Nadeem Malik

Wednesday, April 29, 2009

Why military action is not the answer


Why military action is not the answer
Wednesday, April 29, 2009
Shireen M Mazari

The chaos following the Swat deal and the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation have been reflections of the failure of the writ of the state to actually enforce these arrangements. This has allowed the Taliban to go beyond the terms of their deal and assert a 'give-more' mantra similar to the US 'do-more' mantra we have been afflicted with in the face of an increasingly weak state and government that shows absolutely no signs of wanting to govern. The net result is an expansion of the Taliban efforts to seize power in the surrounding areas of Swat and the renewal of military operations with all the chaotic fallout of displaced persons fleeing the fighting. Clearly, such desperate military action is not a desirable or valid long-term solution to the threat of extremist violence confronting us today. Already, we have seen the military-centric approach cause more chaos and suffering for our people – not to mention the deaths of thousands of innocent people caught in the crossfire of the Taliban, the security forces and the US drones. We have also seen the growth of the suicide bomber and as has been pointed out in earlier columns the Pakistani suicide bomber comes from the marginalised population with no hope or opportunity to improve his family's lot.

Many solutions have also been discussed not only in these columns but also by a wide-ranging and divergent group of people to deal with our multi-dimensional threats from terrorism – ranging from the religious extremist variety to the sub-nationalist. While the latter really is a matter of righting political wrongs, in the context of the former, the urgency of the situation requires a quick but long-term strategy to deny space to more extremist militants. A beginning has to be made by altering the operational environment in the state's favour and that can only be done by distancing ourselves from the US, for it has now become part of our own terrorism problem. That is why US dollars are not the answer but an aggravation of the problem given the perception of the US within all levels of Pakistani society. There is no middle-class Pakistani majority that wants drone attacks – regardless of the claims made by a few Pakistani 'advisers' to the US who say what the US wants to hear.

Beyond that, we need to focus on the sleeper cells for the obscurantist militants. These are the madressahs spread across the country. Already, a move has begun by the militants to take over madressahs in southern Punjab, but one has to actually see the scope of the problem in numbers to realise why military or other violent action by the state is not even the beginning of a solution.

Just take the case of southern Punjab and the madressahs that operate there. Some are large with adequate resources, but there are also the small ones with barely any resources and these are highly susceptible to being taken over by the militants who have the resources. The data discussed below is part of the data collected for three districts of southern Punjab during 2006-2007 and details sought ranged from the sect, number of students (and their age groups) and teachers, the level of mainstream education in addition to Islamic education, the political affiliations, funding sources and general reputation – for instance, jihadi, non-jihadi etc.

In Dera Ghazi Khan (DGK), taking both its tehsils, there are 185 registered madressahs of which 90 are Deobandi (with a total of 324 teachers), 84 are Barelvi (with a total of 212 teachers), six are Ahl-e-Hadith (107 teachers) and five are Fiqah-e-Jafria (10 teachers).

Of the Deobandi madressahs, only the Jamia Atta-ul-Uloom in DGK, with 200 boarders and 20 day students ranging from 5-25 years and eight teachers, which receives donations from Kuwait as well as from private local and religious trusts and is affiliated to the JUI with a reputation of belonging to the Hezbul Mujahideen, offers education up to matric. Another madressah, Jamia Darul Rehmania in DGK tehsil, with the same credentials, offers education up to middle and has 350 boarders plus 230 day students and 28 teachers. Four Deobandi madressahs of DGK offer primary education but the bulk only offers what is termed 'Islamic' education. The bulk of this sect's madressahs are locally funded, are regarded as non-jihadi and are medium to large, with only a few containing less than 50 students. The total number of Deobandi madressah students in DGK district is 11,535. Interestingly, in this category, it is the large madressahs linked to the JUI and the Hezbul Mujahideen that receive foreign funding which in the case of DGK district is almost solely from Kuwait. In fact, funding from Kuwait also goes to non-jihadi Deobandi madressahs.

Of the 84 Barelvi madressahs of DGK district with a total of 7,335 students ranging from 5-25 years, only the Madressah Alia Mehmooda Mehmoodia receives foreign funding from Saudi Arabia and is the only one with a fair number of teachers (18) offering education up to matric. Of the rest, only one offers middle level mainstream education while six offer primary education. None of the Barelvi madressahs are known to have political party or jihadi affiliations. Also, barring the madressah mentioned above, all of the rest have two to three teachers while the Deobandi teacher average is around four per institution with some exceptions for the larger ones.

All the six Ahl-e-Hadith madressahs, which seem to be only in DGK tehsil (none in Taunsa tehsil), with a total of 1,610 students, receive funding from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait. Three of them are linked to a political party, Jamiat Ulmae Ahl-e-Hadith while four are regarded as non-jihadi. Two are reputed to be part of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jamaat-ud-Dawa and they are part of the three that are funded entirely from donations from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait. These three have a large number of teachers (60 in one, 30 in another and 11 in the smallest one) and offer the most mainstream education including computer and vocational training, with one of them offering education up to BA while the other two offer up to matriculation. One other madressah in this sect offers matriculation also while the remaining two offer only Islamic education.

The five Fiqah-e-Jafria madressahs have a total of 300 students (from 5-20 years). They are all funded locally and only offer Islamic education.

The data for Rajanpur and Rahim Yar Khan is equally interesting and almost on the same patterns – with a few local variations but paucity of space prevents a detailed discussion on that data. However, certain patterns can be deduced – that most of the madressahs are poorly equipped for any form of education at all given the terrible student-teacher ratio and the vast age range of the students – who come from the marginalised poor of the area. The foreign funding may not be as ominous as it looks but it needs to be established whether it comes from private zakat or other charitable donations or official sources. In some cases, like three of the four non-jihadi-reputed Ahl-e-Hadith madressahs, Anjuman Markaz Al Touheed, Markaz Umer Ibne Khatab and Markaz Umer Bin Khitab, the main donor is transparent and identified as being Abdullah Salfi, Kulyat ul Banat.

The main point that has been raised for some time in these columns now is that in order to remove the three main issues of madressahs in Pakistan – that is, the marginalised poor students, the lack of mainstream education and therefore lack of any future prospects and problem of transparency of funding – can only be removed by bringing in the private sector to pump in funds, provide mainstream education alongside the religious education which the various madressah boards can continue to supervise, and offer employment opportunities so that the very poor do not need to offer their children as suicide bombers and cannon fodder for violence. Let the Pakistani nation take up the challenge because the state has failed miserably and time is running out. All the state can do is to offer incentives for what I refer to as the 'adopt-a-madressah' scheme alongside the necessary legislation.

When one sees the human figures involved the massive scale of the problem becomes all too evident for it is these deprived youth that will keep the extremist violence continuing within Pakistan just as the marginalised Muslim youth of Britain are the future terrorist threat for that country despite the British leaders' inability to do introspection rather than indulge in a convenient blame game. Military action can never resolve this issue – how many of our people will we kill? The solution lies in justice and restoration of dignity alongside a future of hope for the dispossessed.

 
 
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N A D E E M   M A L I K
Director Programme
AAJ TV
ISLAMABAD
00-92-321-5117511

nadeem.malik@hotmail.com 




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Tuesday, April 28, 2009

Taliban threaten press with “terrible consequences” in Swat valley


Reporters Without Borders/Reporters sans frontières
Press release

28 April 2009

PAKISTAN
Taliban threaten press with "terrible consequences" in Swat valley
 
Reporters Without Borders is extremely worried by the threats being made against the media by Taliban fighters in the Swat valley. Leaflets (attached) were posted today outside the offices of news media in the Swat valley city of Mingora threatening "terrible consequences" for those that do not stop their "anti-Taliban coverage." The leaflets were signed by suicide candidates "fidayeen" of Swat's Tehreek-e-Taliban.
 
