of Cold Start for regional stability,

particularly the potential risks of conºict escalation.

Implications of Cold Start for South Asian Stability

In contrast to the Cold War, where the low risk that conventional conºict between

the superpowers would escalate to the nuclear level actually facilitated

low-level conºict in the periphery, scholars who study the South Asian nuclear

balance have argued that if a limited clash between India and Pakistan were to

expand into a full-scale conventional war, escalation to the nuclear level would

likely result.34 Nevertheless, some Indian strategic planners believe that India

could ªght a limited conventional war against Pakistan without allowing the

A Cold Start for Hot Wars? 167

tion. John R. Boyd, Patterns of Conºict, ed. Chuck Spinney and Chet Richards (Atlanta: DNI, September

2006), pp. 69–89.

32. The dispersed operations by highly mobile units envisioned by Cold Start are the kind that

would be required on a nuclear battleªeld.

33. For explicit discussions of the desire to achieve a decision before international interference

brings a conºict to a close, see John H. Gill, "India and Pakistan: A Shift in the Military Calculus?"

in Ashley J. Tellis and MichaelWills, eds., Strategic Asia, 2005–06: Military Modernization in an Era of

Uncertainty (Seattle, Wash.: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005), p. 253; and Peters et al., War

and Escalation in South Asia, p. 30.

34. Kapur, "India and Pakistan's Unstable Peace," pp. 127–130.

conºict to escalate to the nuclear level.35 For example, former Chief of Army

Staff Gen. V.P. Malik has publicly argued that "space exists between proxy

war/low-intensity conºict and a nuclear umbrella within which a limited conventional

war is a distinct possibility."36 Although the concept of limited war

has its antecedents in the nineteenth century, its modern conception came

about during the Cold War, when the U.S.-Soviet nuclear standoff made the

use of total force or the goal of total victory impossible in a clash between the

two superpowers. Robert Osgood has deªned "limited war" as one "fought

for ends far short of the complete subordination of one state's will to another's,

using means that involve far less than the total military resources of the

belligerents and leave the civilian life and the armed forces of the belligerents

largely intact."37

Can India undertake limited conventional operations against Pakistan without

triggering a nuclear response? Although the exact conditions under which

Pakistan would use its nuclear weapons remain ambiguous, it has not ruled

out employing them in response to a conventional attack. The clearest articulation

of Pakistan's "red lines" comes from Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, who, while

head of the Strategic Plans Division, outlined the general conditions under

which nuclear weapons could be used: India attacks Pakistan and conquers a

large part of its territory; India destroys a large part of Pakistan's land or air

forces; India blockades Pakistan in an effort to strangle it economically; or

India pushes Pakistan into a state of political destabilization or creates largescale

internal subversion in the country.38

It is a well-worn military axiom that no plan survives contact with the en-

International Security 32:3 168

35. For representative views, see Suba Chandran, "Limited War with Pakistan: Will It Secure

India's Interests?" ACDIS Occasional Paper (Urbana-Champaign: Program in Arms Control, Disarmament,

and International Security, University of Illinois, August 2004), p. 48; and K.

Subrahmanyam, "Indo-Pak Nuclear Conºict Unlikely," Times of India, January 2, 2002. For a contrary

view by a former Indian director-general of military operations, see Atul Aneja, "Limited

War between India, Pak Can Lead to Nuclear Conºict," Hindu, March 26, 2002.

36. V.P. Malik, "Strategic Stability in South Asia," panel discussion, Center for Contemporary

Conºict, Monterey, California, June 29–July 1, 2004. A Pakistani general ofªcer concurs that limited

war is possible. See Ashraf, "Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces," p. 54.

37. Robert E. Osgood, Limited War Revisited (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1979), p. 3.

38. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martellini, "Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability, and Nuclear

Strategy in Pakistan: A Concise Report of a Visit by Landau Network-Centro-Volta" (Como,

Italy: Landau Network, January 2001), p. 5. For subsequent discussion of Pakistan's nuclear program,

sanctioned by the Pakistani government, that attempted to create more ambiguity about the

conditions under which Pakistan would employ nuclear weapons, see Mahmud Ali Durrani, "Pakistan's

Strategic Thinking and the Role of NuclearWeapons," Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional

Paper, No. 37 (Albuquerque, N.M.: Sandia National Laboratories, July 2004), pp. 1–54.

emy. Cold Start is an example of creative military problem solving in response

to Pakistan's support for terrorism and stated rejection of a no-ªrst-use nuclear

doctrine. By moving away from the Sundarji doctrine, the Indian Army believes

that it is developing the ability to respond to a Pakistani proxy war with

conventional force, while remaining below the nuclear threshold. This development

has signiªcant implications for stability on the subcontinent, however.

Analysts such as Ashley Tellis have argued that the cornerstone of the "ugly

stability" that has persisted between India and Pakistan is a product of the incapacity

of either side to gain its political objectives through conventional

war.39 Pakistan charges that India is deliberately creating a risky environment

in South Asia by engaging in a conventional military buildup that reduces

Pakistan's relative security.40 Furthermore, there is every reason to expect that

Pakistan will make its own innovations in response to Cold Start. As India enhances

its ability to achieve a quick military decision against its neighbor in a

future conºict, Pakistan will come under increasing pressure to rely on its nuclear

arsenal for self-defense. An operational Cold Start capability could lead

Pakistan to lower its nuclear red line, put its nuclear weapons on a higher state

of readiness, develop tactical nuclear weapons, or undertake some equally

destabilizing course of action.41

The fundamental concern about any limited war strategy in South Asia is

that a conºict begun for limited aims escalates into a much bigger conºagration.

Morton Halperin has identiªed two ways that a limited war can escalate

into a larger conºict: deliberately and inadvertently.42 A side that is losing a

limited war could choose to escalate the conºict to avoid defeat. Alternatively,

A Cold Start for Hot Wars? 169

39. Tellis, Stability in South Asia, p. 5.

40. Indian efforts to enhance its conventional superiority are interpreted in Pakistan as evidence

of a desire to "undo" the partition of British India and eliminate Pakistan as an entity. Shaun Gregory

and Maria Sultan, "Towards Strategic Stability in South Asia," Contemporary South Asia, Vol.

14, No. 2 (June 2005), p. 136; and Stephen P. Cohen, "South Asia," in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron

L. Friedberg, eds., Strategic Asia, 2002–03: Asian Aftershocks (Seattle, Wash.: National Bureau of

Asian Research, 2002), p. 279.

41. It has been suggested that Pakistan's nuclear escalation ladder has only "one rung." Shireen

M. Mazari, "Nature of Future Pakistan-India Wars," Strategic Studies (Islamabad), Vol. 22, No. 2

(Summer 2002), pp. 1–8. The Pakistan Army's preferred response to the use of Cold Start is an aggressive

counterattack into Indian territory that bypasses the advancing IBGs. Islamabad is also

likely to activate terrorist cells within India in response to a conventional attack. The author thanks

Stephen Cohen and Daniel Twining, respectively, for clarifying these two points.

42. Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York: John Wiley, 1963), p. 11. For a

valuable discussion of the risks of inadvertent escalation in the context of a limited conºict between

NATO and the Warsaw Pact that references several of the historical episodes discussed below,

see Barry R. Posen, "Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank,"

International Security, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Fall 1982), pp. 28–54.

the course of a conºict could be overtaken by events that could cause it to

move beyond the control or intended scope of the policymakers who initiated

it. As a result, waging limited war can pose a number of challenges to political

leaders attempting to achieve their aims through the use of force. In particular,

a limited war strategy poses four challenges for India: the challenge of setting

political objectives, the challenge of Pakistani misperception, the challenge of

agency, and the challenge of geography.

political objectives: setting clear goals for limited war

The ªrst challenge for policymakers contemplating limited war is to craft a

strategy and related objectives that are achievable by the use of military force

yet sufªciently restrained to ensure that the conºict does not escalate to the nuclear

threshold. Clear policy objectives are of utmost importance in limited

wars because policymakers must overcome both internal and external pressures

to expand the scope of a conºict. Wars have a way of taking on a life of

their own: once lives have been lost, money has been spent, and territory has

changed hands, leaders could face tremendous pressure to expand the scope

or objectives of a conºict. In theory, clearly deªned strategic objectives with a

properly developed correlation between means and ends could be an effective

way to prevent the escalation of a conºict. In practice, the selection of ways

and means to conduct a limited campaign is challenging for a national security

bureaucracy such as India's, which is characterized by a high degree of disconnection

between civil and military authorities.43 The principle of civilian supremacy

is ªrmly entrenched in India. Yet in peacetime, the country's elected

leadership is often disengaged from security matters and provides the military

with only vague planning guidance.44Within India's defense community, civilian

bureaucrats at the Ministry of Defense dominate decisionmaking, while

the uniformed military is largely excluded from the security policymaking

process. The impact of this disconnect between politicians and the military is

apparent when evaluating Operation Parakram, which lacked clear objectives

and terminated with inconclusive results. This raises questions as to the ability

of India's civilian leaders to set the kind of concrete objectives and associated

International Security 32:3 170

43. A number of observers have identiªed signiªcant ºaws in India's defense management system.

See, for example, Vijay Oberoi, "Air Power and Joint Operations: Doctrinal and Organisational

Challenges," USI Journal, Vol. 133, No. 1 (January–March 2003), pp. 3–22; and Ayesha Ray,

"Civil-Military Relations in India: Questions and Concerns," ORF Issue Brief, Vol. 1, No. 6 (September

2004), pp. 4–6.

44. India does not publish a national security strategy, and subsequently, the armed forces have

little on which to base a national military strategy.

military tasks that would be necessary to engage in limited warfare between

two nuclear powers.

At present, it is not necessarily clear where a Cold Start–style limited military

operation would be directed: against jihadi training camps in Kashmir or

their support bases in Punjab and Sindh? In pursuit of militants crossing the

Line of Control? Against vulnerable parts of Pakistan as part of a response to a

terrorist attack within India? There appears to be an assumption behind the

Cold Start doctrine that punishment inºicted by limited conventional strikes

can persuade Pakistan to halt its support for Kashmiri militants.45 Yet whether

this level of punishment can be inºicted without crossing Pakistan's nuclear

threshold remains uncertain.

The available evidence indicates that the Indian Army developed Cold Start

with minimal guidance from the country's political leadership. As Stephen

Cohen notes, politicians dislike the move toward a limited war doctrine because

it gives the military "more of a role in decision-making."46 India's civilian

leaders are unlikely to substantially engage with Cold Start until forced to

by a future crisis. In that situation, integrating these disconnected military

means with political ends to achieve limited aims in a nuclear environment

would not be an easy task.

misperception: confronting the fog of war

The second challenge to deªning a strategy for limited war such as Cold

Start is posed by Pakistan's perception of the military operations. Carl von

Clausewitz cautioned that war is a reciprocal engagement: "In war, the will is

directed at an animate object that reacts."47 The enemy's capabilities, intentions,

and perceptions must be accounted for in any war plan. Politicalmilitary

objectives considered limited in New Delhi are unlikely to be viewed

identically in Islamabad, nor are the incentives to prevent escalation the same

in both capitals. This logic is recognized within certain circles of the Indian

government. As an External Affairs Ministry ofªcial has noted, "The idea that

A Cold Start for Hot Wars? 171

45. The concept of deterrence by punishment is explored in Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense:

Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 9–

16. The author thanks Šumit Ganguly for pointing this out. For a discussion of why punishment is

unlikely to change Pakistani behavior, see Ganguly and Kraig, "The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis,"

pp. 316–317. Another scenario that the Indian Army has not explicitly discussed would be for

IBGs to be sent into Pakistani territory in response to internal disorder in Pakistan, as happened in

1971.

46. Cohen, "South Asia," p. 293.

47. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton

University Press, 1984), p. 149.

Pakistan will cooperate in a conºict and comply with India's wishes to ªght a

limited war is ridiculous. It will be naturally in [Pakistan's] interest to keep

any conºagration as unlimited as possible."48

Indian military planners may not have considered how threatening Cold

Start offensive operations could appear to an opponent. The intent to pursue

limited objectives may not be clearly perceived by the other side. Given the

Pakistan Army's doctrine of "offensive defense," which seeks to respond to an

Indian attack with aggressive counterattacks on Indian territory, Pakistan

could react to Cold Start in a manner that Indian leaders view as "disproportionate"

to the amount of force employed in pursuit of their own limited

goals. This could prompt India to escalate the conºict, thereby heightening

Pakistan's perception that Indian aims are not limited, and potentially leading

to an escalation spiral between the two sides.

It is a common cognitive bias to assume that whereas one's own actions are

sometimes the result of chance or error, an opponent's acts are always deliberate.

George Quester recounts a classic example of how such misperception led

to the escalation of violence during World War II. Both Germany and Great

Britain had signiªcantly overestimated the accuracy of each other's bomber capability.

As a result, accidental bombing of population centers was interpreted

as a deliberate attack, which justiªed attacking enemy cities in response.49

South Asia is not immune to similar dynamics. Indeed, misperception in crisis

escalation has had a signiªcant impact in the region. In 1987 a massive exercise

carried out by the Indian Army in Rajasthan, called "Brasstacks," precipitated

a major mobilization by Pakistan, which believed it was about to be attacked.

The Pakistani mobilization subsequently led Indian forces to assume a higher

stage of alert, perpetuating a diplomatic crisis that was resolved only with U.S.

and Soviet intervention.50

The fog of war can also lead to misperception of an opponent's intentions

and actions. During wartime it can be extremely difªcult to rationalize disconnected

and sometimes contradictory pieces of information to assemble a coherent

understanding of a conºict's progress. Decisionmakers are often forced to

provide direction on the basis of incomplete information. Even with modern

surveillance and communications systems, organizational and cognitive factors

can cause a misinterpretation of ongoing combat operations. As Stephen

International Security 32:3 172

48. Quoted in Ganguly and Kraig, "The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis," p. 311.

49. George H. Quester, Deterrence before Hiroshima: The Airpower Background to the Nuclear Age

(New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1986), pp. 115–122.

