The recent high-profile visit to Washington by the chief of Pakistan's ISI,
Lt Gen Ehsanul Haq, reflects both the vital role of intelligence in the 'war
on terror' as well as the key institutional linkage in the current 'special
relationship' between Pakistan and the US.
Although intelligence agencies of both countries have historically enjoyed a
close bond, the current intimacy is of a qualitatively different character
necessitated after 9/11. For instance, till the early 1960s, the IB used to
have an 'adviser' from the CIA. And visits of ISI chiefs to the US are not
new. In September 1999, DG ISI Lt Gen Ziauddin was in Washington where a
plan was apparently devised for a CIA-ISI joint operation to nab Osama bin
Laden. And in September 2001, DG ISI Lt Gen Mahmood Ahmed happened to be in
Washington when the terror attacks took place in New York and the Pentagon,
resulting in the US 'rediscovery' of its relationship with Pakistan.
Since 1954, when Pakistan formally joined the US camp at the height of the
Cold War, the linchpin of the relationship was that between the Pentagon and
GHQ, with military hardware, role in US-led pacts and the US base in Badaber
serving as its mainstay. This relationship remained resilient, even during
the period of sanctions under the Pressler Amendment or when civilian
governments held office.
For instance, in May 1977, under Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, when
the PNA agitation to oust him was at its peak, the COAS Gen Ziaul Haq hosted
a special dinner for the US Ambassador, sending shock waves across the
civilian establishment, since the Foreign Office and the PM were kept out of
the loop. Six weeks later, when the July 5 coup took place, the US endorsed
it by maintaining silence over the demise of an elected civilian
administration.
Similarly, in February 1992, when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was in office,
COAS Gen Asif Nawaz visited Washington where, according to The New York
Times, he was feted 'like a Head of State.' In all three meetings with
senior civilian officials at the Pentagon and the State Department, he had
one-on-one sessions, with the Ambassador politely excluded from the
meetings.
Now in the changed international environment, it is apparent that, for the
first time, the intelligence link seems to have superseded other
institutional linkages in the context of Pakistan's American Connection.
This change is due to three key factors. First, US strategy is now dependent
on intelligence in major Muslim countries both to resolve contentious
political issues as well as track terrorists. For instance, in settling
differences between President Yasser Arafat and Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas
in the Palestinian Authority, the key role of an 'honest broker' was played
by the chief of Egyptian Intelligence, Omar Sulaiman, who shuttled between
the two, finally sealing a deal that has the concurrence of both the
Americans and the Israelis. And the CIA, not the State Department, has been
entrusted with monitoring the implementation of the 'roadmap' in Palestine,
particularly issues relating to security and finance within the Palestine
Authority.
Even in India, matters relating to the Kashmir question are handled by the
Intelligence, albeit under the direction of the Prime Minister's Office. A
RAW chief, Girish Saxena, served as Governor of Occupied Kashmir, while
Prime Minister Vajpayee's principal trouble-shooter and interlocutor for
dealing with the freedom fighters and the APHC, A.S. Aulakh, is a former
Intelligence hand.
Second, after the Iraq War, as terrorism in Riyadh and Casablanca has
demonstrated, the Bush Administration, which earlier had been claiming that
'the back of Al-Qaeda is broken', now has reversed that assessment. Their
focus on tracking terror has shifted again to Pakistan, making intelligence
cooperation pivotal. On May 17, The New York Times reported, citing 'counter
terrorism officials in Washington', that 'Al-Qaeda is regrouping', claiming
Pakistan and Chechnya are the terror group's 'reorganised bases of
operations'. On the same day, in his weekly radio address to the American
people, President Bush stated that 'From Pakistan to the Philippines, to the
Horn of Africa, we are hunting down Al-Qaeda killers.'
In that hunt, the crucial connection is between the two countries
intelligence agencies, with the Americans already praising Pakistani
cooperation in capturing over 500 of the 640 detainees at Guantanamo Bay in
Cuba.
Third, the key goals in American strategy for Pakistan have made the
intelligence connection more robust. These goals include preventing war
between India and Pakistan (pressuring India from undertaking any military
action and pushing the path of a political settlement while asking Pakistan
to close down alleged 'training camps in Azad Kashmir'). The other goal of
tracking terrorists is evident from the capture of key Al-Qaeda operatives
in which ISI cooperation was crucial. Curbing religious extremism is another
goal that the US has set for Pakistan, and here too intelligence cooperation
is vital.
If the intelligence cooperation between Islamabad and Washington is
currently the key element in the Pakistan-American relationship, implying US
trust and confidence in Pakistan intelligence capabilities, Pakistan too
should utilise this opportunity to promote its interests. For instance, in
the past, Indian disinformation regarding 'crossborder infiltration' has
been too readily swallowed hook, line and sinker by the US. The Americans
have already admitted their poor intelligence gathering capabilities in this
region, a fact borne out by two different developments. In May 1998, the US
admitted to an intelligence failure in detecting the Indian nuclear tests.
And after 9/11, despite ousting the Taliban in Afghanistan, the US is still
clueless as to the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar or Gulbadin
Hekmatyar.
With India ready to present Kashmir as an issue of 'crossborder terrorism'
at the June G-8 Summit in France, Pakistan should take steps to counter this
Indian falsehood, while at the same time expressing concern over the
state-supported rise of Hindu religious extremism in India, since it is an
impediment to better Pakistan-India relations.
Given this extraordinary US dependence on Pakistan's cooperation to attain
its goals in the 'war on terror', Pakistan should also push for a quid pro
quo with Washington on its vital interests. Take the declaration of the
indigenous Kashmiri group, Hizbul Mujahideen, as 'terrorist' by the State
Department, which was basically meant as a sop to the Indians. The decision
is unfair since the Hizb has never engaged in acts of violence against US
citizens or property, and it is the one Kashmiri group with which the
Indians have been negotiating. In fact, in July 2000, Prime Minister
Vajpayee had a ceasefire agreement with the Hizb, even stating that he was
willing to negotiate with them 'within the framework of humanity,' eschewing
the traditional mantra regarding Kashmir being an 'integral part of India'.
Interestingly, although the US declared Hizbullah as the 'A-team of
terrorists', the Lebanese government refused to declare them 'terrorist'
saying Hizbullah 'is a legitimate resistance organization,' a formulation
that Pakistan should also be advocating for the Hizbul Mujahideen.
This new relationship between Pakistan and the US also comes in an
environment when pressure on Pakistan has lessened considerably. India,
which was threatening war till recently, is now talking of peace, and the
first steps towards normalisation are already underway.
The US, with its hands full in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine, and facing
an extended terrorist threat, is no longer talking in terms of a Muslim 'hit
list' or 'which country is next after Iraq'. Washington has apparently
realised, as the Iraq War has proven, that the 'war on terror' has escalated
since the root causes of terrorism remain to be addressed.
Pakistani policymakers need to utilise this breather provided by the new US
need to rely on Pakistan in areas of intelligence cooperation to pursue more
proactive, innovative initiatives on the diplomatic front and bargain better
for its national interest. General Musharraf's upcoming June 24 meeting with
President Bush should be a useful opportunity for this
-----------------------------------------------------------
N A D E E M M A L I K
CNBC PAKISTAN
BUREAU CHIEF
ISLAMABAD
0321-5117511
nadeem.malik@hotmail.com
16th Floor, Saudi Pak Tower, 61-A Jinnah Avenue, Islamabad. 051-2800113-14,
Fax: 051-2800118
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