Several journalists including Ghulam Farooq, the editor of the local newspaper Shamal, told Reporters Without Borders that Swat's media community was taking the threats very seriously. "We will soon have no other option but to close our offices and leave the district," Farooq said.
 
"These Taliban threats are unacceptable and seriously endanger the safety of the journalists working courageously in the Swat valley," Reporters Without Borders said. "We appeal to Maulana Sufi Muhammad, the historic leader of the Movement for the Enforcement of the Prophet Muhammad's Sharia (TNSM), who told recently Reporters Without Borders he believed in press freedom, to guarantee the safety of journalists and to put a stop to these threats."
 
In a report on its recent fact-finding visit to the Swat valley, Reporters Without Borders deplored the fact that application of the Sharia was being used by Taliban groups as grounds for restricting freedom of expression even more. Read the report:
 
Written in Urdu, the Taliban leaflet said: "All the editors of wire services, private and official news agencies and journalists and columnists are informed that the way you present news and report events give us the impression that you are now pursuing a pro-west policy, under greed or pressure, saying the Taliban are sabotaging the peace and enforcement of the Islamic system"
 
The leaflet added: "The media help the west to focus on us. Stop doing this … and if you do not desist from doing this we will take you before Islamic courts and you will be held responsible for this conspiracy … and will be responsible for terrible consequences."
 
The threats have come at time when several media have criticised the behaviour of the Taliban, who have violated an accord reached with the government by continuing their attacks in the Swat valley and neighbouring districts.




 
 
-----------------------------------------------------------
N A D E E M   M A L I K
Director Programme
AAJ TV
ISLAMABAD
00-92-321-5117511

nadeem.malik@hotmail.com 




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Islamabad Tonight – 27th April (Dir/Swat Operation)


http://awaz.tv/playvideo.asp?pageId=3315
 
Islamabad Tonight – 27th April 2009

Irfan Siddiqui Analyst, Senator S. M. Zafar PML-Q, Malik Azmat Khan MNA Lower Dir and Brig. Mehmood Shah Former Secretary FATA  in fresh episode of Islamabad Tonight & discusses current issue with Nadeem Malik.
 
http://pkaffairs.com/playshow.asp?pageId=3315



 
 
-----------------------------------------------------------
N A D E E M   M A L I K
Director Programme
AAJ TV
ISLAMABAD
00-92-321-5117511

nadeem.malik@hotmail.com 




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Islamabad Tonight – 27th April (Dir Operation)


http://awaz.tv/playvideo.asp?pageId=3315
 
Islamabad Tonight – 27th April 2009
Irfan Siddiqui Analyst, Senator S. M. Zafar PML-Q and Malik Azmat Khan PPP in fresh episode of Islamabad Tonight & discusses current issue with Nadeem Malik.


 
 
-----------------------------------------------------------
N A D E E M   M A L I K
Director Programme
AAJ TV
ISLAMABAD
00-92-321-5117511

nadeem.malik@hotmail.com 




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Friday, April 24, 2009

Hajamat Karna Mana Hey



 
 
-----------------------------------------------------------
N A D E E M   M A L I K
Director Programme
AAJ TV
ISLAMABAD
00-92-321-5117511