50. For a discussion of misperception and escalation in this episode, see Kanti P. Bajpai, P.R. Chari,

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen Cohen, and Šumit Ganguly, Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and

Management of Crisis in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar, 1995).

Biddle has observed, intelligence and information on the battleªeld are frequently

ambiguous, requiring interpretation, which is often shaped by the extant

beliefs and attitudes of the interpreter.51 The historical record does not

offer much comfort in this regard; as in previous crises, the militaries of both

countries have overreacted to a security situation that faulty intelligence led

them to perceive was more threatening than it actually was.52

Cold Start heightens concerns about misperception because the doctrine explicitly

seeks to confuse Pakistani forces and disrupt their decisionmaking cycle.

Although in conventional war, disorienting the enemy's leadership is a

virtue, in a limited war between nuclear powers, transparency and the clear

signaling of intent are required to prevent escalation.

agency: the downside of battleªeld initiative

A third challenge to waging a limited war arises from the principal-agent relationship

between politicians and the military. Civilian political leaders may design

a tightly integrated strategy with clearly deªned objectives, but they must

devolve responsibility to the military to execute their strategy. This is not to

suggest that the Indian military is an unfaithful servant of the state, merely

that the political leadership lacks total control over the implementation of a

given strategy. Confusion, opportunity, and local initiative may prompt military

ofªcers to act in ways that exceed or even run contrary to the broader political

goals established by the state's policymakers.

Military history is replete with examples of this phenomenon. For example,

Richard Betts reports that, during the latter stages of the Vietnam War, Air

Force Gen. John Lavelle ordered twenty unauthorized bombing raids into

North Vietnam, which jeopardized ongoing peace negotiations.53 In World

War I, the disastrous British campaign to capture Baghdad was launched

by the local commander, Lt. Gen. Sir John Nixon, without ªrst consulting

London.54 Similar episodes have occurred more recently in South Asia. Bruce

A Cold Start for Hot Wars? 173

51. Biddle, Military Power, p. 64.

52. See Neil Joeck, "Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South Asia," Adelphi Paper, No. 312 (London:

International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 1997), pp. 15–34.

53. Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University

Press, 1977), pp. 49–50. Lavelle was also accused of ordering his pilots to violate the standing

rules of engagement by ªring on targets in North Vietnam before being ªred upon. Making this

necessary, Lavell argued, was the increasing sophistication of the North Vietnamese radar system.

Recently released archival materials suggest that the secretary of defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

and the White House were all aware of Lavell's "protective reaction" policy long before it became

a national scandal. Bob Cuddy, "Son Hopes Revelations Will Bring Redemption," Telegram-Tribune

(San Luis Obispo), March 2, 2007.

54. The British Army in India had landed troops at Abadan to control the oil ªelds there and subsequently

occupied Basra. Nixon was the architect of the plan to capture as much of Mesopotamia

Riedel has reported that during the 1999 Kargil crisis, the Pakistani political

leadership was unaware that the Pakistan Army had begun to activate contingency

plans for a nuclear strike.55 On the Indian side, during Operation

Parakram, an aggressive corps commander ordered armor elements of the

II Corps to advance into assault positions near the international border without

prior approval.56 The principal-agent dynamic that exists between the

policymakers and the military illustrates how unintentional escalation could

occur even in a restrained limited war setting—particularly if these "overaggressive"

actions are subject to misperception by the enemy.

geography: limited war in close quarters

The particular geography of South Asia poses the ªnal challenge to implementation

of a limited war doctrine.57 That any conºict between India and Pakistan

will occur on the home territory of one of the principal actors makes the situation

qualitatively different from the proxy conºicts of the Cold War, which occurred

primarily in relatively unimportant third countries.

The geography of South Asia shapes both countries' views on limited war.

India is four times larger and seven times more populated than Pakistan. India

possesses great territorial depth, which Pakistan lacks. Forming a long, slender

rectangle, Pakistan is 1,000 miles long, but averages only 300 miles wide. With

its length running parallel to India's northwest border, Pakistan is extremely

vulnerable to ºanking movements or a central assault that would spilt the

country in two.58 Furthermore, a number of important Pakistani cities as well

as transport networks and lines of communication lie close to the international

border, compounding Pakistan's lack of defensive depth. For example, in the

1965 war, Indian forces threatened Lahore within twenty-four hours of the

start of the conºict.59 Given Pakistan's lack of strategic depth, even small incursions

employing the Cold Start doctrine's bite-and-hold strategy could

pressure Pakistan to escalate the conºict. The effects of the security dilemma

International Security 32:3 174

as possible. Briton Cooper Busch, Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914–1921 (Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1971).

55. Bruce Riedel, "American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House," Policy Paper

Series (Philadelphia: Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania, May

2002).

56. S. Kalyanaraman, "Operation Parakram: An Indian Exercise in Coercive Diplomacy," Strategic

Analysis, Vol. 26, No. 4 (October–December 2002), p. 485.

57. For an argument in favor of including geographic considerations in assessments of strategic

stability, see Bernard Loo, "Geography and Strategic Stability," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 26,

No. 1 (March 2003), pp. 156–174.

58. John Arquilla, "Nuclear Weapons in South Asia: More May Be Manageable," Comparative

Strategy, Vol. 16, No. 1 (January–March 1997), p. 16.

59. Desmond E. Hayde, The Battle of Dograi and Batapore (New Delhi: Natraj, 2005).

and the relative incentives to overreact to an opponent's actions are easily

magniªed in this relatively compact geographic space.60

Regardless of the training and discipline of the Indian Army, the four factors

cited above (goal setting, misperception, agency, and geography) combine to

make the notion of a limited war in South Asia a risky proposition. The claims

of Indian strategists to know precisely where Pakistan's red lines are or how

Islamabad would react in a future crisis are suspect, as history suggests that

neither side understands the other as well as it thinks.61 The danger of escalation

is further compounded by the relatively immature state of the command

and control and early warning systems of both India's and Pakistan's nuclear

arsenals.62 India's increasing military capabilities would reduce the relative

costs of conºict with Pakistan and give its political leaders new options in future

crises. This may increase the willingness of Indian leaders to use military

force in future confrontations with its neighbor, which could have disastrous

consequences for the region if the conºict could not be kept limited.63 The following

section provides an examination and assessment of the Indian Army's

progress in developing its Cold Start capability.

Assessment of Indian Progress toward Cold Start

Monitoring and assessing another nation's efforts to develop new means of

warfare in peacetime can be difªcult. Unlike other branches of government or

private industry, where new products and processes can generate immediate

feedback, military organizations do not spend the majority of their time undertaking

their core task: ªghting the nation's wars. Opportunities to test and

demonstrate new military capabilities in the crucible of war are typically rare.

Nevertheless, it is possible to evaluate a particular military's attempts to conceive

new war-ªghting techniques. Thomas Mahnken has advanced a framework

for studying foreign military innovation.64 Recognizing that "innovation

is a process that unfolds over years or decades," he identiªes three distinct

phases of the process: speculation, experimentation, and implementation.65

A Cold Start for Hot Wars? 175

60. The concept of the security dilemma is derived from John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism

and the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2 (January 1950), pp. 157–180. See also Robert

Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University

Press, 1976), pp. 67–76, 349–355.