nadeem.malik@hotmail.com 




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Wednesday, April 22, 2009

From AfPak to PakAf --CFR REPORT

POLICY OPTIONS PAPER
From AfPak to PakAf
A Response to the New U.S. Strategy for South Asia
Daniel Markey
April 2009
This project was made possible by the generous support of Mark Fisch.
CFR expresses its thanks to the Rockefeller Foundation for its support for the In-dia, Pakistan, and South Asia Program.
The author also wishes to acknowledge the intellectual contributions to this project by a CFR Pakistan-Afghanistan discussion group, chaired by Samuel R. Berger. The project does not necessarily represent the views of the group or its chair, but reflects the judgments and recommendations of the author alone.
The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, busi-ness executives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. Founded in 1921, CFR carries out its mission by maintaining a diverse membership, with special programs to promote interest and develop expertise in the next generation of foreign policy leaders; convening meetings at its headquarters in New York and in Washington, DC, and other cities where senior government officials, members of Congress, global leaders, and prominent thinkers come together with CFR members to discuss and debate major in-ternational issues; supporting a Studies Program that fosters independent research, enabling CFR scholars to produce articles, reports, and books and hold roundtables that analyze foreign policy is-sues and make concrete policy recommendations; publishing Foreign Affairs, the preeminent journal on international affairs and U.S. foreign policy; sponsoring Independent Task Forces that produce reports with both findings and policy prescriptions on the most important foreign policy topics; and providing up-to-date information and analysis about world events and American foreign policy on its website, CFR.org.
The Council on Foreign Relations takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affilia-tion with the U.S. government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its pub-lications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.
For further information about CFR or this paper, please write to the Council on Foreign Relations, 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10065, or call the Director of Communications at 212.434.9400. Visit CFR's website, www.cfr.org.
Copyright © 2009 by the Council on Foreign Relations®, Inc.
All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America.
This paper may not be reproduced in whole or in part, in any form beyond the reproduction permit-ted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law Act (17 U.S.C. Sections 107 and 108) and excerpts by reviewers for the public press, without express written permission from the Council on Foreign Relations. For information, write to the Publications Office, Council on Foreign Relations, 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10065.
1
Introduction
President Barack Obama publicly unveiled his administration's so-called AfPak (Afghanistan-Pakistan) strategy on March 27, 2009. Over the subsequent weeks, the White House has also briefed relevant congressional leaders and committees, the media, NATO allies, and other regional and in-ternational partners. The U.S. House of Representatives has moved ahead with its own legislative debate (the PEACE bill)1, and the administration recently submitted a 2009 supplemental budget request consistent with its new strategy.
While the broad contours are in place, clearly Washington's approach to South Asia remains a work in progress. The strategy's authors insist that it is intended to provide a framework, not a strait-jacket, for U.S. policy. Questions remain about the correct prioritization of U.S. objectives; the level of and manner in which U.S. diplomatic, military, intelligence, and economic resources should be deployed; and the appropriate sequencing and duration of U.S. efforts.
CONTEXT
Over the past two years, the security environment in Afghanistan and Pakistan has taken a significant turn for the worse. The spread of militancy, whether by terrorists connected with al-Qaeda, the Tali-ban of Mullah Omar or Baitullah Mehsud, criminal gangs, narco-traffickers, or sectarian extremists, among others, has destabilized the Pashtun belt in southern and eastern Afghanistan as well as west-ern Pakistan. At the same time, a range of other violent actors—from Punjabi anti-Indian extremists to Central Asian warlords—operates in the non-Pashtun areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Pakistan and Afghanistan offer these groups an unusually hospitable environment, one that com-plicates and magnifies the danger. Well-worn smuggling routes link the region's notoriously remote and difficult terrain to globally interconnected megacities, creating nearly ideal conditions for al-Qaeda operatives and their sympathizers. The geographic proximity of Pakistan's nuclear program to these sophisticated terrorists and the recent history of illicit transfers of material and know-how also pose a unique threat.
Fragile state institutions, weak leadership, and inadequate resources limit the ability of Islamabad and Kabul to fight militancy in the near term or to foster moderation over the long run. Finally, a trust deficit burdens the United States; anti-Americanism is widespread, and many of Washington's closest partners in the region express deep skepticism about U.S. intentions and commitment.
Many of Washington's challenges in Pakistan and Afghanistan are linked, and so it is correct—and overdue—that the United States should formulate a strategy to address the region as a whole. But the specific threats and policy options across and within these two states range widely. Moreover, the diplomatic, military, and development tools available to the United States vary from one side of the border to the other.
2
The Obama Strategy
President Obama's remarks on March 27, 2009, and an administration white paper released the same day outline the basic elements of the administration's approach.2 Rooted in an assessment of persis-tent terrorist threat, the new AfPak strategy attempts to walk a middle path between a narrow coun-terterror mission and a much more ambitious nation-building agenda.
According to the White House, the fundamental objective for U.S. policy in Pakistan and Afgha-nistan should be to turn the tide against regional militants who offer safe haven to global terrorists, and to build indigenous security structures capable of prosecuting effective counterterror and coun-terinsurgency missions. A timely and generous injection of U.S. resources should be used to demon-strate the fundamental weakness of the Taliban, thereby offering breathing space to governments in Islamabad and Kabul.
As a U.S. senator and presidential candidate, President Obama stressed that the deterioration of security conditions in the region should be attributed to inadequate U.S. resources and attention since 2003. Al-Qaeda leaders eluded capture and the Taliban regrouped in Pakistan and Afghanistan while much of America's military, intelligence, and foreign policy machinery was dedicated to the war in Iraq. The sympathy and credibility the United States enjoyed in the region shortly after 9/11 have since evaporated, but the Taliban and al-Qaeda are by no means invincible. The ongoing draw-down in Iraq will—belatedly—offer significant new military and intelligence tools to commanders in the Pakistan-Afghanistan theater.
The basic counterinsurgency lessons from Iraq also appear to inform U.S. plans for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Washington will begin with a rapid expansion of military force to confront decisively the Afghan Taliban's offensive during the spring and summer fighting seasons. At the same time, the United States appears to be accelerating the use of Predator (unmanned aerial drone) strikes against Taliban leadership in Pakistan, while encouraging the Pakistani military to pursue offensive opera-tions against militants based in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas along the Afghan border.
With these offensive operations underway, the United States plans to start a major expansion of the Afghan National Security Forces. The United States has already achieved significant success in building the Afghan National Army, while existing programs—such as Focused District Develop-ment, which takes entire district police forces off-site for an eight-week training course, then returns them with embedded trainers—appear to have the potential to improve the capacity of the Afghan police. In Pakistan, the Pentagon has already allocated roughly $400 million to train and equip the paramilitary Pakistani Frontier Corps and recently proposed a Pakistani Counterinsurgency Capabil-ity Fund, which would allocate $3 billion over the next five years to train and equip Pakistan's army and paramilitary forces for a counterinsurgency mission. All of these efforts are likely to be accele-rated and expanded within several years, provided Washington can supply more trainers, build new training facilities, and work closely with Pakistani and Afghan counterparts.
In addition, aid to Pakistan's army will be carefully tailored to improving its counterinsurgency ca-pacity (rather than boosting defenses against India) and conditioned upon effective action against 3
militants along the border with Afghanistan. When possible, the United States and its partners (Afg-hanistan, Pakistan, NATO, and others) will seek to translate battlefield successes into political settle-ments with local populations, negotiating from a position of strength to win support against the most extreme militants and to eliminate sanctuaries available to global terrorists. Intelligence leads from newly pacified areas will, in time, help U.S. forces find and destroy al-Qaeda's senior leadership.
Quick-hitting economic assistance is also to be used to support counterinsurgency efforts on both sides of the border. U.S. forces will have access to flexible emergency funds so they can rush humani-tarian, development, and reconstruction programs into areas immediately after offensive operations. This rapid-response programming is designed to win compliance from local populations and avoid swelling the ranks of the insurgency. Vastly expanded nonmilitary assistance to Pakistan, along the lines of the Senate's soon-to-be-introduced Kerry-Lugar legislation (an updated version of the En-hanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2008, which was introduced by Senator Joe Biden and Sena-tor Richard Lugar in July 2008 but did not pass before the end of the session) and the House's PEACE Act of 2009, will help to build the state's capacity to deliver basic services and to improve law and order. Nonmilitary assistance will also provide a tangible, popular demonstration of the benefits of a U.S.-Pakistan partnership.
The Obama administration is prepared to foot a hefty bill for maintaining indigenous security forces in Afghanistan over at least the next decade or so. But compared to U.S. and NATO opera-tions, the cost to U.S. taxpayers will be greatly reduced. By helping to stifle the Taliban-led insurgen-cy and root out al-Qaeda's leaders while building and maintaining more effective indigenous security institutions, the White House hopes to reduce the footprint of American (and NATO) operations within several years and still achieve its vital security interests in the region.
AN EMERGING DEBATE
As a political statement, the AfPak strategy has been well received, perhaps in part because it leaves unresolved a number of contentious policy questions. In the public debates that will accompany con-gressional decisions on AfPak funding, as well as the Obama administration's internal debates on policy implementation, a middle-path strategy will face challenges from at least two competing alter-natives.
Some critics will argue that the strategy correctly diagnoses the urgent threat posed by al-Qaeda and global jihadists, but that the administration's policy prescriptions are too costly and wide-ranging to meet that narrowly defined challenge. Others will argue that the administration has astutely si-tuated the problem of global terrorism within a regional political-economic context, but that impor-tant elements of the strategy are still too narrowly conceived or inadequate toward the enormous task of achieving U.S. national security interests in Afghanistan, and even more so, in Pakistan.
These two alternative strategies are explored at greater length in the following sections.
Alternative 1: Focus Goals and Limit Costs
One alternative to the Obama administration's approach would be to limit U.S. costs by strictly fo-cusing on the counterterror mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan, rather than getting bogged down in a messy quagmire of state capacity building and long-term development issues. From this perspec-tive, the Obama administration is correct in its understanding that the fundamental objective for U.S. 4
policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan should be the reduction of the threat to U.S. national security posed by al-Qaeda. But a clear and sustained focus on al-Qaeda will protect U.S. interests best by li-miting financial and human costs and by avoiding a wide range of exceedingly complicated challenges that Washington appears ill-equipped to manage.
Building moderate, stable, and more effective governments in Islamabad and Kabul and tackling long-standing regional tensions may be admirable causes, but they will require expensive, long-term U.S. investments that pay—at best—limited, uncertain dividends. The United States has relatively few essential interests in this region; even a stable and economically viable Pakistan and Afghanistan would remain distant and poor, and would play virtually no positive role in Washington's long-term political, military, or economic considerations.
Realistically, even a narrow focus on the threat posed by al-Qaeda will require a far more extensive U.S. presence in the region than existed prior to 9/11. But that presence should not primarily take the form of U.S. armed forces, diplomats, or U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) offi-cials. The expansion of these personnel in Afghanistan, as advocated by the White House, is therefore ill-advised. An effective counterterror strategy should instead demand sustained investments in sur-veillance and human intelligence capabilities as well as the means to strike individuals engaged in the training, planning, and managing of terror attacks against the United States or its interests.
High-tech platforms, from next-generation unmanned aerial vehicles to satellites, will help the United States manage counterterror operations without a heavy ground presence in Pakistan or Afg-hanistan. The U.S. military presence in Afghanistan should be phased out over the next several years, providing just enough time and security for U.S. intelligence operatives and Special Operations Forces to cultivate a sustainable network of local partners engaged in human intelligence collection.
The focus of U.S. partnerships with Afghan and Pakistani intelligence services (as well as with other intelligence actors in the region) should narrow and intensify on terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda, that have global aspirations. In Pakistan, the United States should transfer technologies and other assistance that will help to protect Islamabad's nuclear warheads, facilities, and scientists from attack or infiltration by al-Qaeda or its sympathizers. U.S. assistance to Pakistani and Afghan security forces should continue, but it should be employed primarily as a means for inducing cooperation against al-Qaeda. The United States should avoid investments in regional security forces—such as the massive expansion of the Afghan National Army or the transformation of Pakistan's Frontier Corps—that are unlikely to be sustained by Kabul and Islamabad without permanent external assis-tance. Washington should instead encourage Pakistan and Afghanistan to seek alternative funding streams or redirect existing national resources in order to build those security institutions considered most vital to state stability.
The United States should also recognize that its own extensive presence in Afghanistan since 2002 has altered regional calculations—and not for the better. An open-ended U.S. commitment has created incentives for "free riding," encouraged the pursuit of parochial interests, and raised fears that the United States has ulterior motives for maintaining its presence in the region. U.S. diplomats should therefore clarify Washington's intention to rededicate itself to the fight against al-Qaeda, to find common cause with all actors who support that effort, and to accept regionally generated solu-tions as long as they do not directly undermine counterterror goals. In addition to existing partners, the United States should reach out to China, Iran, and Russia.
In sum, the United States should focus and intensify its efforts to finish the fight that al-Qaeda started and avoid conflating that specific threat with a much more diffuse set of regional challenges. 5
A dire economic crisis at home and a world full of urgent and looming dangers require Washington to pick its battles carefully in order to win them. In its history, the United States has rarely demon-strated a capacity to rebuild broken states like Afghanistan or to transform enormous developing nations like Pakistan. In a region where American involvement is already unpopular, the Obama ad-ministration must understand that expanding U.S. engagement and investment is at least as likely to prove counterproductive as it is to yield the types of gains sought by the White House.
Alternative 2: Expand U.S. Effort, Focus on Pakistan
A second alternative to the Obama administration's approach would emphasize publicly just how long, difficult, and costly Washington's effort is likely to be and would focus on the hardest and most critical problem of the region—Pakistan—where relatively few resources have been spent compared to Afghanistan, U.S. policy tools are all too limited, and mutual distrust between Washington and Islamabad often proves debilitating.
The Obama strategy clearly recognizes that a fractured or incapacitated Pakistan would threaten core U.S. interests, not least because its nuclear weapons would be vulnerable to al-Qaeda or similar terrorist groups. Today, al-Qaeda's top leadership is most likely based in Pakistan, along with top Ta-liban leaders, both Afghan and Pakistani. In addition, the "Talibanization" of Pakistan's Pashtun belt is gradually moving eastward into settled districts, creating new terrorist safe havens in once-tranquil locales such as the Swat valley. Pakistan's non-Pashtun extremist and sectarian groups, some of which were historically nurtured by the state as a means to project influence into India and Afghanis-tan, also have the potential to prove deeply destabilizing. Organizations like the banned Jaish-e-Mohammed or Jamaat-ud-Dawa are well resourced and globally interconnected. Some appear to retain significant influence within state institutions and enjoy public sympathy, in certain cases be-cause of the social services they provide. If present trends persist, the next generation of the world's most sophisticated terrorists will be born, indoctrinated, and trained in a nuclear-armed Pakistan.
But the Obama administration's strategy does not establish that securing Islamabad's political sta-bility and partnership should be Washington's primary regional objective. The White House's inten-sified focus on counterterror and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and the Pakistani tri-bal belt is not misplaced, but it will prove entirely insufficient to overcoming these deeper challenges. The United States should therefore make broad and ample investments beyond the Pashtun tribal belt and in Pakistan's civilian and military institutions as a means to improve their capacity and to create incentives for sustainable bilateral cooperation in the fight against extremism and militancy over the long run.
In some ways, the Obama AfPak strategy makes a good start along precisely these lines, but critical gaps remain. While the president's remarks prioritized Pakistan as a U.S. national security concern, U.S. resources and attention are far more heavily engaged in Afghanistan. Since 9/11, the United States has spent (or requested for fiscal year 2009) roughly $170 billion on Operation Enduring Freedom and just over $15 billion in assistance and reimbursements to Pakistan.
3 Of course, achiev-ing greater stability in Afghanistan would mitigate some of the political and military pressures now faced by the Pakistani state. A comprehensive strategy for Pakistan should therefore include major counterinsurgency and counterterror operations in Afghanistan. But it must also be recognized that a victory against the Taliban in Afghanistan will be hollow and illusory if it yields a destabilized or ad-versarial regime in Pakistan. Tactics that flush militants out from Afghanistan and into Pakistan will 6
prove counterproductive unless Pakistan's own security forces are ready to mount an adequate re-sponse. Today they are not. Similarly, the use of drone strikes in Pakistan's tribal belt must be weighed against the political costs they impose on U.S.-Pakistan cooperation, not least the role they play in amplifying popular anti-Americanism in parts of Pakistan well beyond the areas bordering Afghanistan.
The United States has relatively few direct policy tools for fighting extremism and improving state capacity inside Pakistan. Widespread anti-Americanism, official distrust, and poor security condi-tions now impose severe limits on U.S. military, intelligence, and even economic development ef-forts. The centerpiece of U.S. efforts should therefore be to win trust among partners within Pakis-tan's military, intelligence, and civilian institutions and to empower these partners to undertake the daunting task of fighting terrorism and militancy. A policy of inducement—through financial, tech-nical, and diplomatic assistance—is the best means to shift the strategic calculations of influential Pakistanis and bolster moderates who share basic U.S. interests. Fortunately, although Pakistan's ex-tremists are all-too-numerous and vocal, the overwhelming majority of the country's population ab-hors terrorist tactics and has no desire to live in a Taliban-like state.
Still, winning influential partners will not be easy. Pakistan's army and intelligence services have been frustrating and internally conflicted allies since 9/11. Many within their ranks doubt that close partnership with Washington will serve Pakistan's security interests; they prefer to hedge their bets by retaining ties to militant groups with violent anti-Indian and anti-Western agendas. But these se-curity institutions are complicated, many-layered bureaucracies, not unitary actors. Washington should work to influence internal debates and transform mindsets among the rising classes of Pakis-tani officers.