61. Gill, "India and Pakistan," p. 266.

62. Khan, "LimitedWar under the Nuclear Umbrella and Its Implications for South Asia," p. 30.

63. Peters et al., War and Escalation in South Asia, p. 35.

64. Thomas G. Mahnken, "Uncovering Foreign Military Innovation," Journal of Strategic Studies,

Vol. 22, No. 4 (December 1999), pp. 26–54.

65. Ibid., pp. 31, 48.

The ªrst phase focuses on conceptual development and identiªcation of

new ways to solve existing military challenges.66 Activity in this phase is

largely conªned to intellectual output such as studies, speeches, writings in

professional journals, and even books that promote new methods of conducting

military operations. Speculative concepts embraced by a military organization

move to the experimentation phase when war games or ªeld exercises are

conducted to explore these new war-ªghting concepts. In some cases, experimental

units may be created to carry out these tests.War-ªghting concepts that

have been successful at the experimentation phase may move on to implementation.

Here, militaries adopt new war-ªghting practices and make the organizational

changes necessary to implement them. Mahnken identiªes several

visible indicators that suggest new combat methods have been adopted.

Among them are the establishment of new military formations, the dissemination

of new military doctrine, the establishment of new service branches or

career paths to support the new concept, and widespread training in the new

war-ªghting method.67

One can apply Mahnken's framework to judge the Indian Army's progress

toward developing an operational Cold Start capability. Based on the available

evidence, it appears that Cold Start remains within the experimental stage of

development. Although the limited war strategy has moved beyond theoretical

discussions in professional military journals, it has not yet produced the

widespread organizational changes required for full implementation. This

assessment is informed by a study of three areas: the demonstration of the operational

capabilities required to execute the Cold Start doctrine, the implementation

of the requisite organizational changes, and the development of the

resources and infrastructure required to support the envisioned military

operations.

demonstration of operational capabilities

War games and military exercises are simulations designed to train soldiers

and test battleªeld tactics. As simulations, they approximate the reality of battle

ªeld conditions, but do not replicate them. Even the most advanced "free

play" simulation (meaning a two-sided game in which either side can win)

lacks the confusion, emotion, and uncertainty that Clausewitz says distinguishes

"real war from war on paper."68

International Security 32:3 176

66. For a full discussion of all three phases, see ibid., pp. 30–33.

67. Ibid., p. 33.

68. Clausewitz, On War, p. 119.

Nevertheless, the study of a unit's performance in war games and exercises

can provide insight into its military capabilities. Although the ability to execute

military tasks in a simulation or on the proving ground does not indicate

the ability to execute such tasks in actual combat, the inability to do so in

a structured environment virtually guarantees the inability to do so in wartime.

The military requirements to implement the Cold Start doctrine include

the employment of highly mobile units capable of generating substantial

organic ªrepower, sophisticated intelligence resources, and sufªcient command

and control capabilities to coordinate multiple combined-arms battle

groups operating in conjunction with air support. Making these work together

requires both highly trained staff ofªcers as well as junior ªeld commanders

capable of taking initiative and responding to events as they unfold on the

battleªeld.

In assessments of India's ability to implement its Cold Start doctrine, military

exercises can provide indications of capabilities in three areas. The ªrst is

a demonstrated capability to execute tasks directly related to Cold Start, such

as offensive action by pivot corps, short mobilization offensives, and independent

operations by multiple units. The second relevant capability is the

conduct of joint-service warfare. In terms of Cold Start, this is primarily the

ability of the Indian Army and Indian Air Force to integrate and synchronize

their operations, though the air component of the Indian Navy is, to a lesser

extent, also relevant in this area. Cold Start assumes that signiªcant close air

support will be provided to offensive units by the Indian Air Force, so joint operations

are a key to implementing the doctrine. The third area of interest is evidence

of network-centric warfare capability. Network-centric warfare theory

hypothesizes that the networking of geographically dispersed forces via

advanced communications tools can increase the sharing of information and

enhance situational awareness. This networking ampliªes the speed of decisionmaking

and improves the synchronization among dispersed forces—both

of which enable a networked force to disrupt and confuse its enemy's own

decisionmaking cycle. The successful employment in war games of networked

sensor systems (unmanned aerial vehicles or UAVs, reconnaissance satellites,

and advanced radar) and sophisticated communications suites by combat

units and their headquarters is evidence of potential network-centric warfare

capability.

Since 2004 India has held ªve exercises of varying sizes that tested or demonstrated

capabilities required by Cold Start. The remainder of this section

brieºy describes each exercise followed by a discussion of the insights gleaned

A Cold Start for Hot Wars? 177

regarding the Indian military's ability to employ Cold Start in a simulated

environment.

divya astra. The ªrst war game to demonstrate aspects of the new Cold

Start doctrine was the March 2004 exercise Divya Astra (Divine Weapon). The

purpose of this exercise was to test the ability of the Indian Army's various

combat arms to deliver integrated ªrepower in conjunction with the air force.

Taking place at the Mahajan Firing Range in Rajastan, 70 kilometers from the

international border, this ninety-minute tactical battle scenario featured army

and air force elements undertaking operations to penetrate ªxed enemy

fortiªcations through a mechanized assault supported by artillery and ground

attack aircraft.69

vajra shakti. The second test of the Cold Start concepts was the May 2005

Vajra Shakti (Thunder Power) exercise, which took place on the plains of

Jalandhar in Punjab, roughly 80 kilometers from the international border. This

area was the scene of signiªcant tank battles between India and Pakistan during

their 1965 and 1973 wars. The ten-day exercise involved 25,000 Indian

troops from the Panther Infantry Division and the Flaming Arrow Armored

Brigade of the XI Corps (Vajra Corps), one of the army's pivot corps.70 This exercise

was the ªrst demonstration of the ability of units from the previously

defense-oriented pivot corps to undertake the kind of offensive operations that

would occur at the outbreak of large-scale hostilities.

In the scenario, "Blue Land" (friendly) forces squared off against the adversary

"Red Land" forces across the Sutlej River, which simulated the international

border with Pakistan. The exercise presupposed that relations between

the two nations had degenerated to the point where the Blue forces launched a

preemptive attack followed by a rapid advance into Red territory. Nine days of

simulated attacks and counterattacks by both sides resulted in Blue forces advancing

30 kilometers into enemy territory, setting the stage for a strike corps

to launch a substantial follow-on offensive.71 The Indian Air Force also took

part in Vajra Shakti with the air forces of both Blue and Red undertaking 130

day and night sorties to degrade enemy mechanized forces as well as attack

targets in depth.72

International Security 32:3 178

69. "Indian Army Displays Firepower near Pakistan Border," Doordarshan National Television,

March 2, 2004; and Vijay Mohan, "Army Flexes Its Firepower," Tribune (Chandigarh), March 2,

2004.

70. Rajat Pandit, "Army Set for War Exercise to Test New Doctrine," Times of India, April 29, 2005;

and Vijay Mohan, "Army Tests New War Concepts," Tribune (Chandigarh), May 10, 2005.