As President Obama has stated, Washington should not be in the business of writing blank checks to Islamabad, whether for civilian or military purposes. That said, the United States should also resist the temptation to impose inflexible conditions on its military assistance as a means of ensuring Pakis-tan's cooperation. U.S. threats of this sort may be cathartic, but they are also counterproductive; they offer easy ammunition to America's skeptics in Pakistan while discouraging real and potential allies. Instead, Washington should maintain a baseline of generous defense assistance while seeking every opportunity to enhance COIN and CT training, bilateral engagement, and joint operations with Pa-kistani security and intelligence forces.
To help stem the tide of extremism and militancy within Pakistani civil society, the United States should implement vastly expanded assistance programs to improve state governance capacity (espe-cially law and order), meet basic humanitarian needs, influence public opinion, and promote long-term development. The United States should set clear measures of success. But initial failures to achieve these benchmarks should prompt new implementation strategies, not threats to reduce or revoke resources.
In order to have any chance of effectively formulating, implementing, and monitoring these new and improved assistance programs, Washington must also invest in its own institutions. USAID and the Department of State will need expanded personnel and security to operate throughout Pakistan and to enable improved cooperation with public and private organizations.
The United States should also coordinate with regional and global partners in its effort to build and transform Pakistani institutions and to deal effectively with the full spectrum of Pakistan's politi-cal leaders and parties. China and Saudi Arabia have particular influence over Pakistan's military and 7
political leaders, and other major donors including Japan and the UK offer valuable resources, leve-rage, and experience.
A comprehensive approach to countering extremism in Pakistan will demand expensive and in-tense U.S. engagement over at least a decade, possibly much longer. But because smart, sustained investments ultimately represent the most cost-effective way for the United States to avoid a far more dangerous future, the Obama administration would be well advised not to narrow its ambitions from the outset or to understate the enormity of the challenge.
8
Recommendation: Shift from AfPak to PakAf
The Obama administration should recalibrate its strategy to emphasize the priority of the mission in Pakistan and to prepare domestic and international audiences for expanded, sustained U.S. engage-ment in South Asia. The present approach—professing narrow counterterror goals while seeking expanded state-building resources in Afghanistan and Pakistan—may be a politically astute means to garner early support, but runs the risk of confusing the American public (as well as U.S. allies and adversaries) down the road about Washington's true intentions. That confusion is likely to make a costly commitment to the region harder to justify and sustain over the long run.
A wide array of global and domestic considerations undoubtedly influenced the Obama adminis-tration's AfPak strategy. The costs—political, economic, and military—of a lengthy commitment to South Asia will invariably require real compromises on other issues and in other regions. At a time of severe economic distress, U.S. foreign assistance programming must contend with urgent domestic expenditures. And any strategy of long-term investment requires some confidence that resources and attention will manage to survive subsequent budget battles and future elections.
That said, if the United States takes seriously the enormity and complexity of the threat posed by extremism in South and Central Asia, only a comprehensive, Pakistan-centered strategy will serve U.S. security requirements today and into the future. Narrowing America's ambition to attacking al-Qaeda and its close associates may placate some budget hawks at home, but it will do little to address the serious, entrenched threats posed by instability and weak state capacity in Pakistan.
TURNING STRATEGY INTO POLICY
Much of the Obama team's strategy is already fairly consistent with a long-term, Pakistan-centered approach to the region. In order to be more specific about how a PakAf approach should be imple-mented over time, and where it would deviate from the administration's apparent plans, the follow-ing section offers policy guidelines as well as a limited number of detailed recommendations. It is in-tended to suggest the way ahead, not to serve as an all-inclusive policy agenda.
Near Term (Six Months): A Military, Political, Economic, and Diplomatic Surge
Over the next six months, the United States should surge resources into South Asia and work to eliminate the greatest immediate stumbling blocks to better cooperation with Pakistan and Afghanis-tan.
President Obama assumed power at a time of morale-sapping turmoil within both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Strong and cooperative political partners are in short supply, and security conditions have deteriorated to the point that U.S. civilian personnel face risky operating environments throughout the region. The Obama administration's efforts have been calibrated to begin to address 9
this situation. By devoting sufficient military resources to stem Taliban offensives in Afghanistan, Washington can help to secure greater geographic and political space for national elections and de-velopment programs. In Pakistan, the United States should continue with efforts to navigate ongoing partisan power struggles, capitalize on the opportunity presented by the restoration of the chief jus-tice of the supreme court, and advance multilateral efforts to shore up Pakistan's economic situation, all while building closer working relationships with military and intelligence officials.
To enhance security across the region, the United States should take the following steps over the next six months, consistent with the administration's new strategy:
Increase the mass of military power available to U.S. and NATO commanders in Afghanistan, starting—but not ending—with 17,000 additional U.S. troops;
Practice a "population-centered" counterinsurgency approach in Afghanistan, with an emphasis on improving Afghan public confidence in U.S./NATO operations, in part by reducing civilian ca-sualties through a more selective use of coalition airpower;
Expand the frequency and intensity of senior-level U.S.-Pakistan dialogue and, where appropriate, intelligence-sharing and focused discussions about militant networks in Pakistan, including the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network, and Lashkar-e-Taiba.
At the same time, recognizing the centrality of its emerging partnership with Pakistan to achieving success in the region, the Obama administration should shift its approach in the following ways:
Restrict attacks by unmanned aerial vehicles (such as Predators and Reapers) in Pakistan to coun-terterror targets (such as al-Qaeda leadership) to limit collateral damage and reduce an unpopular irritant in relations with Pakistan's political and military leadership;
Follow through on existing assistance commitments to the Pakistani military, including the F-16 program, as a means to retain the confidence of officers who have bought into partnership with the United States;
Work with the U.S. Congress to avoid new legislation that includes inflexible and potentially puni-tive "conditionality" on military assistance to Pakistan.
To strengthen the foundations for political partnership in Afghanistan and Pakistan, over the next six months the United States should also take the following diplomatic steps, consistent with the ad-ministration's new strategy:
Apply diplomatic pressure on the Karzai government and provide security and technical assis-tance to enhance the likelihood that Afghanistan's presidential election is perceived as legitimate both by the Afghan public and international observers;
In Pakistan, retain flexibility in the midst of intense partisan political competition by engaging in regular, active dialogue with leaders and second-tier officials from the full range of political parties.
Over the same time frame, the Obama administration should undertake the following overtures in order to clarify or shift Washington's political intentions:
Refrain from official U.S. involvement in negotiations with the Afghan Taliban to avoid undercut-ting the legitimacy conferred by Afghanistan's electoral process or appearing too eager for an easy exit from the region;
10
Delineate redlines with respect to future Pakistani negotiations with the Taliban to clarify that ter-rorist safe havens and the shrinking writ of the Pakistani state, not the implementation of tradi-tional, or sharia, laws, are Washington's primary reasons for concern;
Engage Pakistan's political leadership in discussions about the security and logistical procedures planned for Afghanistan's election as a means to encourage Islamabad's support for the process and acceptance of the outcome;
Work with groups, including Pakistani and international nongovernmental organizations, aca-demic institutions, and the legal community, to depoliticize Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry's reinstatement and turn it into an opportunity for meaningful judicial reform in Pakis-tan.
To stabilize regional economic conditions, set a new tone for development assistance, and jumpstart more constructive international engagement in the region, over the next six months the United States should do the following, all consistent with, if not necessarily dictated by, the adminis-tration's new strategy:
Mount a review of USAID's Afghanistan mission to identify programming and personnel gaps, and, in particular, to craft new mechanisms for community-oriented aid disbursement and re-duced dependence on non-Afghan implementing partners;
Coordinate closely with the International Monetary Fund and major donors to Pakistan (through the Friends of Pakistan forum or an alternative grouping) to stabilize—where necessary—and boost—where possible—economic growth;
Announce U.S. plans for major new nonmilitary assistance expenditures in Pakistan ($1.5 billion a year, consistent with the imminent Kerry-Lugar legislation) and begin discussions with Pakistan's government, business leaders, and civil society to identify creative new mechanisms to oversee and manage a significant portion of these funds through demand-driven block grants, a trust fund, or other widely accepted means;
Mobilize USAID to assist—in whatever forms acceptable—the Pakistani army and Frontier Corps in delivering reconstruction assistance to postconflict zones of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, especially the devastated civilian communities of Bajaur Agency;
Raise Pakistan and Afghanistan to the top of Washington's diplomatic agenda with regional and global partners, including China, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the European Union, and others;
Regularize Pakistan-Afghanistan-U. S. trilateral summits;
Quietly encourage India's new government (shortly after its own national elections in April and May) to reinvigorate dialogue with Pakistan. Facilitate early interactions if necessary.
Medium Term (One to Four Years): Identify and Empower Partners
Over President Obama's first term in office, success in Pakistan and Afghanistan should not be meas-ured solely by whether top al-Qaeda terrorists are eliminated or the Taliban is dealt a military setback in Afghanistan. Washington must also identify a range of partners among Afghan and Pakistani civi-lian and military institutions and empower them to assume moderating and stabilizing roles over the long haul. 11
By the end of this four-year period, Afghanistan's national security forces should be ready to as-sume a primary role in counterinsurgency operations. Over the same time frame, Washington should aim to develop far closer cooperation with the Pakistani military and intelligence services, including more extensive training and, where mutually acceptable, regular joint operations and extensive intel-ligence sharing. The United States should create the conditions for effective, long-term regional de-velopment programming and political outreach by investing in new U.S. personnel and facilities.
To shift Afghan counterinsurgency operations to an indigenous lead, and to enable intense, regu-lar cooperation with the Pakistani security and intelligence services, over the next four years the United States should undertake the following steps, most of which are consistent with, if not dictated by, the Obama AfPak strategy:
Accelerate and expand the training and equipping of Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police to create a force capable of bearing the bulk of national combat and policing duties;
Revamp mechanisms for U.S. military assistance to Pakistan to improve transparency and to elim-inate regular points of mutual irritation, such as the Coalition Support Funds program, while maintaining a U.S. commitment to generous budgetary support as a means to build trust;
Expand educational opportunities for Pakistani officers in U.S.-based programs, especially those geared toward counterinsurgency and counterterrorism;
– Build on existing "train the trainer" programs for the Pakistani Frontier Corps;
Seek opportunities for joint U.S.-Pakistan military and intelligence training missions outside Pa-kistan as a means to improve specialized counterterror skills and win trust (and with an eye toward joint operations down the road);
Offer training and assistance to Pakistan's provincial police forces, starting with major urban cen-ters, to promote reforms, reduce corruption, and improve law and order;
Engage in a quiet, high-level nuclear dialogue with Pakistan to build bilateral trust and seek new ways to safeguard its nuclear program.
To enable better cooperation with civilian political leaders in the region, over the next four years the United States should also undertake the following steps:
Use the occasion of Afghanistan's post–presidential election transition and subsequent parliamen-tary elections in 2010 to encourage political reforms that delegate greater authority to cabinet mi-nisters, parliamentarians, and provincial officials relative to the presidency as one means of in-creasing the number and quality of potential U.S. partners throughout the Afghan state;
Create additional civil-military units in Afghanistan similar to Provincial Reconstruction Teams to facilitate community and tribal outreach efforts (as part of a national reconciliation effort) and to improve the quality of subnational governance, especially the judiciary;
Increase diplomatic staffing levels in Pakistan and establish new sub-consular offices (and requisite security procedures) to facilitate political outreach within and beyond Pakistan's major cities;
Launch a cooperative initiative with Pakistan's military and civilian leadership to improve Islama-bad's national security decision-making process, starting with a dedicated exchange program and training curriculum for a small group of rising mid-career Pakistani army, intelligence, and foreign policy officers.
To promote sustainable economic development in Afghanistan and Pakistan, over the next four years the United States should do the following: 12
Build a more substantial USAID presence dedicated to long-term development assistance in Afghanistan, with the capacity and mandate to support and expand local, community-based devel-opment projects similar to the National Solidarity Program;
Increase USAID staffing and secure facilities in Pakistan to support local development initiatives in coordination with provincial and local authorities throughout the country, including the Fron-tier Corps and political agents in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas;
Follow through on pledges to provide Pakistan with sustained access to nonmilitary assistance, disbursed through mechanisms that are transparent and accountable to the Pakistani public;
Identify and implement a major, high-profile infrastructure project in Pakistan to demonstrate to Pakistan's populace the tangible benefits of U.S.-Pakistan partnership.
In its diplomatic efforts within and outside the region, over the next four years the United States should do the following:
Institute a regular, senior-level dialogue with China on Pakistan and Afghanistan as a means to leverage collective U.S.-China political, military, and economic influence in the region;
Accept a de facto two-tiered NATO involvement in Afghanistan as a means to improve the al-liance's efficiency in military operations while encouraging financial and other contributions from member states that cannot sustain military commitments;
Reconvene the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference (RECC) for Afghanistan (or a suc-cessor forum) to promote trade opportunities linking Central Asia to South and East Asia, and en-courage buy-in by other major regional actors, including Russia and China, as well as the private sector and international organizations such as the World Bank.
Long Term (Five to Ten Years or More): Build and Sustain Effective Institutions
Over the long run, the United States should anticipate continued involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but Washington's allocation of resources should also look far different than it does today. The United States will succeed only if more effective Pakistani and Afghan state institutions are built and sustained to counterbalance forces of extremism and militancy. During the next five to ten years, Washington should draw down U.S. combat forces in Afghanistan while continuing to provide mili-tary assistance, training, and logistical support along with close political partnership and extensive development programming. Over a similar time frame, the United States should aim to achieve broader and deeper cooperation with Pakistan's defense, security, and intelligence services, enabling extensive and sophisticated counterterror and counterinsurgency training, planning, and, where mu-tually agreeable, joint operations. In addition, the United States should be fully engaged in political outreach and economic development throughout Pakistan, helping to strengthen the state and civil society.
The Obama administration should move quickly to declare its long-term commitment to the re-gion as a means to shift expectations and strategic calculations in Kabul, Islamabad, and neighboring capitals. A new, transparent bilateral agreement for defense and cooperation should be negotiated with Kabul after Afghanistan's national elections. Washington should use this negotiation process to signal that, while it has every intention to end the Taliban-led insurgency, it does not seek any perma-nent military presence in the region.
13
In addition, over the five-to-ten-year time horizon, the United States should undertake the follow-ing steps:
Address the daunting challenge of the narcotics industry in Afghanistan by focusing on lasting solutions (alternative livelihoods, law enforcement and prosecutorial capacity, and the targeting and interdiction of traffickers), all of which must be built upon the foundations of effective state institutions;
Approach deep and seemingly intractable challenges to stability in Pakistan—such as the imbal-ance between civilian and military power, the dynastic nature of major political parties, and deep social and economic inequality—through serious, sustained U.S. support for a wide variety of edu-cational, social mobilization and reform efforts that will, at best, pay dividends only over a decade or longer;
Engage in a dialogue with top Pakistani military and civilian leaders about prospects and avenues for normalizing the nuclear program in ways that are not perceived to threaten Pakistan's security with respect to India;
Encourage rapprochement between India and Pakistan through quiet overtures and reiterate Washington's longstanding commitment to support or facilitate when and if necessary.
14
A Daunting Challenge
In its present formulation, the Obama administration's AfPak strategy is framed flexibly enough to permit a long-term, Pakistan-centered commitment to the region. But the White House's approach is now burdened by an Afghanistan-oriented military strategy, a rhetorical nod to tightly focused coun-terterror objectives, and tough-minded but potentially counterproductive plans for conditioning as-sistance to Pakistan. To preclude ambiguity and build sustainable domestic support for its agenda, the Obama administration should clarify that it will pursue sustained, comprehensive engagement in South Asia, with a heavy emphasis on improving cooperation with Pakistan through intense interac-tion and assistance, because this strategy offers the best prospect for long-term American security and regional stability.
Implementing such an ambitious program will be tremendously difficult. It may ultimately overtax Washington's diplomatic, financial, and military resources. Nor can there be any guarantee that even such a costly program will stave off the worst threats it is intended to address. Indeed, many critical dynamics in the region are to a significant degree outside America's capacity to control, no matter how hard it tries. That said, alternative strategies that focus more narrowly on the threats posed by al-Qaeda or by Afghanistan's Taliban insurgency may also fail to achieve their goals. More troubling, they may inspire policies that undermine stability in Pakistan or fail to direct adequate attention to the many sources of Pakistani instability situated outside the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan.
Under these difficult conditions, narrowing Washington's strategic ambition would represent a false economy, saving marginal U.S. resources in the near term but creating even greater long-term threats to U.S. interests as well as to regional and global security. Since 9/11, the United States has lurched from crisis to crisis in South Asia, putting out fires without investing in the future. The time has come to readjust the balance, to recognize that entrenched threats of this sort demand enduring and costly U.S. investments, and to commit forthrightly to meeting the daunting challenge in Pakis-tan and Afghanistan.
15
1. U.S. House of Representatives, 2009, PEACE Act of 2009, 111th Congress, 1st session, HR 1886.
2. "White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan," March 27, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf.
3. K. Alan Kronstadt, "Direct Overt U.S. Aid and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002–2009," Congressional Research Service, April 15, 2009; Amy Belasco, "The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11," Congressional Research Service, October 15, 2008, p.6.
Endnotes