71. Mohan, "Army Tests New War Concepts."

72. Ajit K. Dubey, "Gaming for War," Force, June 2005.

desert strike. Six months after Vajra Shakti, the Indian military undertook

a third test of both its new doctrinal concepts and its ability to conduct joint

operations, in a fourteen-day exercise conducted in Rajasthan's Thar Desert

that was code-named "Desert Strike." Employing 25,000 soldiers from the

Bhopal-based XXI Strike Corps as well as ªghter aircraft from the Indian Air

Force's Jaisalmer air station, Desert Strike was the largest exercise conducted

by the Indian military since the 1987 Brasstacks war game, which had brought

India and Pakistan to the brink of war.73

The stated purpose of the exercise was to test the ability of a strike corps to

conduct joint operations with combat squadrons from the Indian Air Force. In

a nod to Cold Start, a principal aim was to examine the Indian military's ability

to defeat an enemy by causing psychological collapse through the use of

preemption, dislocation, and disruption.74 In particular, units were tested on

their ability to conduct fast-paced, operational-level maneuvers in a desert

environment while employing electronic and information warfare assets. In

focusing on these objectives, the Indian military consciously modeled its efforts

on the U.S. success in Operation Desert Storm 1991 and the conventional

portions of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, which it describes as "key examples

of successful military campaigns in which action was initiated by

airpower and sustained by ground operations."75

Units participating in Desert Strike engaged in a number of maneuvers under

battleªeld conditions: army paratroopers practiced dropping behind enemy

lines, and armored units conducted fast-moving assaults along multiple

axes of advance, while the air force carried out surgical strikes in support of

advancing ground forces.76 The capstone element of Desert Strike was a joint

ground/air assault, featuring dismounted infantry supported by armor, on an

enemy strongpoint that was defended by a mineªeld.77

sanghe shakti. May 2006 saw the fourth and largest test of Cold Start doctrine

when the corps-level exercise Sanghe Shakti (Joint Power) took place on

the plains of Punjab, 100 kilometers from the international border. More than

A Cold Start for Hot Wars? 179

73. "Desert Strike to Unleash Network-Centric Warfare," Pioneer (Delhi), November 17, 2005; and

"India Displays Its Military Might," Pakistan Observer, November 20, 2005.

74. "Exercise Desert Strike," Force, Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 2005).

75. "India Holds Major War Games at Pakistan's Uneasy Borders," Agence France-Presse, November

18, 2005.

76. "Army Demonstrates Vision of Fighting a Short and Intense War," Daily Excelsior (Jammu),

November 20, 2005; and "India Showcases Military Might to Foreign Observers," Indo-Asian

News Service, November 18, 2005.

77. Pravin Sawhney, "A Good Beginning," Force, December 2005; and "India Showcases Military

Might to Foreign Observers."

40,000 soldiers from the 1st Armored Division, 14th RAPID Division, and 22nd

Infantry Division of the Ambala-based II Strike Corps participated in weeklong

war games.78 The testing of the II Strike Corps during Sanghe Shakti is

signiªcant because the corps contains 50 percent of the Indian Army's offensive

power and is the formation that would be tasked with conducting an armored

thrust through the Cholistan Desert to cut Pakistan in two in the advent

of a general war on the subcontinent.79

Sanghe Shakti was a sequel to the May 2005 Vajra Shakti exercise. Vajra

Shakti tested the ability of a notionally defensive pivot corps, the XI Corps, to

conduct multiple limited-offensive thrusts across the international border into

enemy territory on short notice. Sanghe Shakti tested the ability of a strike

corps to quickly mobilize and then exploit openings in enemy defenses that

had been created by the pivot corps' surprise attack.80 Dropping the pretense

of using "Red" and "Blue" to refer to the opposing sides in the scenario,

Sanghe Shakti posited that a war had broken out between India and Pakistan

and that II Corps had been tasked with invading and dividing Pakistan in

half.81

The capstone of the exercise consisted of a blitzkrieg-like armored incursion

into "enemy territory." With the exercise's emphasis on rapid penetration,

ºank security for the armored units was provided by attack helicopters, while

enemy strong points were bypassed and cut off by advancing units. Close air

support from the Indian Air Force's MiG-23s, MiG-21s, and Mirage-2000s provided

mobile ªre support that could keep pace with the advancing armored

columns.82

ashwamedh. The ªfth major exercise designed to test the Cold Start doctrine,

Ashwamedh, took place in Rajasthan's Thar Desert in April–May 2007.83

Involving 25,000 soldiers from the I Strike Corps, as well as supporting infantry

ªghting vehicles, main battle tanks, heavy artillery, and helicopter

gunships, Ashwamedh was described by the Times of India as a test of the

country's new "pro-active war strategy."84 The exercise was speciªcally de-

International Security 32:3 180

78. Rajat Pandit, "Massive Army Exercise in Punjab, Rajasthan," Times of India, May 3, 2006.

79. Ibid; and S.M. Hali, "Pakistan Speciªc Wargames," Nation (Islamabad), May 10, 2006.

80. "Cold Start, Quick Thrust," Telegraph (Calcutta), May 17, 2006.

81. Vivek Raghuvanshi, "Indian Army Winding Down Exercise Near Pakistani Border," Defense

News, May 15, 2006.

82. Shiv Aroor, "Exercise Sanghe Shakti Eliminates Operation Parakram Flaws," Indian Express

(Mumbai), May 20, 2006.

83. The literal translation of this exercise's name is "Horse Sacriªce." It refers to an ancient ritual

that was conducted by Hindu kings to assert their superiority over neighboring kingdoms.

84. "Army's Wargames to Test Reºexes against Nuke, Bio Attacks"; and "New Concepts, Equipment

to Be Validated in Army's Ashwamedh Exercise," Asian News International, April 27, 2007.

signed to assess both the army's ability to magnify its combat power through

the networking advanced sensors with its weapons systems, as advocated by

network-centric warfare theorists, as well as its capacity to provide logistical

support to highly mobile units under realistic battleªeld conditions.85

Dividing the I Corps into "Blue Land" and "Red Land" forces, the concluding

scenario of Ashwamedh's monthlong series of drills featured a ªve-day

battle that simulated an assault by Blue forces across the international border.

Unlike Vajra Shakti, in which initial cross-border attacks were undertaken by a

pivot corps, Ashwamedh featured offensive operations by elements of a strike

corps. Launching a three-pronged attack across a canal system, Blue forces

succeeded in breaching Red's defenses at one point. The rapid movement of

follow-on forces allowed Blue to consolidate their bridgehead in the face of

Red's counterattack. The inªltration of several hundred Blue paratroopers behind

Red's lines facilitated Blue's breakout from the canal zone and rapid advance

30 kilometers into Red territory.86 As in Sanghe Shakti, helicopter

gunships provided cover for advancing armored units, while tactical air assets

from the Indian Air Force provided close air support.

insights from the war games

The Indian military's ability to implement the Cold Start doctrine, as demonstrated

in these ªve exercises, can be assessed in three areas: the capacity to execute

tasks related to Cold Start, the conduct of joint operations, and the

employment of information technology to gain the advantages of networkcentric

warfare.

execution of cold start tasks. In the ªve exercises considered here, the

Indian military demonstrated a moderate amount of success in employing elements

of Cold Start in a simulated environment. During the second exercise,

Vajra Shakti, a notionally defensive pivot corps initiated offensive operations

and advanced 30 kilometers into enemy territory. Sanghe Shakti, the fourth exercise,

showed that a strike corps could deploy from its base areas to the

conºict zone rapidly enough to exploit the openings in enemy defenses created

by the pivot corps' attack. Public assessments of the exercise by the Indian

high command praised it as a highly successful simulation that had "validated"

India's new limited war doctrine.87 Particularly exciting to Cold Start

A Cold Start for Hot Wars? 181

85. "New Concepts, Equipment to Be Validated in Army's Ashwamedh Exercise"; and "Indian

Army to Use Satellite Imagery during War Games," Indo-Asian News Service, April 27, 2007.