 
 
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N A D E E M   M A L I K
Director Programme
AAJ TV
ISLAMABAD
00-92-321-5117511

nadeem.malik@hotmail.com 




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Senator Joseph Lieberman---Sen. John Kerry

Pakistan is in a moment of peril: Sen. John Kerry
WASHINGTON: US Sen. John Kerry says the Obama administration's plan for Pakistan "is not a real strategy."

"Pakistan is in a moment of peril," Kerry, the Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said in an interview with a US newspaper. "And I believe there is not in place yet an adequate policy or plan to deal with it."


 

Prepared Remarks by Senator Joseph Lieberman: "Afghanistan and Pakistan: A View from the Hill"

Author:
Joseph Lieberman

April 21, 2009
Thank you so much, Evan, for that gracious introduction. It is an honor to be here at the Council on Foreign Relations this afternoon.

As you know, the Council was founded nearly ninety years ago, in 1921, by a group of far-sighted leaders who recognized that the era in which America could remain safely disengaged from the rest of the world, protected by two great oceans, was over. This was by no means a popular position to take in the 1920s. On the contrary, after the bloodshed of the First World War, many Americans wanted nothing more than to withdraw behind our borders and pull up the drawbridge—putting in place protectionist economic policies, restrictions on immigration, and above all, avoiding any further entanglements abroad.

The founders of the Council stood athwart this isolationist tide and instead set out to build a new internationalist consensus in American foreign policy. In doing so, they invited Democrats and Republicans alike to join their ranks.

Today, preserving and expanding that bipartisan commitment to internationalism, here in Washington and throughout our country, remains a vitally important and sometimes challenging task—and it is especially relevant as we consider the future of our engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Since his Inauguration three months ago, President Obama has significantly expanded America's commitment to the security and stability of South Asia. After years of under-resourcing, the President has ordered the deployment of over 20,000 additional American troops to Afghanistan along with a dramatic increase in the number of civilian experts on the ground. He has also backed substantially greater aid to the region. And he has appointed one of our most accomplished and talented diplomats, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, as special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

There were some who warned that the American people—tired of war and worried about our problems here at home—would not support such an ambitious new international commitment. But instead of encountering resistance, the President's new strategy has been greeted with broad support from Democrats and Republicans in Congress, as well as from our allies abroad.

Part of the reason for this, I believe, is that, although the American people are understandably focused on the extraordinary economic crisis we now face, they understand the importance of Afghanistan and by extension Pakistan, and know that we cannot afford to repeat the mistakes of the past and turn our back on this region, as we did after the Soviet withdrawal. And they know that we were attacked from Afghanistan on 9/11, and will be again if we fail there. As President Obama himself rightly put it during last year's campaign, "As 9/11 showed us, the security of Afghanistan and America is shared."

At the same time, it is important to understand that the bipartisan consensus that now exists around our war effort in South Asia will probably be tested in the months ahead. As additional troops are deployed to Afghanistan, American casualties will rise, and things are likely to get worse there before they get better. Our commanders on the ground have requested additional forces beyond those authorized by the President, and these reinforcements are likely to be needed next year.

Despite these challenges, a long-term American commitment to Afghanistan and Pakistan is politically sustainable—if the President and all of us who support his policies in South Asia continue to make the case to the American people why they are so vital to our security here at home, and our values around the world.

The other key to the domestic political sustainability of our policy in Afghanistan is for it to succeed. The President has outlined a smart strategy and begun to provide the necessary resources. But now we need to make it work.

Unfortunately, our war effort continues to be hobbled by organizational incoherence. In Afghanistan today, we have a fragmented military command structure under NATO, an even more balkanized civilian effort, and no unified leadership between the two. This is no way to run a counterinsurgency—for in counterinsurgency, success depends upon bringing together all of the elements of our national power in a joint campaign plan. The current organizational incoherence also raises the risk that, even as we devote greater resources to this war effort, they will be spent ineffectively and wastefully.

The Obama administration seems to recognize this problem and has set out to solve it. In Afghanistan, for instance, General McKiernan has instituted a series of reforms that have begun to bring a greater degree of coherence to our military command structure. In addition, the British military has agreed to send an existing division headquarters to southern Afghanistan this fall to take charge of military operations in this critical theater, and that represents a huge improvement over NATO's past practice of staffing its regional headquarters in Afghanistan with ad hoc pick-up teams.

Still, much more sweeping changes are needed and soon. Given the near-doubling of American forces in Afghanistan this year, I think it is time to put in place a three-star corps headquarters in Kabul, to serve as an operational command for the war effort. This would replicate the successful command structure we have in Iraq, where—during the surge—General Odierno served as the three-star operational commander, responsible for running the day-to-day counterinsurgency, while General Petraeus served as the four-star strategic commander above him. It is too much to ask General McKiernan to do both these jobs in Afghanistan, where today, there is no operational headquarters to develop and coordinate the nationwide counterinsurgency campaign plan we need to defeat the insurgency.

Moreover, as we expand our civilian footprint in Afghanistan, we must also ensure that it is integrated, at all levels, with the military effort. The bureaucratic walls that have grown up between the U.S. Embassy and our military coalition need to be torn down quickly. Just a few years ago, the American ambassador and the coalition military commander worked in adjoining offices in the same building, and their staffs had in place a single nationwide civil-military campaign plan to defeat the insurgency. This needs to happen again, with General McKiernan and our new Ambassador, Karl Eikenberry.

Finally, it is very important that we forge an interagency process here in Washington that reinforces unity of effort in the field. Two years ago, the Bush administration made the wise decision to establish the position of Iraq and Afghanistan war czar at the National Security Council. That position now needs to be expanded to include Pakistan. It is critical that, as General Petraeus manages our regional military strategy and Ambassador Holbrooke, our regional diplomatic strategy, we have a single high-ranking person at the NSC, whose full-time job is managing the interagency process for these wars.

Let me now say a few words about the regional dimension of the challenge we face. Some have suggested that progress in Afghanistan is impossible as long as insurgent safe havens remain across the border in Pakistan. Others have gone further and questioned the strategic value of trying to succeed in Afghanistan at all, given that it is Pakistan—with its nuclear weapons, political instability, and al Qaeda sanctuary—that represents the greater threat to our national security.

I respectfully disagree on both counts. We cannot afford to fail in Pakistan, or in Afghanistan. These are two unique countries and peoples in one theater of conflict, but the conflict in each country is different and must be understood on its own terms.

In Pakistan, we have a vital national interest in helping our moderate allies combat the extremist groups that pose the single greatest threat to their national security, not just in the tribal region but throughout the country. This requires Pakistani leaders who will fight the militant groups throughout their territory, but who are also ready to break through the corruption and feudalism that has hobbled their country's development for so long, and that is creating a gap between the Pakistani people and their government that the extremists are now rushing in to exploit.

Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, on the other hand, will ultimately be won or lost among the Afghan people themselves, at the local level, not across the border in Pakistan. Although terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan unquestionably make our task in Afghanistan harder, we can go a long way toward "hardening" Afghanistan against these safe havens by providing enduring population security at the local level and building up effective Afghan-led institutions. Indeed, that is what we have done in Iraq, where militant infiltration from Syria and Iran is sharply down, not because of a political decision by these neighboring governments, but because of the progress made by our soldiers and our Iraqi allies on the ground inside Iraq, which has made the country much less permeable to malign interference from outside.

"Hardening" Afghanistan may also help change the geopolitical dynamic in the broader region in ways that will help combat extremism in Pakistan as well. Let me explain what I mean by this.

Until the late 1970s, Afghanistan was a poor but largely safe and stable developing country, with a government that carried out basic functions and was broadly viewed as legitimate by its people. In addition, Afghanistan had indigenous security institutions that were sufficiently strong to deter its neighbors from thinking that they, or their rivals, could take over the country. As a result, Afghanistan was treated as a kind of buffer state by the region.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 upended this equilibrium and ushered in a new regional dynamic, in which neighboring states fought for control of Afghanistan by sponsoring indigenous proxies there. In Pakistan, it was through this pattern of proxy warfare that linkages were forged between elements of the Pakistani security establishment, namely the ISI, and Pashtun extremist groups like the Haqqani network and the Taliban. And it is in part because of a fear that the United States will once again abandon Afghanistan, and that the cycle of full-blown proxy warfare will resume, that some in Pakistan have been reluctant to break with these groups, and instead continue to maintain ties with them, as part of a hedging strategy.

Our single best weapon to alter this calculation in Pakistan is to commit ourselves in Afghanistan, unambiguously and for the long-term, to help Afghans get their country back on its feet, and make clear that we will not permit a security and governance vacuum to emerge there again. Conversely, the more we hedge our bets in Afghanistan, the more the Pakistanis will hedge their bets too—in ways that will make our fight against extremism throughout the region monumentally more difficult.

In Afghanistan, therefore, what is needed is patient, resource-intensive, and system-wide support to build up Afghan governing institutions, both top-down and bottom-up.

What is needed is a redoubling of our support for proven Afghan success stories, such as the National Solidarity Program, which empowers Afghan communities at the village level by offering them grants to design and implement their own development projects.

What is needed is more direct investment in the Afghan people, with a major scholarship program to bring thousands of Afghans students and professionals to the United States and other coalition countries every year—much as we did with South Korea in the 1950s, when that country was still mired in poverty.

And, most important of all, what is needed is an immediate commitment to a significant expansion in the end strength of the Afghan National Security Forces, in particular the Afghan National Army. In September of last year, the Bush administration belatedly agreed to double the Afghan army to 134,000 soldiers by 2011—a goal that the Obama administration has since reaffirmed. Unfortunately, this is still too little, too late.

No less than a total Afghan security force of 425,000 to 450,000 is needed, including an Afghan National Army that is at least 250,000 strong. It is only when Afghan forces reach those numbers that the ratio of security personnel to population will achieve the level necessary for success in counterinsurgency.

Some have suggested that we should first reach our goal of 134,000 soldiers by 2011, and then reassess whether further growth is needed. This would be a grave mistake in my view and a perpetuation of the Bush administration's incrementalist approach in Afghanistan. Given the country's population, size, geography, and security environment, it is apparent that a 134,000-strong army will be insufficient to the country's needs. There is nothing to be gained from postponing a recognition of this reality. On the contrary, given how long it takes to recruit, train, equip, and mentor additional Afghan forces, President Obama and our allies need to commit now to a significant expansion in the Afghan National Security Forces, in order to begin reaping the benefit of a larger Afghan army by the end of his first term.

To be clear, our core national interest in Afghanistan is to prevent that country from once again becoming a terrorist safe haven. But the only realistic way to prevent that from happening is through the emergence of a stable and legitimate political order in Afghanistan, backed by capable indigenous security forces. That is our goal in Afghanistan, and it is consistent with our national values as well as our national security. But we cannot get from here to there without a significant and sustained American commitment. Just as in Iraq, there is no shortcut to success, no clever "middle way" that allows us to achieve more by doing less, no strictly "military" solution.

History and our own experience tell us that Afghanistan is not doomed to be an ungovernable graveyard of empires. In the first place, poll after poll show that Afghans themselves want a functioning, uncorrupt government that provides basic services and keeps them safe, and that they overwhelmingly reject the Taliban. We have seen how, when we work in partnership with the Afghans, significant progress is possible.

We should also acknowledge that, although we face many problems in Afghanistan today, none of them are because of the good things we have already helped Afghanistan achieve since 2001. None are because we have made it possible for five million Afghan children, boys and girls, to go to school, or because child mortality has dropped 25 percent since we overthrew the Taliban in 2001, or because Afghan men and women have been able to vote in their country's first free and fair elections in history.

On the contrary, the reason we have not lost in Afghanistan—despite our many missteps—is because our country and our values still inspire hope of a better life for millions of ordinary Afghans, and because we have already delivered it to so many of them. And the reason we can defeat the extremists in Afghanistan is because they have not.

Ultimately, the global war with Islamist extremists is an ideological war. Military strength is a necessary but, by itself, insufficient basis for victory. We need to help the Afghan people establish security first, but then it is as critical to help them establish a legitimate and lasting political order that makes freedom and opportunity possible.

That, then, is the real opportunity and objective that is ours to seize: to make Afghanistan into a quagmire—not for America, but for al Qaeda and its extremist allies.

Thank you.

 
 
 
-----------------------------------------------------------
N A D E E M   M A L I K
Director Programme
AAJ TV
ISLAMABAD
00-92-321-5117511

nadeem.malik@hotmail.com 




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Passport of Founder of Pakistan, Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah


Attached is the scanned copy of Passport of Founder of Pakistan, Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah.



 
 


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NADEEM MALIK LIVE

NADEEM MALIK LIVE

Nadeem Malik Live is the flagship current affairs programme of Pakistan. The programme gives independent news analysis of the key events shaping future of Pakistan. A fast paced, well rounded programme covers almost every aspect, which should be a core element of a current affairs programme. Discussion with the most influential personalities in the federal capital and other leading lights of the country provides something to audience to help them come out with their own hard hitting opinions.

http://youtube.com/NadeemMalikLive