86. "Indian Army Tests Network-CentricWarfare Skills," Indo-Asian News Service, May 2, 2007.

87. "Vice Army Chief Shares Changes in Military Doctrine, Equipment, Thinking," Force, June

2006.

enthusiasts was the indication that the time frame for the mobilization of a

strike corps had been shortened considerably. One estimate by the Indian

Army indicates that the II Corps in Sanghe Shakti had managed to shave off

"days if not weeks" from the mobilization time that was required in Operation

Parakram.88

Furthermore, these capabilities were exercised under a variety of battleªeld

conditions. All ªve scenarios assumed that Pakistan had used nuclear, biological,

or chemical weapons against Indian forces, which tested the ability of the

army and air force to operate in contaminated environments. In Vajra Shakti,

Sanghe Shakti, and Ashwamedh, the majority of the "ªghting" took place at

night, which tested the night-ªghting abilities of the troops involved and provided

experience in employing night-vision equipment and thermal imagers

under realistic conditions. Vajra Shakti and Desert Strike were conducted in

relatively open desert terrain. In contrast, Divya Astra, Ashwamedh, and

Sanghe Shakti included operations in conditions that would be faced by

Indian forces in an actual assault across the international border. In Divya

Astra, combat engineers bridged a 60-meter-wide canal within thirty minutes

using truck-mounted bridges capable of supporting tanks and armored vehicles.

A similar cross-canal assault against a defensive line was a feature of

Ashwamedh. Sanghe Shakti included operations in built-up terrain, forcing

advancing units to navigate inhabited areas and practice crossing waterways

and canals.89

Indian forces performed their tasks impressively on the proving ground, but

this does not indicate that such a capability exists across the army and air

force. In the ªrst four exercises, participating units needed several days of rehearsals

to practice a range of maneuvers and battle drills required by Cold

Start, while in Ashwamedh the units rehearsed at the brigade and battalion

level for nearly a month. Additional practice was required even by units from

the offensive-oriented, and presumably elite, strike corps. The continual need

to rehearse doctrinal concepts and practice methods for offensive and defensive

operations ahead of participation in these exercises strongly suggests that

more time will be required before the army and the air force fully internalize

the Cold Start doctrine.

joint operations. The Indian military has achieved considerably less success

in the conduct of joint operations. In the tightly scripted exercise Divya

International Security 32:3 182

88. Aroor, "Exercise Sanghe Shakti Eliminates Operation Parakram Flaws."

89. "Army, IAF to Conduct Joint Exercise," Tribune (Chandigarh), May 17, 2006; and Mohan,

"Army Flexes Its Firepower."

Astra, army and air force units operated sequentially, failing to integrate their

efforts or demonstrate a high degree of joint warfare capability. A signiªcant

improvement was seen in Vajra Shakti, where integrated planning of the operations

by army and air force commanders took place. Coordination between

the services was much improved from the 1999 Kargil operation, the last time

joint army/air force operations were attempted.90 Successful coordination in

planning operations, however, has yet to translate into the synergies required

at the operational and tactical levels. Analysis of joint army/air force operations

at the operational and tactical levels during Sanghe Shakti indicated persistent

interoperability deªciencies that belie previous claims by the military

that "there is seamless integration [between the army and air force] at all levels."

91 Despite multiple rehearsals, the two services consistently failed to integrate

their actions in the ªve war games considered here. At present, it appears

that more time and further exercises are required at smaller unit levels to

achieve the kind of joint operational ability that the Cold Start doctrine requires.

Joint operations have been a traditional difªculty for the Indian military,

and as is discussed in the section on organizational issues below, they are

likely to continue to be a challenge.

network-centric warfare. Of these three areas, the Indian military has

demonstrated the most capability in the use of advanced information technology

and communications systems on the battleªeld to enable network-centric

operations. During these exercises, real-time situational awareness was provided

by satellite imagery as well as UAVs that tracked the enemy's positions

and movements. As a result, the time required for commanders to assess the

situation on the battleªeld and make corresponding tactical decisions has been

reduced considerably from previous conºicts where "current" battleªeld intelligence

was hours or even days old.

Advanced technology procured from Israel and Russia has further contributed

to Indian reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition

capabilities.92 The integration of a range of sensors and surveillance devices

via video and data links in a sensor-to-shooter network allowed UAVs to de-

A Cold Start for Hot Wars? 183

90. Subhash Kapila, "Indian Army Validates Its Cold Start War Doctrine," No. 1408 (Noida, India:

South Asia Analysis Group, June 7, 2005), http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers15%5Cpaper1408

.html.

91. Aroor, "Exercise Sanghe Shakti Eliminates Operation Parakram Flaws." For Lieutenant General

H.S. Panag's claims that "all [Indian military] operations are 'joint' from the word go, both in

planning, selection of objectives, and execution at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels,"

see "Exercise Desert Strike."

92. See, for example, Vijay Mohan, "Army's Tactical Network Goes Hi-Tech," Tribune

(Chandigarh), May 12, 2005.

tect targets that were subsequently destroyed by precision artillery or air

strikes ªring from beyond visual range.93 Commenting on the performance of

the recently acquired weapons and sensor systems, then-Chief of the Army

Staff Gen. N.C. Vij said that their introduction had led to a ªftyfold increase in

the army's ability to detect and neutralize enemy forces.94

The Indian military's success in integrating advanced sensor systems into its

nascent network-centric warfare capability highlights a signiªcant shortcoming,

however—limited communications bandwidth. During Desert Strike, unit

commanders spent hundreds of man-hours on satellite video conferences between

various formation headquarters. According to one analyst, the exercise

suggests that a large-scale conºict in South Asia could require 3.3 gigahertz of

bandwidth for military use alone.95 This is the equivalent of the bandwidth

provided by three commercial telecommunications satellites. As UAVs become

more prevalent across the military, and the armed forces become ever more information-

centric, the demand for bandwidth will continue to grow. The army

has taken steps to address the issue, such as the deployment of the Mercury

Thunder communications network, which employs optical ªbers, microwave

radios, and satellites to transport large amounts of bandwidth in support of

military operations.96 Nevertheless, in the near term, the network-centric systems

will put a signiªcant strain on the Indian military's communications

network.

organizational issues

One of the ªrst indications that India was taking steps toward implementing

Cold Start was a restructuring of the forces on the Pakistani border. To reduce

the burden on the Indian Army'sWestern Command, which had responsibility

for the area of the international border from Rajasthan to Jammu, on April 8,

2005, a new South Western Command was initiated with its headquarters at

Jaipur. Carved out of the operational area formerly covered by the Western

Command, the new South Western Command covers key areas in Punjab and

Rajasthan. Western Command is now tasked with focusing on the border region

between Pathankot and Jammu.97

International Security 32:3 184

93. For examples, see "Exercise Desert Strike"; and Sawhney, "A Good Beginning."

94. Vijay Mohan, "Big Increase in Infantry Firepower: General Vij," Tribune (Chandigarh), March

2, 2004.

95. Prasun K. Sengupta, "The Final Frontier," Force, February 2006.

96. Girja Shankar Kaura, "New Network for Indian Army," Tribune (Chandigarh), September 13,

2006.

97. "India's Cold Start Doctrine: DGMO to Brief Senior Commanders Today," Pakistan Times, April

29, 2005, http://pakistantimes.net/2005/04/29/top2.htm.

Creating an additional command not only relieves responsibility for a large

stretch of territory from the existing headquarters units, but it also streamlines

command and control of the forces along the western border. If Cold Start is

employed, the demands on headquarter staffs would be signiªcant. The creation

of a new command enables better battlespace management of the increased

number of units that would have to be forward deployed in the border

region. South Western Command has had a pivot corps and a strike corps assigned

to it (X Pivot Corps and I Corps); it is not clear from published reports,

however, if the strike elements assigned to the new command have taken up

positions in the border areas.98

For the Indian Army to achieve the surprise and rapid mobilization envisioned

in Cold Start, its offensive forces must be based in close proximity to

the international border. Deployment of offensive capabilities either within

pivot corps or in the border area, rather than deep in India's heartland where

the strike corps are currently positioned, would indicate India's intention to

implement Cold Start. There is no public evidence to date that the integrated

battle groups have been formed or deployed alongside the pivot corps. In the

Cold Start exercises discussed previously, offensive units drilled as strike corps

rather than as IBGs, suggesting that these large formations have not yet been

disaggregated to form battle groups. Arguing in favor of Cold Start in July

2006, Gen. Sundararajan Padmanabhan, former chief of army staff, wrote that

pivot corps "should be enabled to take up 'cold start' offensives by grouping

them with mechanized forces, airborne/heliborne forces as the case may be,"

which seems to indicate that this has not yet occurred.99 That offensive elements

from the strike corps assigned to South Western Command, as discussed

above, do not appear to have taken up forward positions is further

evidence that the Indian Army has not yet taken the step of positioning its offensive

assets within striking range of the border. Although this conclusion is

largely based on the absence of evidence, given the degree of repositioning of

offensive units required by Cold Start, it is difªcult to believe that such a task

could be accomplished without attracting signiªcant attention.

Cold Start's full implementation is challenged by both interservice rivalries

and civil-military tension in defense decisionmaking. Cold Start is primarily a

creation of the Indian Army, which has been the dominant military service

A Cold Start for Hot Wars? 185

98. "Muscle for New Command: Strike Force Put in Place," Telegraph (Calcutta), August 17, 2005.

99. Sundararajan Padmanabhan, "The Indian Army in 2020," Security Research Review, Vol. 2, No. 2

(July 2006), http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/SRR/index.php?option?com_content&task?view

&id?22&Itemid?30.

since independence. India's air force, and to a lesser extent its navy, have

sought to escape the army's shadow, and are unlikely to willingly embrace a

new war-ªghting doctrine that places them in a subordinate combat role. This

is particularly true of the air force, as Cold Start employs airpower according

to the army's own vision of joint warfare, where elements of all three services

are under the control of a uniªed (presumably army) commander. As Y.I. Patel

notes, this plan runs counter to the Indian Air Force's own concept of joint operations,

which involves the services ªghting wars separately, but according to

a coordinated plan.100 Furthermore, the air force believes that attaching aircraft

to speciªc ground units in a deªned geographic space, as the integrated battle

group concept requires, is a fundamental misuse of airpower that fails to leverage

the air force's numerical superiority over its Pakistani counterparts.101 This

issue is unlikely to be resolved quickly, as the air force continues to focus its efforts

on air-to-air combat and strategic bombing while downplaying the importance

of close air support as a core mission.102 An operational Cold Start

capability would therefore require the air force to support the doctrine at a

level at which it has heretofore been unwilling to do.

Since independence, the political leadership of India has attempted to exercise

close control over military operations. This has mixed implications for

Cold Start. If this close involvement by civilian leaders provides the clear political

objectives required to prevent a limited war from escalating, it is possible

that Cold Start would be more likely to be employed. The independent military

operations envisioned by Cold Start, however, are not necessarily conducive

to the degree of control India's political leadership has exercised in the

past. Under the new doctrine, rapid political decisionmaking and effective crisis

management will have to become the norm. Unless India's political classes

can either provide timely command and control to rapidly unfolding military

operations or increase their comfort with devolving authority to junior ofªcers

in the ªeld who take independent initiative, Cold Start will face signiªcant

political barriers to employment.

The challenges of both interservice and civil-military coordination could be

signiªcantly ameliorated by the creation of the position of chief of the Defense

Staff. In 1947, soon after achieving independence, the Indian government abol-

International Security 32:3 186

100. Patel, "Dig Vijay to Divya Astra."

101. Ahmed, "The Calculus of 'Cold Start.'"

102. Oberoi, "Air Power and Joint Operations"; A.Y. Tipnis, "Indian Air Force, 2020," Security Research

Review, Vol. 1, No. 2 (January 2005), http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/SRR/Volume12/

tipnis.html; and P.K. Vasudeva, "Integrated War Doctrine Required," Tribune (Chandigarh), January

18, 2005.

ished the post of commander in chief of the Indian military, a post that had traditionally

been held by the head of the army, and empowered the leaders of

the three services (army, navy, and air force) to lead their own organizations as

equals. In the absence of joint leadership that would force them to integrate

their wartime strategies and plans, ªerce interservice rivalries developed.

Simultaneously, overall defense policymaking has suffered without a professional

head of the armed forces who could act as the principal military adviser

to the government. In 2001 the Indian government took a half-step toward

jointness by creating the Integrated Defense Staff. This body is charged with

the management of defense issues across the Indian military, particularly longterm

planning. In theory, it would be headed by the chief of the Defense Staff,

who would also serve as the principal military adviser to India's political leadership.

A combination of bureaucratic inªghting, political disagreements, and

concern about concentrating so much military authority in a single ofªce, however,

has prevented a chief of the Defense Staff from ever being appointed. The

Integrated Defense Staff is instead headed by an ofªcer who would be the vice

chief of Defense Staff, should a chief ever be appointed. In this capacity, rather

than being their leader, the present head of the Integrated Defense Staff is actually

subordinate to the chiefs of the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force, and

therefore has little ability to force the services to adopt a joint approach to war

ªghting. The appointment of a chief of Defense Staff would be an important

organizational signal that India was getting serious about its joint war-ªghting

capabilities and therefore enhance its ability to implement Cold Start. Furthermore,

appointing a single general ofªcer to serve as military adviser to India's

senior leadership, similar to the role played by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff in the United States, could ameliorate some of the civil-military tensions

inherent in Cold Start and lead to a better alignment of political ends and

military means in India's defense planning.103

resources and infrastructure issues

The forward deployment of integrated battle groups and other offensive elements

capable of undertaking Cold Start operations requires the construction

of new support infrastructure to house not only the units themselves, but also

the logistical "tail" that supports them. Stationing division-sized forces in the

A Cold Start for Hot Wars? 187

103. Some analysts have suggested that effective military integration may be unachievable in the

absence of a chief of Defense Staff. A. Vinod Kumar, "Will the Joint Doctrine Result in Synergy on

the Ground?" IDSA Strategic Comment (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis,

June 8, 2006), http://www.idsa.in/publications/stratcomments/VinodKumar080606.htm.

border region will require the expansion of existing facilities and the construction

of new ones. Forward locations close enough to the international border

would be located along a line stretching from Barmer-Jaisalmer-Bikaner-

Suratgarh. It is likely that the IBGs would be colocated with existing units

from the pivot corps in their area of operations. Key strategic locations in this

regard include the cantonment at Bathinda, Punjab (the largest cantonment in

India) and the 24th RAPID base at Bikaner.

At this point, there is no indication in open source materials that these required

facilities are being developed. Although hiding some new construction

within existing facilities might be possible, given how closely the Pakistanis

and Indians are watching each other, it is reasonably safe to assume that the

construction of facilities to house nine divisions' worth of armor, vehicles, and

soldiers along the border would attract attention. By contrast, Pakistan's

signiªcantly more modest construction of new bunkers and observation towers

on its side of the border adjacent to Barmer, Jaisalmer, and Bikaner in

December 2005 attracted Indian attention and press coverage.104

Similarly, Cold Start would require the extensive prepositioning of ammunition,

fuel, and spare parts to allow for rapid and continuous offensives. While

India has been repairing and upgrading its ammunition depots in the wake of

a series of ªres at strategically located facilities in Bikaner and Suratgarh, there

is a lack of evidence that these facilities, as well as others in forward locations

such as the ªeld ammunition depot at Lalgarh, have been expanded to house

the necessary stocks of war materials.

The Indian Army faces signiªcant shortages of key equipment to implement

Cold Start. The integrated battle groups will require organic self-propelled

artillery to have the mobility and ªrepower necessary to accomplish their

mission. Yet, by one estimate, the army possesses only 10 percent of the selfpropelled

guns it needs.105 The army's tank corps suffers from a low operational

readiness rate, as much of its equipment is at the end of its service life.

Although several hundred T-90 tanks recently acquired from Russia possess

signiªcant battleªeld capabilities, they are at best a "silver bullet" force.

Finally, there are serious questions as to whether the army possesses the mobility

and logistical capability to implement Cold Start. It is estimated that only

35 percent of the army is equipped to move about India, and an even smaller

portion possesses the mobility to mount cross-border operations.106 Limited

International Security 32:3 188

104. See, for example, "Pak Army Building Bunkers," Tribune (Chandigarh), December 22, 2005.

105. Gill, "India and Pakistan," p. 244.

106. Ibid.; and A.Z. Hilali, "India's Strategic Thinking and Its National Security Policy," Asian Survey,

Vol. 41, No. 5 (September–October 2001), p. 745.

supplies of spare parts, primitive logistical networks, and inadequate maintenance

facilities will also hinder offensive operations.107 The army is attempting

to gain the necessary funds to address these issues as part of its modernization

program; India's defense budget is limited, however, and both the air force

and the navy are pressing their own competing claims.108

Even more deªcient than the Indian Army's material shortfall is its lack of

skilled ofªcers capable of executing Cold Start operations. A Cold Start–style

maneuver doctrine requires high-quality junior ofªcers who possess the initiative

and ºexibility to react to changing circumstances on the battleªeld without

explicit instructions from their superiors. This poses a signiªcant challenge

for the army. Not only is there a shortage of nearly 13,000 ofªcers, but those

currently serving are not necessarily well suited to implement the new doctrine.

Existing military education emphasizes rote learning and the careful

implementation of "schoolhouse solutions," rather than free thinking. Furthermore,

the army has traditionally favored carefully preplanned military operations

against ªxed positions that seek to attrit the enemy's strength through

tactical engagements. A conservative institutional culture that is resistant to

change and where subordinate units are tightly controlled by higher command

does not foster the initiative and creativity demanded by maneuver warfare.109

It requires a long period of time to cultivate junior leaders who can take risks

and adapt to changing circumstances rather than mechanically execute a

scripted battle plan, and the army has just begun that process.

still in the experimental phase

An examination of the Indian Army's progress toward implementing Cold

Start shows that the limited war doctrine remains in the experimental phase.

Simulated exercises demonstrate signiªcant progress in networking various

units, but much more work is required to achieve proªciency in the execution

of Cold Start and the joint operations required by the doctrine. Organizationally,

the creation of the South Western Command represents a step forward,

but there is no evidence of offensive units being forward deployed as

the doctrine requires. Interservice and civil-military tensions remain signi

ªcant barriers to the doctrine's acceptance. Finally, the execution of Cold

A Cold Start for Hot Wars? 189

107. Ashok K. Mehta, "War or Peace?" Rediff.com, January, 18, 2002, http://in.rediff.com/news/

2002/jan/18ashok.htm.

108. Gill, "India and Pakistan," pp. 247–248.

109. V.K. Kapoor, "Indian Army—A Perspective on Future Challenges, Force Development, and

Doctrine," USI Journal, Vol. 134, No. 3 (July–September 2004), pp. 355–375; Stephen Peter Rosen,

Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press), p. 233; and

Tellis, Stability in South Asia, p. 24.

Start will require further improvements in the quality of the army's matériel

and the caliber of its ofªcers. All of this paints a picture of a military organization

struggling with the implications of a new war-ªghting strategy.

Conclusion

The Indian Army has developed a new limited war doctrine for responding to

the speciªc challenges posed by Pakistan's proxy war strategy. While this Cold

Start doctrine represents a signiªcant advance in India's conventional capabilities,

it also risks provoking or escalating a crisis on the subcontinent that could

breach the nuclear threshold. The persistent disengagement of India's political

leadership from security issues is a cause for concern, for they may turn to a

limited war strategy during the next crisis without having evaluated the potential

consequences.

At present, Cold Start remains more of a concept than a reality. Recent military

exercises and associated organizational changes indicate that even though

the Indian Army has made progress toward developing an operational Cold

Start capability, much work remains. Nevertheless, this is a development that

should continue to be studied. Relative conventional parity has been a cornerstone

of the ugly stability that exists on the subcontinent. Not only does enhanced

war-ªghting ability threaten that stability, but as the Indian Army

progresses toward a Cold Start capability, the political pressure to employ such

a strategy in a time of crisis only increases.

International Security 32:3 190

 
 
-----------------------------------------------------------
N A D E E M   M A L I K
Director Programme
AAJ TV
ISLAMABAD
00-92-321-5117511
nadeem.malik@hotmail.com 

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